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This dissertation consists of three essays that examine choices and preferences at
the individual, household and community levels. The first chapter, “Labor Mar-
ket Outcomes with Heterogeneous Preferences and Search Frictions: The Case
of Chinese Migrant and Urban Workers”, examines decision-making at the indi-
vidual level. Neither Rosen’s classical compensating differential model nor newly
developed search models could explain the particular pattern of wage and job
characteristics distributions in China, where migrant and urban workers coexist
and dominate different sectors. In the theoretical part of this paper, I expand
the model by Lang and Majumdar (2003) to show that wages need not be com-
pensating when preferences are heterogeneous, and that the group more averse to
undesirable working conditions need not earn less when reservation utilities differ
and/or when employers practice taste-based discrimination. In the empirical part,
I substantiate the assumption in my theoretical modeling that urban workers are
more averse to undesirable working conditions using a discrete choice experiment,
where 225 workers in China made hypothetical choices between jobs characterized
by different wage levels and working conditions. I backed out preference parame-
ters and willingness to accept measures for job attributes. I find that consistent
with my assumption, urban workers need to be compensated more to accept out-
door jobs and jobs in second line cities. I also find that migrant workers have more
dispersed preferences that vary with personal characteristics such as gender and
education.
The second chapter,“Where Did the Money and Time go? De-mystifying the
Negative impact of Remittances on Human Capital Investment in the Kyrgyz Re-
public”, examines how households allocation of financial and labor resources affects
human capital formation in the Kyrgyz Republic. International migration and re-
mittances from overseas may encourage human capital investment and improve
educational outcomes in developing countries. Empirical studies, however, have
shown mixed evidence. In our study, we focus on the case of Kyrgyz Republic,
one of the largest remittances-receiving countries in Asia. I used a 5-year panel
dataset that tracks the same 3,000 households and 8,000 individuals in the country
to examine the impact of remittances on both household educational expenditure
and attendance rate of school age children. I used instrumental variables and fixed-
effects regressions to correct for potential selection bias. I find that remittances
have a negative impact on human capital formation – namely both educational ex-
penditure and school attendance rate are lower for households that receive a higher
amount of remittances. To explore the possible channels of the negative effects,
I further regressed itemized household expenditures and the time use pattern of
school-age children on remittances. I find that the negative effects can at least be
partly attributed to increased expenditure on durable goods and increased hours
of child labor on farm work as a compensation for adult labor insufficiency in-
duced by out-migration. My finding calls for the monitoring of farm labor hours of
school-age children. Moreover, implementation and scaling up of financial literacy
programs that help parents balance short-term expenditures (durable goods) and
long-term investments (education, health) can be beneficial. In addition, targeted
investment to improve the quality of education services in the country may help
increase perceived return to schooling and may therefore improve human capital
investment.
The final chapter,“Kinship, Social Preferences and Voting in Rural China: A
Lab-in-the-Field Experiment”, goes beyond individuals and households to exam-
ine communities and how social preferences and social network can affect collective
decision-making. Economists have come to understand that human choices are not
only driven by self-interest but also “social preferences” – a person’s concern over
resources allocated to other people. Moreover, such preferences may be affected
by the environment in which such choices are made, especially social networks and
social pressure. I performed a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural China, where I
recruited 162 Chinese farmers to vote in 7 variants of allocation games in randomly
assigned groups and with real-world social contacts, with and without pressure.
I find that social network and social pressure combined have significant yet het-
erogeneous effects on social preferences. The source of heterogeneity includes the
assignment with in-group or out-group members, membership in dominant lin-
eages, individual characteristics as defined by age and gender, and the degree of
kinship between individuals within a social group. My study not only provides
empirical evidence for the social preference theories but also urges policy makers
to be careful in choosing an appropriate voting method. In addition, constraining
the power of dominant lineage and having better educated villagers more involved
in village affairs could be welfare improving.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The heart of the standard or rational model of economics is the idea that
consumers seek to maximize innate, stable preferences over the quantities and at-
tributes of the commodities they consume 1. Along with the progress in choice the-
ories, empirical techniques for the estimation of preference parameters have evolved
from cross-sectional regressions using market-level or national-accounts-level data
in the 1960s, to hedonic models using individual-level data, to the development
of random-utility discrete-choice framework (McFadden 1968, 1976, 1978; Train
2003).
While choice analysis and preference estimation saw rapid growth in model-
ing consumer decisions and marketing strategies, its application in Development
Economics, Labor Economics, and Public Economics has been scarce. However, it
must be acknowledged that individuals, households, and communities in fact do
have preferences over attributes of consumer goods as well as other goods, for ex-
ample hedonic aspects of jobs, the value of education, and the fairness of resource
allocation within a society. Just as consumer preference lies at the core of product
development and market growth, preferences and choices over education and social
goods are at the core of social development, since they can be both the causes and
the consequences of inequality.
This dissertation therefore aims to examine how choices at the individual,
household and community levels are shaped by preferences as well as the social
context in which the decisions are made, and how they contribute to a variety of
issues faced by developing countries in Asia, for example labor market inequality,
1McFadden, D. (2001). Economic choices. American economic review, 91(3), 351-378.
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under-investment in human capital, and under-provision of rural public goods.
The first chapter, “Labor Market Outcomes with Heterogeneous Preferences and
Search Frictions: The Case of Chinese Migrant and Urban Workers”, examines
decision-making at the individual level. The study originates from my observation
from the Chinese labor market where white-collar jobs tend to be dominated by
urban workers whereas blue-collar jobs with undesirable working conditions are
usually undertaken by migrant workers. Yet migrant workers are paid less than
urban workers, which is contradictory to Rosens classical compensating differen-
tials model. In the theoretical part of my paper, I developed a search model with
market frictions to show that wages need not be compensating when preferences
are heterogeneous, and that the group more averse to undesirable working condi-
tions need not earn less when reservation utilities differ and/or when employers
practice taste-based discrimination. In the empirical part, I substantiated the as-
sumption that urban workers are more averse to undesirable working conditions
using a Discrete Choice Experiment, where I recruited 225 workers in China to
make hypothetical choices between jobs characterized by different wage levels and
working conditions. I backed out preference parameters and willingness-to-accept
(WTA) measures for job attributes using multinomial logit and mixed logit regres-
sions, both in the preference space and in the willingness-to-pay space. I find that
consistent with my assumption, urban workers need to be compensated more to
accept outdoor jobs and jobs in second-line cities. I also find that migrant workers
have more dispersed preferences that vary with personal characteristics such as
gender and education. The policy implication is that the implementation of labor
contract law and workplace safety regulations may have unintended effects, in that
it may induce urban workers into the market and crowd out migrant workers.
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The second chapter focuses on households as decision makers. “Where Did the
Money and Time go? De-mystifying the Negative impact of Remittances on Human
Capital Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic”, was developed during my internship
with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the summer of 2018. We examine
how households allocation of financial and labor resources affects human capital
formation in the Kyrgyz Republic. It is generally believed that international mi-
gration and remittances from overseas encourage human capital investment and
improve educational outcomes in developing countries. Empirical studies, how-
ever, have shown mixed evidence some positive, some negative, some have shown
zero effects. In our study, we focus on the case of Kyrgyz Republic, one of the
largest remittances-receiving countries in Asia. We used a 5-year panel dataset
that tracks the same 3,000 households and 8,000 individuals in the country to ex-
amine the impact of remittances on both household educational expenditure and
attendance rate of school age children. We used instrumental variables and fixed-
effects regressions to correct for potential selection bias. We find that remittances
have a negative impact on human capital formation namely both educational ex-
penditure and school attendance rate are lower for households that receive a higher
amount of remittances. To explore the possible channels of the negative effects,
we further regressed itemized household expenditures and the time use pattern of
school-age children on remittances. We find that the negative effects can at least be
partly attributed to increased expenditure on durable goods and increased hours
of child labor on farm work as a compensation for adult labor insufficiency in-
duced by out-migration. Our finding calls for the need for monitoring farm labor
hours of school-age children. Implementation and scaling up of financial literacy
programs that that help parents balance short-term expenditures (durable goods)
and long-term investments (education, health) can be beneficial.
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The final chapter goes beyond individuals and households to examine commu-
nities and how social preferences and social network can affect collective decision-
making.“Kinship, Social Preferences and Voting in Rural China: A Lab-in-the-
Field Experiment”, is my job market paper. It is motivated by the policy change
in rural China where public goods provision is no longer determined by the gov-
ernment but has to be voted by villagers. The implementation, however, has
encountered many difficulties due to the unique social network structure where
villages are shaped by lineages with conflicting interests and heterogeneous power.
To understand how network structure and peer pressure affect villagers choices
and behaviors in public goods voting, I performed a lab-in-the-field experiment in
rural China, where I recruited 162 Chinese farmers along with their social contacts
to vote in 7 variants of allocation games. The payoff structure reflects trade-offs
among self-interest, efficiency, and the equality of allocation. The experiment fol-
lows a 2-by-2 design. On one dimension, I introduced “social network treatment
by making the control group vote in randomly assigned 3-person groups while the
treatment group votes in 3-person groups consisting one pair of social contacts plus
one stranger. On the “social pressure dimension, the control group is assured that
their votes will not be revealed at any point whereas the treatment group is in-
formed beforehand that their votes will be made public to their group members at
the end of the experiment. I used a multinomial logit model to back out preference
parameters. I have three findings. First of all, I find that social network and social
pressure combined have significant effects on social preferences. In particular, it
makes the pairs more concerned with in-group gains at the cost of the out-group
member. Secondly, social preference patterns vary with personal characteristics.
For example, female subjects are more averse to inequality whereas more educated
subjects care more about efficiency. Thirdly, the heterogeneity in preferences can
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also be explained by network characteristics. Namely, pairs with closer social re-
lationships tend to focus more on within-group gains under pressure. My study
not only rectifies the drawbacks of lab experiments in validating social preference
theories but also has policy implications. In the setting of public goods referenda,
policy makers need to choose appropriate voting methods, for example secret bal-
lot instead of show of hands. Moreover, having female and more educated villagers
more involved in village affairs may help improve public goods voting outcomes in
rural China.
Although the entire dissertation falls into the broad area of Development Eco-
nomics, the three chapters focus on Labor Economics, Labor/Education Eco-
nomics, and Social/Public Economics respectively. In terms of methodology, the
first chapter employs a combination of theoretical modeling and discrete choice
experiment (DCE), the second chapter uses a more traditional fixed-effects panel
regression with instrumental variables approach, whereas the third chapter is an
application of lab-in-the-field experiment. In terms of geographical coverage, the
first and third chapters focus on rural China while the second chapter examines
the Kyrgyz Republic. The broad coverage of fields and techniques serves as an
additional evidence that choices and preferences matter in multiple aspects of hu-
man existence and can be approached from multiple perspectives. The impetus
for all the above endeavors, however, is my desire to understand why people make
the choices they make, and how such choices reflect the human conditions they are
faced with, and how such choices in turn contribute to the evolution of the human
society.
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CHAPTER 2
LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES WITH HETEROGENEOUS
PREFERENCES AND SEARCH FRICTIONS: THE CASE OF
CHINESE MIGRANT AND URBAN WORKERS
Abstract
Neither Rosens classical compensating differential model nor newly developed
search models could explain the particular pattern of wage and job characteristics
distributions in China, where migrant and urban workers coexist and dominate
different sectors. In the theoretical part of this paper, I expand the model by Lang
and Majumdar (2003) to show that wages need not be compensating when pref-
erences are heterogeneous, and that the group more averse to undesirable working
conditions need not earn less when reservation utilities differ and/or when employ-
ers practice taste-based discrimination. In the empirical part, I substantiate the
assumption in my theoretical modeling that urban workers are more averse to un-
desirable working conditions using a discrete choice experiment, where 225 workers
in China made hypothetical choices between jobs characterized by different wage
levels and working conditions. I backed out preference parameters and willingness
to accept measures for job attributes. I find that consistent with my assumption,
urban workers need to be compensated more to accept outdoor jobs and jobs in
second line cities. I also find that migrant workers have more dispersed preferences
that vary with personal characteristics such as gender and education.
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2.1 Introduction
The relationship between wage and non-pecuniary job characteristics such as work-
ing hours, working condition, contract and insurance offers has been explored theo-
retically and tested empirically for decades. The baseline theoretical model can be
dated back to 1974, where Rosens equalizing differential, or compensating differ-
ential model, predicts that jobs offering unfavorable working conditions must pay
premiums to attract workers. This prediction, however, is contradicted by numer-
ous empirical tests1. Lang and Majumdar (2003) showed that the contradiction is
likely to be due to the competitive market assumption. They incorporated search
frictions into the model to show that in the presence of search frictions, the equi-
librium wages need not be compensating. They then extend the model to allow for
heterogeneous preferences and showed that when firms can make type-contingent
offers, there will be wage discrimination against the group that is more averse to
unattractive job characteristics. This prediction, however, is not consistent with
observations in labor markets where multiple types of workers coexist. The most
eminent case is China, where rural migrants often take jobs with undesirable char-
acteristics that urban workers are unwilling to take (Zhao 2000; West and Zhao
2000; Meng 2000; Meng and Manning 2010). For example, according to a national
representative survey of over 5000 urban and migrant workers in 2009 (RUMiC),
12.8% of urban workers and 77.7% of migrant workers are employed in blue collar
positions, yet migrant workers not only earn less in terms of average monthly wage
1Lucas (1977) use a cross-sectional data source to estimate how wages varied with job char-
acteristics. Although some of the coefficients for other job characteristics are of the expected
sign, many others take exactly different signs. For example, jobs requiring physical strength are
generally associated with lower wages than sedentary ones. Browns (1980) use a panel data anal-
ysis to exclude individual level unobservables, but still obtained many wrong-signed estimates
relative to what is predicted by the theory. He concludes that the hypothesis that wrong signs
in previous studies was due to the omission of important dimensions of worker quality was not
supported by the data.
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but also have lower access to insurance and fringe benefits compared to urban work-
ers (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Our more up-to-date, albeit less geographically
representative survey in 2017 in Shandong Province, reveals similar patterns (Fig-
ure 2.3). The average monthly wage for migrant workers in our sample is 6330.86
RMB, which is 10,000 RMB lower than their urban counterparts. Meanwhile, mi-
grant workers face significantly worse working conditions (longer working hours
and tougher working environment) and have lower rate of contract and insurance
compared to urban workers.
A by sector comparison from our recent survey (Figure 2.4) offers more insights.
In both white-collar and blue-collar jobs, migrant workers face significantly worse
working conditions – longer hours, more dirty environment, less rate of contract
and insurance coverage. Wage-wise, however, migrant workers on average earn
significantly less in white-collar jobs and significantly more in blue-collar jobs.
Figure 2.1: Wage and Working Conditions : Urban Workers
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Figure 2.2: Wage and Working Conditions : Migrant Workers
Figure 2.3: Migrant-Urban Comparison: Wage and Working Conditions
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Figure 2.4: By Sector Comparison: Wage and Working Conditions
Another interesting observation in China is that the unemployment rate among
urban workers is substantially higher. In fact, in recent years urban youths non-
participation has become such a social problem that an abbreviation is created
–“NEET” (Not currently engaged in Employment, Education or Training). The
unemployment rate for migrants in the RUMiC 2009 sample was 1%, while for their
urban counterparts was 37%. Our recent survey, although less representative, offers
a similar pattern. All the migrants we interviewed are currently employed, while
7% of the urban workers are unemployed.
Figure 2.5: By Sector Comparison: Employment Rate
Therefore, the above evidence from China contradicts both Rosen and Lang
& Majumdar’s predictions. In the theoretical part of this paper, we employ and
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extend Lang and Majumdars model to explain the unemployment rate gap be-
tween urban and migrant workers in China. We also extend their model to show
that when both reservation utility and aversion to undesirable job characteristics
differ, the group that is less averse to undesirable working conditions could be paid
less. Last but not least, we explore the impact of taste-based discrimination – ei-
ther when both sectors practice taste-based discrimination or only the white-collar
sector discriminates against migrant workers – on labor market outcomes of both
populations. In the empirical part, we conduct a discrete choice experiment (DCE)
with migrant workers and urban workers in China to back out preference parame-
ters for each population. This allows us to robustly test preference heterogeneity
and calculate willingness to accept (WTA) measures of each group. This helps us
substantiate the assumption in the theoretical model that urban workers are more
averse to undesirable working conditions than migrant workers.
This study contributes to the existing literature by modifying Lang and Ma-
jumdars model to explain the empirical reality in the labor markets of many de-
veloping countries. Our discrete choice experiment contributes to the empirical
labor economics literature by isolating the effect of preferences from market con-
straints, which allows us to robustly estimate preference parameters and willingness
to accept measures. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 re-
views existing literature both in theoretical modeling and empirical estimation.
In Section 2.3 we extend Lang and Majumdars model to explain the wage and
unemployment gaps and incorporate taste-based discrimination into the model. In
Section 2.4 we present the design and results of our discrete choice experiment
(DCE) in China. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Theoretical Modeling of Compensating Differentials
Labor market participation, or working, can no longer be viewed as merely a means
to earning money and feeding oneself. Jobs must be viewed multidimensionally,
where non-pecuniary characteristics such as working hours, working conditions,
locations, contract and insurance offers, are as important as monetary payoffs.
Workers choose jobs based on not only wage offers but also the consumption values
of the jobs, thereby generating an implicit market for job characteristics. Firms
must balance the prospect of hiring and the costs to improve attractiveness of job
offers. The market equilibrium and the wage and welfare distributions resulting
from the above process are of great interest to labor economists.
Rosens (1974, 1986) equalizing differential, or compensating differential model,
offers a baseline analysis. When labor market is competitive, jobs that offer favor-
able working conditions attract labor at lower than average wages, whereas jobs
offering unfavorable working conditions must pay premiums to attract workers. If
two jobs, one clean and one dirty, is offered, then the market must only observe
two wages, with the difference W1-W0 just enough to compensate the marginal
worker to make her indifferent between choosing the two jobs.
The compensating differential, however, is hardly supported by empirical works.
Lucas (1977) use a cross-sectional data source to estimate how wages varied with
job characteristics. Although some of the coefficients for other job characteristics
are of the expected sign, many others take exactly different signs. For example,
jobs requiring physical strength are generally associated with lower wages than
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sedentary ones. Browns (1980) use a panel data analysis to exclude individual
level unobservables, but still obtained many wrong-signed estimates relative to
what is predicted by the theory. He concludes that the hypothesis that wrong
signs in previous studies was due to the omission of important dimensions of worker
quality was not supported by the data.
The contradiction between theory and data is very likely to be because the
assumption of competitive market in Rosens model is not realistic. Lang and
Majumdar (2003) incorporated search frictions into the model to show that in the
presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not
show evidence of compensating wage differentials. They then extend the model
to allow for two types of workers with different preferences for non-pecuniary job
characteristics and conclude that when firms can make type-contingent offers, there
will be wage discrimination against the group that is more averse to unattractive
job characteristics. Namely, if urban workers are more averse to dirty work than
migrant workers, then urban workers will on average earn less than migrant workers
in both clean and dirty jobs.
2.2.2 Wage Distributions and Occupational Segregation in
China
The urban labor market in China in the past decade has witnessed a sharp increase
in the inflow of migrant workers from rural area. From the late 1990s, the number
of rural migrants increased by more than 100 million and another 300 million inflow
is expected for the next few decades. An interesting phenomenon is that China’s
rural migrants often take jobs which urban workers are unwilling to take (Zhao
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2000; West and Zhao 2000; Meng 2000; Meng and Manning 2010). It is estimated
that in 2011, over 89 percent of migrant workers are employed as unskilled workers
in blue-collar jobs (construction, manufacturing, etc.), while only 40 percent of
urban workers take these jobs (Meng 2012). Blue-collar jobs in urban China are
characterized by low wage, long working hours, undesirable working conditions,
and inaccessibility to contract and social insurance. For example, the average
monthly wage of migrant workers in 2009 is 1,591 RMB, 400 RMB lower than
their urban counterparts, although they on average work 1,100 hours per year
more than urban workers . It is also reported that as of 2010, the proportion
of migrant workers with access to unemployment insurance is 13.5%, while the
proportion for workers with urban hukou is 66%. The proportion of migrants with
access to urban health insurance is 20% in 2010, while for urban hukou workers it
is 87% (Frijters, Gregory, and Meng 2015).
One can conjecture that such occupational exclusion is due to the difference
in skill distribution, namely urban residents are almost exclusively skilled labors
and are fully absorbed by white-collar jobs. A contradiction, however, is that
the unemployment rate among urban hukou workers is substantially high. The
unemployment rate for migrants in 2009 was 6%, while for their urban hukou
counterparts in the same cities it was 37% (Meng 2012). This implies that 37% of
urban residents would rather stay at home and live off their unemployment benefits
than take on blue collar jobs. In fact, urban youths non-participation has become so
prominent a phenomenon that an abbreviation is created – ”NEET” (Not currently
engaged in Employment, Education or Training). It is therefore doubtful that
the occupational exclusion between the migrants and urban workers can be fully
explained by skill distribution and discrimination differences in preferences must
have been playing an important part in sorting and selection.
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On the policy side, the Chinese government has implemented multiple policies
to improve the welfare of migrant workers. In 2008, China introduced a new La-
bor Contract Law (LCL) to protect workers rights. The majority of scholars that
examined the impact of the law (Cheng et al., 2015; Cui et al., 2013; Gallagher et
al., 2014; Li & Freeman, 2015, Meng, 2017) found positive effects on labor market
outcomes such as wages, working hours, and other work related benefits. Others
find that it reduced labor market flexibility and pushed up wages and labor costs
due to the macro-economic downturn in recent years (Luo, 2015). While the LCL
requires employers to specify working conditions in the written contract, it does not
provide penalty for employers who do not pay the insurance premium. In recent
years, the government has been contemplating to establish a nationwide unified
social security account system that makes workers social insurance accounts trans-
ferable from one locality to another (Li, 2008). Predicting the potential impact of
this new policy on the welfare of migrants and urban workers will therefore offer
valuable policy insights.
Such policy evaluations and simulations can hardly be achieved using reduced
form approaches. One widely used approach in the Chinese labor literature is hedo-
nic regression using cross-sectional and longitudinal data (Kong and Wang 2012,
2014), building on the theoretical framework of equalizing differences in Rosen
(1974) and Rosen (1986). However, estimates from this approach are unstable to
adding person or workplace controls and are often wrong-signed due to the fact
that individuals self-select into jobs that have certain attributes correlated with
wage levels, as well as measurement error and the presence of search frictions in
the labor market (Hwang et al., 1998; Lang and Majumdar, 2004; Bonhomme and
Jolivet, 2009). Additionally, reduced-form parameters are only combinations of
primitive parameters and are of little use in performing counterfactual analysis
15
and policy simulations. Our study therefore contributes to this literature by pro-
viding a more accurate and unbiased estimation of migrants and urban workers
valuations for written contracts, insurance, and workplace safety. Since the new
policies, once implemented, will be available to both migrants and urban work-
ers, we use their valuations to simulate how the two populations would respond
to the new policies and predict how the employment share of each group in each
occupation would change.
2.2.3 Discrete Choice Experiments and Preference Param-
eters
Isolating the effects of preferential choices and constraints on occupational exclu-
sion has always been a challenging task in labor economics (Altonji and Blank,
1999). Labor economists who studied occupational segregation by gender, for ex-
ample, disagree on whether differences in job characteristics between the jobs held
by men and women should be counted as constraints that women face in the labor
market or as an indication of differential tastes by women for the jobs that they
want to hold (flexibility for example). It is also argued that group differences in
pre-labor market human capital investment and in non-labor market activities may
lead to differences in comparative advantage across occupations. Meng (2012) uses
a linear probability regression to predict whether an individual has a white-collar
or blue-collar job and finds that after controlling for all observable individual and
market characteristics, migrants are still around 16 to 24 percent less likely to have
a white-collar job. This indicates that over and above their attribute differences
there is still a great portion of unexplained factors that contributes to the differ-
ence in occupational choices. In addition, the reduced form approach that Meng
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employs does not take self-selection into participation into account and is likely
to yield biased estimates. Unfortunately, although structural estimation (Adda
et al 2017) and experiments (Benjamin et al 2010, Flory et al. 2014) have been
widely applied to the study preferential differences by gender and race, efforts to
comparing preferential choices by migrants and urban workers in China have been
scarce, if not non-existing.
Eliciting stated preference (SP) with choice experiments has been widely used
in the analyses of consumer choices (cars, transportation modes, health care etc.).
It is not until recent years that labor economists start to employ this approach.
Eriksson and Kristensen (2014), for example, use a vignette method to elicit WTP
for various job amenities and fringe benefits in an internet sample of Dutch respon-
dents. Wiswall and Zafar (2016) use a stated preference approach to study how
undergraduate students value job characteristics such as availability of part-time
work and potential for promotion in hypothetical future jobs. Mas and Pallais
(2017) use a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national
call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work ar-
rangements such as flexible working hours and working from home. The advantage
of these approaches is that they robustly identify preferences for various job at-
tributes, free from omitted variable bias and free from considering the equilibrium
matching of workers to jobs (Wiswall and Zafar, 2016). The disadvantage to the
approach is that it is unclear to what extent responses to hypothetical questions
are accurate and approximate behavior in a market setting. This concern has led to
a large literature probing hypothetical bias in the context of contingent valuation
surveys (see e.g., List and Shogren, 1998).
The current study is to our knowledge the first attempt to perform choice ex-
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periment in the Chinese labor market. We conduct a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) with migrant workers and urban hukou workers in China to robustly esti-
mate and directly compare parameters that characterize preferences among these
two populations.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
We start our analysis with a theoretical model, where we show that preference
parameters play a key role in determining wage distribution and unemployment
incidences. We omit the simplified homogeneous workers part in Lang and Ma-
jumdar’s (2003) and start with two types of workers (Migrant and Urban) with
heterogeneous preferences both searching for jobs on a market with frictions.
2.3.1 Firm and Profit Function
Each job offer has two dimensions: Salary S and working condition h, with higher
h indicating worse working condition. Final product Q(h) is increasing in h with
price normalized to 1. Firms incur a cost C(h) to improve working condition and
C ′(h) < 0. Firm’s profit function is therefore
pi = Q(h)− S − C(h)
2.3.2 Worker and Utility Function
There are x types of workers. For now we assume x = 2: urban (U) and rural
(R). Workers differ only in Hukou status and are equally productive. They both
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like higher wage (∂U/∂S > 0) and dislike bad working conditions (∂U/∂h < 0),
but to different extents. For now we assume urban workers are more averse to bad
working conditions compared to rural migrants – an assumption that will be tested
with a choice experiment. Utility function is assumed to be additively separable
in wage and working condition, :
Ux(S, h) = Φ(S)− βx · h j = U,R
βU > βR > 0
where Φ′(S) > 0 and Φ′′(S) < 0. We also assume that compared to rural migrants,
urban workers have higher reservation utility. That is
U rU > U
r
R > 0
2.3.3 Market Frictions Equilibrium without Taste-based
Discrimination
We start out with a competitive labor market with search frictions where employers
do not practice taste-based discrimination. The number of firms with job vacancies
for type x workers is Mx. The number of type x workers looking for jobs is
Nx. The vacancy-worker ratio λx =
Mx
Nx
measures market tightness and follows
a Poisson distribution. In this section we assume that Nx is large. Each firm
decides independently whether or not to make an offer, and how best to offer
it. We assume that firms are aware of the Hukou status of the workers and can
make type-contingent offers. Making an offer will incur a fixed cost K > 0. Each
worker chooses among all offers he receives the one that gives him the highest
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utility (which has to be no lower than his reservation utility). Since offer arrival is
random, some workers receive zero offers and will be unemployed. Similarly, some
firms’ offers will be turned down and their vacancies will remain unfilled.
Firms face the trade-off between making a better offer to increase the proba-
bility of its offer being accepted, and the fact that better offers lower profit. Here
a firm’s mixed strategy is a probability distributions over all offer bundles (S, h)
and a probability of making no offer. The firm’s expected profit is
Ex(pi) = Px(Ux(S, h))(Q(h)− Sx − C(h))−K
where Px(·) is the probability of the offer being accepted by a type x = U,R worker.
Since the worker chooses the offer that gives him the highest utility, only utility
ranking matters. The following two claims are quoted from Lang and Majumdar
(2003) without proving.
Claim 1: In any equilibrium, the offer distribution must be continuous, have
support [U rx , U
max
x ], and have no mass points.
Claim 2: Define p˜ix(a) = max{S,h:Ux(S,h)=a}Q(h) − S − C(h), and the utility
level Umaxx by p˜ix(U
max
x ) = K, then if e
−λx p˜ix(U rx) < K, all offers in the support of
any equilibrium distribution must make zero expected profit. All offers that are
outside the support must make non-positive expected profit.
Intuitively, Claim 1 establishes a continuous distribution bounded from below
by the reservation utilities of each group (since any offer lower than reservation
utility will not be accepted) and from above by the maximum utility that each
group can achieve (since firms will not make an offer that generates negative profit).
p˜ix(a) in Claim 2 establishes the most profitable way to offer a bundle of salary
S and working condition h that ensures Ux(S, h) = a. Under mild concavity
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conditions 2, the bundle of (S, h) offer that ensures Ux(·) = a is unique. Similarly,
Umaxx defines the maximum achievable utility for type x worker when firms make
zero expected profit.
Employment Incidences
For simplicity, instead of taking h as a continuum of working conditions, we assume
for now that firms can only offer one of the two types of working conditions: Blue-
collar (h = 1) or White-collar (h = 0). Claim 3 is cited from Lang and Majumdar
(2003) without proof.
Claim 3: If dirty jobs are more profitable when the lowest possible wages are
paid:
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rx + βx) > Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U rx)
then the lowest utility offer for group x specifies a dirty job; If workers prefer clean
jobs when the highest possible wages are paid:
Φ(Q(0)− C(0)−K) > Φ(Q(1)− C(1)−K)− βx
then the highest utility offer for group x specifies a clean job; If both conditions
are met, then all offers above some cut-off utility level U∗x specify that h = 0 and
all offers below U∗x specify that h = 1. U
∗
x is given by the equation:
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗x + βx) = Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗x)
U∗x is non-decreasing with respect to [Q(1)−C(1)]− [Q(0)−C(0)], and U∗R > U∗U .
The two conditions ensure that both blue-collar and white-collar jobs exist in
equilibrium.
2UsQ
′′(h) + Uhh + 2UShQ′(h) + USS(Q′(h))2 < 0, which is satisfied, for example, when both
the utility funchion Ux(·) and the profit function Q(h)− C(h)− S are concave
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Proposition 1: Unemployment rate for urban workers is higher.
Proof: According to Claims 1& 2, the equilibrium with market frictions must
involve mixed strategies and firms must make zero expected profit. Namely,
Px(Ux(S, h)) =
K
Q(h)− C(h)− Sx
=
K
Q(h)− C(h)− Φ−1(Ux + βx · h)
Px(U
r
x), namely the cumulative density of utility offer measured at reservation
utility, gives the unemployment rate of each group. According to Claim 3, the
lowest utility offers come from blue-collar jobs (h = 1), we only need to look at
the lower end of the blue-collar offers to compare unemployment rate:
PR(U
r
R(S, 1)) ≡
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
<
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
≡ PU(U rU(S, 1))
Namely, the unemployment rate for urban workers is always higher since they have
higher reservation utility and stronger distaste for bad working conditions, namely
U rU + βU > U
r
R + βR.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, the proportion of migrant workers employed
in blue-collar jobs is higher than that of urban workers. The proportion of urban
workers employed in white-collar jobs is higher than that of migrant workers.
Proof: Based on Claim 3, the proportion of each type of worker in blue-collar
jobs is characterized by the cumulative density below cut-off utility and above
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reservation utility. Namely,
PU(h = 1) = PU(U
∗
U)− PU(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗U + βU)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
PR(h = 1) = PR(U
∗
R)− PR(U rR + βR)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗R + βR)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗R)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
Since U∗U < U
∗
R according to Claim 3,
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R) >
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) . Also
since U rU > U
r
R and βU > βR, we have
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR) <
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU ) .
Therefore PU(h = 1) < PR(h = 1), which means at equilibrium a higher proportion
of migrant workers will be hired in blue-collar jobs compared to urban workers.
Similarly, the proportion of each type of worker in white-collar jobs is therefore
characterized by the cumulative density above the cut-off utility. Namely,
PU(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
PR(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗R)
Since K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R) >
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) , we have PU(h = 0) > PR(h = 0),
which indicates at equilibrium, a higher proportion of urban workers will be hired
as white-collars than migrants.
Wage Incidences
In this sub-section we look at how wage distributions would be affected by market
frictions and preference heterogeneity.
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Proposition 3: In a frictional competitive labor market where employers do
not practice taste-based discrimination, the average wage of migrant workers is
higher in white-collar jobs. The average wage of migrant workers may be higher
or lower in blue-collar jobs.
Proof: We first characterize 4 key points: (1) the highest wage offers achievable
in white-collar jobs for both types; (2) the lowest wage levels offered in white-collar
jobs to both types; (3) the highest wage offers achievable in blue-collar jobs for both
types; (4) the lowest wage levels offered in blue-collar jobs to both types. These
points combined with the share of each population employed in each sector will
portray an intuitive explanation for average wage levels, as illustrated in Figure
2.6. We then more rigorously characterize wage distributions in terms of stochastic
dominance.
Figure 2.6: Offer Distributions for Migrant and Urban Workers (Without Discrim-
ination)
According to Claim 2, the maximum level of utility that both types of workers
can achieve is when p˜i(Umaxx ) = K, namely when firms make zero profit. It is
intuitive that
UmaxU = U
max
R ≡ p˜i−1(K)
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In white-collar jobs we have h = 0 so neither type of workers needs to be compen-
sated for disutilities from undesirable working conditionss. Therefore the highest
wage levels that both types of workers can expect are equal. Namely,
S¯R,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(UmaxR ) = Q(0)− C(0)−K = Φ−1(UmaxU ) ≡ S¯U,h=0
The lowest wage offered in white-collar jobs are characterized by wages at the
cut-off utility levels. According to Claim 3, U∗R > U
∗
U , therefore we have:
SR,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(U∗R) > Φ−1(U∗U) ≡ SU,h=0
It is therefore clear that although the proportion of migrant workers employed
in white-collar jobs is smaller compared to urban workers, their average wage is
higher in white-collar jobs. This can be mathematically shown by comparing the
distributions of salaries S conditional on the worker being employed in the white
sector (h = 0) for the two types of workers. For white collar jobs, at any given
utility level u,
PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0)− PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0)
=
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
−
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)
=
(1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u))(
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R) −
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ))
(1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R))(1−
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ))
> 0
Namely, PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) > PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) which indicates
that in white collar jobs, the salary distribution for migrant workers first-order
stochastically dominates that for urban workers. Therefore, the average wage for
migrant workers is higher in white collar jobs.
For blue-collar jobs, highest utility offers would be at the compensated cut-off
utilities for the two types of workers, namely S¯U,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U∗U +βU) and S¯R,h=1 ≡
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Φ−1(U∗R + βR). By the definition of U
∗
x in Claim 3, Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(U∗x + βx) =
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗x). Therefore,
S¯U,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U∗U + βU) = [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)] + Φ−1(U∗U)
S¯R,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U∗R + βR) = [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)] + Φ−1(U∗R)
Since U∗R > U
∗
U , we have
S¯R,h=1 − S¯U,h=1 = Φ−1(U∗R)− Φ−1(U∗U) > 0
Which means the highest wage offer achievable is higher for migrant workers than
for urban workers in the blue-collar sector.
The lowest wage offers to both groups in the blue-collar sector are characterized
by wage offer at reservation utilities. By assumption, U rR < U
r
U and βR < βU , we
have
SR,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U rR + βR) < Φ−1(U rU + βU) ≡ SU,h=1
This indicates that the lowest wage offer to migrant workers is lower compared to
urban workers in blue-collar jobs, which is opposite to the upper ends of the wage
offers across the two groups.
Therefore, intuitively, the average wage of migrant workers in blue collar jobs
may or may not be higher than that of urban workers, depending on the relative
size of the differences at both ends and the proportion of workers employed in each
sector. We can also use similar method to compare the salary distribution for both
types of workers conditional on the worker being employed as a blue-collar worker.
PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βU)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) −
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βR)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R) −
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)
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Since both the numerator and denominator are larger for migrant workers
(PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u + βR)|h = 1)), we cannot ascertain the relative size of the two.
Therefore migrant workers may earn higher or lower wage on average in blue-collar
jobs.
Our result is different from Lang and Majumdar (2003), where they claimed
that the type of worker more averse to undesirable working conditions will have
lower average wage in both sectors. This is because they assumed that both types
of workers have the same reservation wage – which in our case would indicate that
urban workers’ reservation utility would be lower than that of migrant workers.
By assuming that urban workers have higher reservation utility, our model adds
a lower tail to the wage distribution of urban workers, thereby bringing down the
average wage of urban workers.
2.3.4 Market Equilibrium When Both Sectors Practice
Taste-based Discrimination
The employment incidences in the previous section coincide with the reality in
China, in that urban residents have higher unemployment rate and are more likely
to be employed in white-collar jobs. The wage incidences, however, are contrary to
what we observe in our most recent survey data. In this section, we allow employers
to perform taste-based discrimination against migrant workers. In particular, firms
generate negative utility from hiring a migrant worker which translates into a
monetary cost, d > 0. This can be thought of as a reduction in productivity of
other workers since they have to work with someone that they do not want to
work with. The profit function when firms in both sectors practice taste-based
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discrimination can be written as
Ex(pi) = Px(Ux(·))(Q(h)− S − C(h)− d · 1x=R)−K
where 1x=R is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the worker is migrant.
Workers’ utility function remain the same as in the previous section.
Employment Incidences
We first explore the employment incidences when firms of both sectors practice
taste-based discrimination.
Proposition 4: Unemployment rate of migrant workers will increase when
both sectors practice taste-based discrimination. It may be higher or lower than
that of urban workers, depending on the size of discrimination d. If the size of
discrimination is greater than the difference in compensating differentials between
the two groups, that is d > Φ−1(U rR+βU)−Φ−1(U rR+βR), then the unemployment
rate of migrant workers will exceed that of the urban workers.
Proof: Since Claims 1 & 2 still hold in this scenario, firms must make zero
expected profit at equilibrium. Namely,
Px(Ux(S, h)) =
K
Q(h)− C(h)− Sx − d · 1x=R
=
K
Q(h)− C(h)− Φ−1(Ux + βx · h)− d · 1x=R
Similar to the previous section, unemployment rate is determined by the cumula-
tive density at reservation utility of each group, that is, Px(U
r
x).
PR(U
r
R(S, 1)) ≡
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)− d
PU(U
r
U(S, 1)) ≡
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
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The inclusion of d in the denominator for the calculation of migrant un-
employment increases the size of PR(U
r
R(S, 1)), indicating that when migrant
workers are discriminated against, their unemployment rate would rise. How-
ever, since Φ−1(U rR + βR) < Φ
−1(U rU + βU), we cannot compare the relative
size of K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)−d and
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU ) , hence the relative size of
PR(U
r
R(S, 1)) and PU(U
r
U(S, 1)) cannot be ascertained. The key takeaway here,
however, is that when both sectors practice taste-based discrimination, migrant
workers may face higher unemployment rate than urban workers despite their
lower aversion to bad working conditions and lower reservation utility.
We then derive and compare the proportions of the two groups employed in
blue-collar and white-collar jobs.
Proposition 5: When employers in both sectors perform taste-based discrim-
ination against migrant workers, the proportion of migrant workers employed in
white-collar jobs will be smaller than that of urban workers. Furthermore, it
decreases from the level where firms do not discrimination. The proportion of mi-
grant workers hired in blue-collar sector may be higher or lower than that of urban
workers, depending on the size of discrimination d. If the size of discrimination is
greater than the difference in compensating differentials between the two groups,
that is d > Φ−1(U rR +βU)−Φ−1(U rR +βR), then the proportion of migrant workers
employed in the blue-collar sector will be lower than that of the urban workers.
Proof: Since the inclusion of d in firms’ profit functions does not change the
concavity conditions, Claim 3 can be carried over here. The cut-off utilities U∗x
where firms are indifferent between offering type x worker a blue-collar or white-
collar takes the same form as in Claim 3, except that the profit functions when
migrant workers are hired involve an additional term d. The cut-off points for R
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and U are now defined as:
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗R + βR)− d = Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗R)− d
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗U + βU) = Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
Since d is subtracted from both side of the first equation, the cut-off utilities
stay exactly the same as when firms do not practice taste-based discrimination.
The cut-off utilities for urban workers also stayed the same as the second equation
is unchanged. As a result, the conclusion in Claim 3 remains valid in this case.
Namely,U∗x is non-decreasing with respect to [Q(1) − C(1)] − [Q(0) − C(0)] and
U∗R > U
∗
U .
When taste-based discrimination is present, the proportions of migrant and
rural workers employed in white-collar jobs are defined by the line segments above
the cuf-off utilities, which can be written as:
PU(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
PR(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗R)− d
since U∗R > U
∗
U and d > 0, we have Φ
−1(U∗U) < Φ
−1(U∗R)+d and hence PU(h = 0) >
PR(h = 0). Namely, the proportion of urban workers employed in white-collar jobs
is higher than that of migrant workers. Further more, the subtraction of d from
the denominator decreases the size of PR(h = 0) from the level where taste-based
discrimination did not exist.
Similarly, the proportions of migrant and rural workers employed in blue-collar
jobs are defined by the line segments above the reservation utilities and below the
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cut-off utilities, which can be written as:
PU(h = 1) = PU(U
∗
U + βU)− PU(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗U + βU)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
PR(h = 1) = PR(U
∗
R + βR)− PR(U rR + βR)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗R + βR)− d
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)− d
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗R)− d
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)− d
We have shown in the white-collar case that K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d >
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) . The relative size of
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU ) and
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)−d ,
however, cannot be ascertained because it depends on whether Φ−1(U rR + βR) + d
is greater than or less than or equal to Φ−1(U rU +βU). Therefore, the proportion of
migrant workers employed in blue-collar jobs may or may not be higher than that
of urban workers.
The offer distributions for migrant and urban workers when both sectors dis-
criminate are illustrated in Figure 2.7. The cut-off utilities (U∗x) remain unchanged.
However, since both sectors generate a disutility from hiring a migrant worker, the
upper tail of the offer distribution in white-collar sector will render a negative
profit for the firms. Similarly, offering the reservation utility in blue-collar jobs
will end up having a negative profit. Hence both line segments – above as well as
below the cut-off utility – grew shorter in this scenario.
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Figure 2.7: Offer Distributions for Migrant and Urban Workers (Both Sectors
Discriminate)
Wage Incidences
As employment incidences change when firms practice taste-based discrimination,
wage distribution also change. While in the non-discrimination case, migrant work-
ers are predicted to have higher average wage compared to urban workers in white-
collar jobs, we show in this section that this is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 6: The average wage of migrant workers may or may not be
higher than that of urban workers, regardless of sectors.
Proof: We first look at the highest achievable wages for both populations
in white-collar jobs. Similar to the proofs before, firms make zero profit when
the highest utility levels are offered. That is, p˜ix(U
max
x ) = K. However, different
from the previous sections, p˜ix(·) takes different form for migrant workers and
rural workers now, due to the presence of discrimination. For migrant workers,
maximum achievable utility solves
Q(0)− Φ−1(UmaxR )− C(0)− d = K
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while for urban workers, it solves
Q(0)− Φ−1(UmaxU )− C(0) = K
Consequently, wage offer at the top point of the distribution is lower for migrant
workers than for urban workers. That is
Φ−1(UmaxR ) ≡ Q(0)− C(0)− d−K < Q(0)− C(0)−K ≡ Φ−1(UmaxU )
Namely, S¯R,h=0 < S¯U,h=0. Intuitively, since firms perceive the presence of migrant
workers as a negative impact on overall productivity, they would not offer as good
a package to migrant workers as in the non-discrimination scenario.
The lowest achievable wage in the white-collar sector is, similar to the non-
discrimination scenario, determined by the cut-off utilities. We discussed in the
employment coincidence section that the cut-off points remain the same as in the
non-discrimination scenario when both sectors practice discrimination against the
migrant population. By Claim 3, the cut-off utility for migrant workers is higher
than for urban workers, the lowest wage offered to migrants is higher than that to
urban workers. Namely:
SR,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(U∗R) > Φ−1(U∗U) ≡ SU,h=0
Since we have S¯R,h=0 < S¯U,h=0 and SR,h=0 > SU,h=0, it is impossible to ascertain if
the average wage of migrant workers is higher or lower than that of urban workers.
The relationship depends on the relative size of discrimination d and the difference
between the two populations’ degrees of aversion to undesirable job characteristics.
Using distributional expressions, we can show that the probability that a worker
receives a wage offer lower than S conditional on the offer being a white-collar job,
for each type of worker respectively, is:
PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
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PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u)−d − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d
Although PU has a larger denominator than PR, we cannot compare the
relative size of the numerators since K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) <
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u)−d and
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) <
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d . One thing we can ascertain from this
practice though is that when discrimination is present, migrant workers will not
necessarily earn more on average in white-collar jobs than urban workers do.
The comparison between average wages in blue-collar sector follows the same
logic. Since the cut-off utilities did not change, the highest achievable wage is
higher for migrants than for urban workers in blue-collar sector, that is
S¯R,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U∗R) + [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)]
> Φ−1(U∗U) + [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)] ≡ S¯U,h=1
The lowest wage level offered should be lowered when discrimination is present
in blue-collar jobs. However, as no packages than reservation utility will be ac-
cepted, the lowest wage offer is still at reservation level. Since U rR < U
r
U and
βR < βU , we have
SR,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(U rR + βR) < Φ−1(U rU + βU) ≡ SU,h=1
SinceS¯R,h=1 > S¯U,h=1 and SR,h=1 < SU,h=1, again we cannot determine if migrant
workers earn more or less than urban workers on average in blue-collar jobs. This
is the same as the case of non-discrimination. Alternatively, the probability that a
worker receives a wage offer lower than S conditional on the offer being a blue-collar
job, for each type of worker respectively, is:
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PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βU)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) −
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βR)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S−d − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)−d
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d −
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)−d
Again it is impossible to determine the relative size of PU and PR, because PR
has both larger numerators and denominators than PU . Therefore, when both sec-
tors practice taste-based discrimination against migrant workers, wage incidences
in both sectors become unclear. Migrant workers may or may not earn higher wage
in either sector.
2.3.5 Market Equilibrium When Only White Sector Dis-
criminates
In this section, we explore the distributional consequences of employment and wage
when only white-collar employers perform taste-based discrimination. Namely,
only firms that offer white-collar jobs experience a reduction in profit d > 0 when
a migrant worker is hired. This is a more realistic description of the current urban
job market in China, since working environments such as construction sites and
laundry shops are less likely to generate disutilities from hiring migrant workers
than office jobs. In the case of white-collar job discrimination alone, the profit
function can be modified to incorporate another indicator function 1h=0 that takes
value 1 if the job is a white-collar one (h = 0)
Ex(pi) = Px(Ux(·))(Q(h)− S − C(h)− d · 1x=R · 1h=0)−K
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Same as the previous case, 1x=R is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the
worker is migrant. Workers’ utility function remain the same as in the previous
section.
Employment Incidences
We first explore the employment incidences.
Proposition 7: The unemployment incidence returns to the non-
discrimination level, with the unemployment rate of urban workers higher than
that of migrant workers.
Proof: The unemployment rates for both sections, as shown in the proof
for Proposition 1, is still measured by Px(U
r
x), namely cumulative distribution of
utility offer measured at reservation utility. Since blue sector does not discriminate
against migrant workers, the unemployment rate returns to the non-discrimination
level, namely:
PR(U
r
R(S, 1)) ≡
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
<
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
≡ PU(U rU(S, 1))
The unemployment rate for urban workers in blue-collar jobs is always higher
since they have higher reservation utility and stronger distaste for bad working
conditions, namely U rU + βU > U
r
R + βR.
Proposition 8: The proportion of migrant workers employed in white-collar
jobs is smaller than that of urban workers. Moreover, this proportion is not only
smaller than the one in non-discrimination scenario but also smaller than the on
in the case where both sectors discriminate against migrant workers.
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Proof: We first show that when only white sector practices taste-based dis-
crimination, the cut-off utility for migrant workers (denoted as U∗
′
R here) no longer
remains at the cut-off level of non-discrimination and the case where both sectors
discriminate (U∗R). This is because as per Claim 3, cut-off utility level is where
employer is indifferent between offering a blue-collar job and a white-collar job:
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗′R + βR) = Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗
′
R )− d
Since U∗
′
R is non-decreasing in [Q(1) − C(1)] − [Q(0) − C(0) − d], we have U∗′R >
U∗R. Intuitively, when white-collar jobs suffer from a disutility of hiring a migrant
worker, employers find it more efficient to shift earlier to offering a blue-collar job.
The cut-off utility for urban workers remains at the same level (U∗
′
U = U
∗
U), since
the profit functions remain the same in both blue and white sectors.
The proportion of each type of workers hired in white-collar jobs is therefore
characterized by the cumulative density above the cut-off utility. Namely,
PU(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗′U )
PR(h = 0) = 1− K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗′R )− d
Since K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗R)−d >
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) , we have PU(h = 0) > PR(h = 0).
That is, a higher proportion of urban workers will be hired as white-collars than
migrants.
The proportion of migrants hired as white-collar workers when only white
section practices taste-based discrimination is not only lower than the non-
discrimination case but also lower than the case where both sectors discrimi-
nate against migrants. The combination of two forces led to this result. First
of all, the presence of discrimination moved the upper end of the offer dis-
tribution since the original highest utility offer UmaxR will yield negative profit
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Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(umax)−d < K so it will no longer be offered. Secondly, the fact
that only white-collar jobs see disutility from employing a migrant worker makes
employers want to shift to offering a blue-collar job earlier, rendering the lower
end of the white-collar offer distribution cut short as well.
Proposition 9: When only white-collar employers discriminate against mi-
grant workers, the proportion of migrants employed in blue-collar jobs is higher
than that of urban workers. Furthermore, it is higher than the case where both
sectors practice taste-based discrimination.
Proof: Similar to previous sections, the proportion of each type of worker in
blue-collar jobs is characterized by the cumulative density below cut-off utility and
above reservation utility. Namely,
PU(h = 1) = PU(U
∗
U)− PU(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗U + βU)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗U)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rU + βU)
PR(h = 1) = PR(U
∗′
R )− PR(U rR + βR)
=
K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U∗′R + βR)
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
=
K
Q(0)− C(0)− Φ−1(U∗′R )− d
− K
Q(1)− C(1)− Φ−1(U rR + βR)
Since U∗U < U
∗
R < U
∗′
R ,
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗′R )
> K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) . Also since U
r
U > U
r
R
and βU > βR, we have
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR) <
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU ) . Therefore
PU(h = 1) < PR(h = 1), which means at equilibrium a higher proportion of
migrant workers will be hired in blue-collar jobs compared to urban workers. In
addition, the proportion of migrants hired in blue collar in this case also exceeds the
non-discrimination case and the case where both sectors practice discrimination
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since U∗
′
R > U
∗
R. In summary, when only whit-collar employers discriminate migrant
workers, the migrants’ unemployment rate would not increase as in the case where
both sectors discriminate. However, even less of them will be hired in the white
sector and more would end up in blue sector.
The offer distributions for migrant and urban workers in this scenario are il-
lustrated in Figure 2.8. Cut-off utility for migrant workers is now higher than the
previous two scenarios, since firms find it more profitable to shift to a blue-collar
job earlier. The line segment above U∗R, therefore, is not only shorter than the
baseline scenario but also shorter than the scenario where both sectors discrim-
inate. Since firms do not generate a negative utility from offering a blue-collar
job to migrant workers, the lower end of the offer distribution in blue-collar sector
returns to the baseline scenario level.
Figure 2.8: Offer Distributions for Migrant and Urban Workers (One Sector Dis-
criminates)
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Wage Incidences
Proposition 10: The average wage of migrant workers may or may not be higher
than that of urban workers, regardless of sectors. However, migrant workers are
better-off in terms of wage distribution compared to the case where both sectors
discriminate.
Proof: The highest achievable wages for both populations in white-collar jobs
stay at the same level as the case where both sectors discriminate against migrant
workers. Namely, for migrant workers, maximum achievable utility solves
Q(0)− Φ−1(UmaxR )− C(0)− d = K
while for urban workers, it solves
Q(0)− Φ−1(UmaxU )− C(0) = K
and
Φ−1(UmaxR ) ≡ Q(0)− C(0)− d−K < Q(0)− C(0)−K ≡ Φ−1(UmaxU )
Namely, S¯R,h=0 < S¯U,h=0. When we look at offers in the white-collar sector, the
top ends stay the same as in the case where both sectors discriminate because
employers are following the same practice.
The lowest achievable wage in the white-collar sector is determined by the
cut-off utilities. As shown in the proof of Proposition 8, U∗
′
R > U
∗
R > U
∗
U , we have
S ′R,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(U∗
′
R ) > Φ
−1(U∗R) > Φ
−1(U∗U) ≡ SU,h=0
That is, the new lowest achievable wage of migrant workers is not only higher than
that of urban workers but also higher than the case where both sectors discriminate.
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Similar to the previous case, since we have S¯R,h=0 < S¯U,h=0 and S
′
R,h=0 > SU,h=0, it
is impossible to ascertain if the average wage of migrant workers is higher or lower
than that of urban workers. The relationship again depends on the relative size
of discrimination d and the relative degree of aversion. It is interesting to notice,
however, that although a smaller portion of migrant workers are employed in the
white sector, their average wage does improve compared to the case where both
sectors discriminate since the lower end of their wage distribution is removed.
This can also be more rigorously shown by calculating the probability that a
worker receives a wage offer lower than S conditional on the offer being a white-
collar job when only the white-collar sector practices taste based discrimination:
PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U )
PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u)−d − KQ(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗′R )−d
1− K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗′R )−d
Very similar to the case where both sectors discriminate, although PU has
a larger denominator than P ′R, we cannot compare the relative size of the
numerators since K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u) <
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(u)−d and
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) <
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗′R )−d
. Therefore, we cannot tell if migrant workers on average are
offered higher or lower wage than urban workers. However, since U∗
′
R > U
∗
R, we
can show that
PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0)− P ′R(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 0) > 0
That is, in this case, migrant workers do see an improvement in their average wage
offer compared to the case where both sectors discriminate.
Wage distributions in blue-collar sector also changed due to the shift of cut-off
utility points. We can see that now the highest achievable wage of migrant workers
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is not only higher than that of urban workers, but also higher than the migrant
workers’ highest achievable wage in the case where both sectors discriminate:
S¯ ′R,h=1 ≡ Φ−1(U∗′R ) + [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)] + d
> Φ−1(U∗U) + [Q(1)− C(1)]− [Q(0)− C(0)] ≡ S¯U,h=1
The lowest wage level offered, similar to the previous two cases, will be deter-
mined by reservation utilities. Since U rR < U
r
U and βR < βU , we have
SR,h=0 ≡ Φ−1(U rR + βR) < Φ−1(U rU + βU) ≡ SU,h=1
SinceS¯ ′R,h=1 > S¯U,h=1 and SR,h=1 < SU,h=1, again we cannot determine if migrant
workers earn more or less than urban workers on average in blue-collar jobs. How-
ever, since the wage distribution of blue-collar workers now contains an upper tail
that was not present when both sectors discriminate, migrant workers are on aver-
age offered a higher wage in this case. This can also be more rigorously shown using
the probability distribution of wages conditional on the offer being a blue-collar
job:
PU(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βU)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗U ) −
K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrU+βU )
P ′R(S ≤ Φ−1(u+ βR)|h = 1) =
K
Q(0)−C(0)−S−d − KQ(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)
K
Q(0)−C(0)−Φ−1(U∗′R )−d
− K
Q(1)−C(1)−Φ−1(UrR+βR)
Since P ′R has both larger numerators and denominators than PU , it is impossible
to determine the relative size of the two. Therefore, as in the case where both
sectors practice taste-based discrimination migrant workers may or may not earn
higher wage in either sector when only the white sector discriminates. However, it
is evident that migrant workers are better-off in terms of average wage offer when
only one sector discriminates, since U∗
′
R > U
∗
R,
PR(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 1)− P ′R(S ≤ Φ−1(u)|h = 1) > 0
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That is, migrant workers’ average wage offer in the blue-collar sector improves
compared to the case where both sectors discriminate.
To summarize, in the theoretical part of this paper, we derived that in the
presence of market search frictions and heterogeneous preferences, compensating
differentials predicted by Rosen’s classical model may not be present. Our model
also explained why the unemployment rate of urban workers is higher than that of
migrant workers. Moreover, contradicting the prediction of Lang and Majumdar
(2003), when the group more averse to undesirable working conditions (i.e. urban
workers) has higher reservation utilities, they do not necessarily earn less in both
sectors. We also show that when employers practice taste-based discrimination,
the group less averse to undesirable working conditions (i.e. migrant workers) may
lose their wage advantage in both sectors. Moreover, if both sectors discriminate
against migrant workers, the unemployment rate of migrant workers may in fact
exceed that of urban workers.
2.4 Empirical Validation: The Discrete Choice Experi-
ment
To substantiate our assumption that urban workers are more averse to undesirable
working conditions, namely βU > βR, we implemented a Discrete Choice Experi-
ment (DCE) where we randomly sampled 165 migrant workers and 93 urban work-
ers in Shandong Province, China. The experiment allows us to obtain each group’s
stated preferences for wage and the non-monetary aspects of jobs, and calculate
their willingness to accept (WTA) for undesirable job characteristics. The follow-
ing section explains our experiment design, implementation, estimation strategy
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using the random utility framework, and results.
2.4.1 Experimental Design
The aim of the experiment is to back out each group of workers’ preference pa-
rameters for wage and non-monetary aspects of jobs. We restrict the geographical
coverage to the labor market of one location – Shandong Province of China. This
is because the wage distribution differ greatly across provinces depending on the
economic development level of the province. Workers at different locations, there-
fore, have very different expectations for wage and working conditions offered. If
we were to cover a national representative sample, a more dispersed distribution of
wage levels will need to be included in the choice experiment, which will increase
the mental task of the respondents. It is therefore optimal to restrict the sampling
to one local labor market. We chose Shandong because it is a middle-level province
in terms of economic development. It is also a relatively large labor market that
attracts a large number of migrant workers from all over the country.
The hypothetical jobs are constructed to best reflect the reality of contempo-
rary labor market in Shandong. Each sampled worker responds to 4 hypothetical
choice scenarios where in each scenario he has to consider the trade-off between
the wage and attributes of two listed alternatives and choose his preferred one or
opt out. This also allows us to estimate the willingness to accept (WTA) distribu-
tion of each group for undesirable job characteristics, namely, how much a worker
needs to be compensated to accept a job with undesirable working conditions.
Each respondent also fills out a questionnaire that collects basic demographic in-
formation after he completes the choice task. We combine information gathered
from the questionnaire and the choice experiment to examine if within group het-
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erogeneity in WTA can be explained by personal characteristics such as gender,
age, education, and family income.
Constructing Attributes and Attribute Levels
The first step of designing this choice experiment is to decide what job attributes
should be included in the portfolio and the range of variation of each attribute (the
levels). Attributes included in the experiments should capture what choice makers
deem relevant and important whereas the levels of attributes should reflect the
reality and at the same time include a wide range of variation so that substitution
patterns can be identified. To achieve these goals, we extract attributes and their
distributions from both public data and a pilot survey we conducted in August
2016. The public data was extracted from the 2015 National Beural of Statistics
Report3. We summarize job characteristics that are deemed important in the past
literature by industry. We further implemented a pilot survey where we interviewed
30 migrant and urban workers in Shandong to collect information on their wage,
working hours, and working conditions. Distributions of attributes are summarized
in Figure 2.9. We observe that wage ranges roughly from 2000 RMB to 4500 RMB
per month, and sectors with more disamenities (for example construction) offer
relatively higher wages. Working hours range from 9 to 11 hours a day and 6-7
days a week. Although more than two-third of our surveyed migrants reported to
have signed contract with their employers, less than half of them are enrolled in
social insurance programs and more than half of them face danger.
3Source: Pilot survey in Shandong Province by authors, August 2016; Report on Chinese
Migrant Workers 2015, National Bureau of Statistics of PRC
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Figure 2.9: Attributes and Levels from Public Data and Survey
Note that the public data from National Bureau of Statistics of China uses
a nation-wide sample, which may not accurately reflect wage levels in Shandong
Province. We therefore conducted two focus group interviews one with migrant
workers and the other with urban residents in Shandong – where we presented
participants with the attribute levels and asked them if these are realistic and if
they would like to add any other attributes that they deem important when they
search for jobs. Almost all participants suggested that wage be adjusted upward.
We therefore set 4 wage levels ranging from 3000 to 6000 RMB per month, which
covers both the average wage range of migrants and urban workers. Some migrants
suggested location whether the job is in large or small cities would matter. We
therefore added location as an additional attribute and provided 3 levels – First-
line cities, Second-line cities, Counties for migrants and First-line cities, Second-line
cities, Third-line cities for urban workers (it is unrealistic for urban residents to
go work in counties). The final construct of attributes and attributes levels are
presented in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: Attributes and Attribute Levels
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Generating Choice Profiles
We use JMP to generate a Bayesian D-Optimal experimental design according to
Sandor and Wedel (2001). This design criterion seeks to minimize the determinant
of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimators. Sandor and Wedel
(2001) showed that the D-optimal designs generally outperform the linear design
where prior parameter vector is set to be zero with zero prior variance (Huber and
Zwerina 1996).
In our design, each respondent is presented with 4 choice scenarios where each
choice scenario provides 2 alternative jobs that are presented as bundles of job
attributes from Figure 2.10. Since it is widely acknowledged in choice modeling
literature that “respondents often find it difficult to trade off prospective goods
when every attribute of the offering changes in each comparison, especially in
studies involving many attributes” (Kessels et al. 2011), we keep 3 attributes
constant and vary 4 attributes at a time in each scenario. We have 16 choice
scenarios in total that are divided into 4 versions of surveys. Each respondent is
randomly assigned 1 version.
Each scenario begins with the following statement (in Chinese): “Imagine that
you are currently not employed and you are actively looking for jobs. If these are
the only two jobs you are offered and all other aspects that are not included in
the table are identical across alternatives, which one will you choose?” Our prior
mean parameters are set assuming that unattractive levels of an attribute can be
compensated for by attractive levels of another attribute. To take into account
the possibility that the above compensatory decision making assumption can be
violated, we provide an opt-out option in each choice scenario where respondents
can reject both alternatives and choose to stay unemployed for 6 months and
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keep looking for other jobs. Figure 2.11 shows a sample choice scenario that a
respondent is presented with.
Figure 2.11: A Sample Choice Scenario
The choice experiment is followed by a questionnaire where we collect infor-
mation on the respondents’ demographic characteristics (gender, age, education,
experience, etc.) as well as information on their current jobs (occupation, wage,
hours, working conditions, access to contract and social insurance).
Experiment Implementation
Prior to the formal implementation of our experiment, we implemented two rounds
of pilot experiment. The first round took place in December 2016 at Shandong
University of Finance and Economics where 81 undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents from 4-5 majors participated. The purpose was to test if the experiment
instructions and the presentation is clear and easy to understand. The second
round of piloting took place in February 2017, where we interviewed 50 migrant
workers that returned to their hometown during Chinese New Year and 30 urban
workers with low-medium level of education and non-elite jobs so that the migrant
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and urban samples are comparable. We also asked respondents for their feedback
on the clarity and length of the survey and adjusted the format accordingly.
The formal experiment was implemented in July 2017 in Shandong Province
in China in two stages. In Stage 1, we randomly sampled incoming passengers
at the train station at Jinan City, a transportation hub where migrant workers
come in for jobs and urban residents return home from either work or vacation.
In Stage 2, we interviewed workers at construction sites, grocery stores and office
buildings in Jinan City to obtain a balanced sample of blue-collar and white-collar
workers. Since we do not know the hukou status (rural vs urban) a priori, the
proportion of migrant and urban workers is not half-half – 142 migrant workers
and 83 urban workers completed the choice experiment and the questionnaire.
The demographic characteristics of the migrant sample and the urban sample are
summarized in Table 2.1. The percentage of female, age, and number of kids are
roughly balanced across samples. However, urban workers do have higher level of
education and higher marriage rate compared to migrant workers.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Migrant and Urban Samples
Migrant Urban Difference
Female 50% 60.20% -10.20%
Age 35.718 36.699 -0.98
Year of Education 11.93 14.41 -2.480***
Marriage 0.697 0.855 -0.158***
Number of Kids 0.923 0.964 -0.041
Number of Observations 142 83
The experiment was conducted face-to-face on a one-on-one basis. The experi-
menter starts with introducing the purpose of the survey and asking the respondent
if he or she would willingly participate. After the respondent agrees, the experi-
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menter reads the experiment instructions on the questionnaire to the respondent
(see Appendix). Each respondent is randomly assigned one version of the ques-
tionnaire that contains 4 choice scenarios. He or she is given 1 minute for each
choice scenario to choose between the 2 alternative jobs or choose to opt out. In
order to make sure the respondent understands the task and is paying attention,
the experiment randomly pick one choice scenario and ask the respondent why he
or she chose one alternative job over the other. After the choice experiment por-
tion is finished, each respondent proceeds to fill out a short questionnaire on their
demographics and current job situation. The whole process takes 8-10 minutes.
Each respondent is thanked with a small gift equivalent to 8-10 RMB.
2.4.2 Estimation and Results
Our estimation is carried out in both the preference space and the willingness-
to-pay (WTP) space. In the preference space estimation, we obtain both groups’
preference parameters for wage as well as for each job characteristic in our ex-
periment design (the main effects). We also test how such preferences vary with
personal characteristics (the interaction effects). The drawback of the preference
space estimation, despite its computational convenience, is that it often yields un-
reasonable willingness to pay estimates. To rectify this, we implement the WTP
space estimation by directly specifying the distributions of WTP measures (al-
though in our case it is the willingness to accept, or WTA).
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Estimation in the Preference Space and Results
We start the preference space estimation with a standard Multinomial Logit (MNL)
model, where respondents choices are analyzed in a random utility framework
(McFadden 1974; Train 2003). Each respondent is faced with a set of alternatives
and chooses the alternative that gives him or her the highest utility. Specifically,
the utility of individual n choosing alternative i is:
Uin = ASCi + q
′
in(β + Z
′
nγ) + εin
Where β and γ are main effect parameters and interaction effect parameters re-
spectively. ASCi is the alternative specific constant, qin indicates a vector of job
attributes (K × 1, including wage) that individual n faces. Z is an L × 1 vector
of individual characteristics of person n, which is excluded from the baseline main
effects estimations. εin is the unobserved part of the utility, which is assumed to
follow an Extreme Value Type 1 distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The
probability that person n chooses alternative i is therefore:
Pin = Pr(Uin > Ujn) =
eASCi+q
′
in(β+Z
′
nγ)∑
j e
ASCj+q′jn(β+Z′nγ)
Under the standard multinomial logit framework, parameters β and γ are estimated
by maximizing the likelihood of sample joint choice probability:
l(β, γ; y|X) = ΠNi Πj∈CnP yinin
We divide the sample into two sub-samples – migrant workers and urban workers
– to obtain preference parameters and interaction effects for each sub-sample re-
spectively. The simple multinomial logit model, however, assumes that within each
sub-sample everyone has the same taste and fails to take into account the possible
heterogeneity within each group. To allow for taste heterogeneity, we estimate a
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Mixed Logit model by assuming that the main effect parameters vector β follows a
normal distribution parametrically characterized by θ (in this case, the mean and
standard deviation of βk). Namely
βk ∼ f(βk|θβk)
The reason why we assume the interaction effects parameters γ are non-random
is to alleviate computational burden. The probability that individual n chooses
alternative i in the mixed logit can be written as:
Pin =
∫
Pn(i|βk,n)f(βk)dβk =
∫
eASCi+q
′
in(β+Z
′
nγ)∑
j e
ASCj+q′jn(β+Z′nγ)
f(βk)dβk
The distribution parameter vector θ is estimated by maximizing sample likelihood
while accounting for the fact that each individual was faced with 4 choice situations
(Tn = 4). This is to make sure that the heterogeneity estimated truly captures
variations across individual, not within the same individual. The sample likelihood
can therefore be written as:
L(θβk ; y|X) = ΠNi=1
∫
ΠTnt=1Πi∈Cn(Pint|ε)f(ε)dε
The Multinomial Logit estimation results for migrant workers, urban workers, as
well as the difference between their preference parameters are presented in the
table below.
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Table 2.2: Main Effects by Sub-Group – Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Migrant Urban Difference ((2)-(1))
Wage 0.000333*** 0.000215*** -0.000118
(5.69e-05) (6.94e-05) (8.97e-05)
Time -0.0100*** -0.00535 0.00468
(0.00382) (0.00495) (0.00625)
Outdoor -0.422** -1.170*** -0.747**
(0.182) (0.266) (0.323)
Nonoffice -0.316 -0.487 -0.170
(0.221) (0.315) (0.385)
Contract 0.403*** 0.276 -0.127
(0.132) (0.170) (0.215)
Insurance 0.693*** 0.690*** -0.00333
(0.151) (0.219) (0.266)
MidDanger -0.0151 -0.104 -0.0891
(0.196) (0.264) (0.329)
HighDanger -0.626*** -0.810*** -0.184
(0.200) (0.283) (0.346)
FirstLine -0.0548 0.0633 0.118
(0.217) (0.305) (0.375)
SecondLine 0.382** -0.142 -0.524*
(0.169) (0.239) (0.293)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As shown in the first two columns, both migrant workers and urban workers
prefer higher wages and jobs that provide insurances, and dislike outdoor and
highly dangerous jobs. The difference, as shown in column (3), is that compared
to migrant workers, urban workers have a significantly stronger distaste for outdoor
jobs and for jobs that are located in second-line cities. These results substantiate
the assumption in our theoretical model that urban workers are more averse to
undesirable working conditions compared to rural migrants, that is, βU > βR > 0.
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Table 2.3: Main Effects by Sub-Group – Mixed Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Migrant (Mean) Migrant (SD) Urban (Mean) Urban (SD)
Wage 0.000257* -0.000547*** 6.41e-05 0.000413**
(0.000134) (0.000132) (0.000176) (0.000184)
Time -0.0363*** 0.0453*** -0.0503*** 0.0625***
(0.0106) (0.00979) (0.0162) (0.0148)
Outdoor -0.755** 0.0652 -1.977*** -0.994
(0.324) (0.594) (0.574) (0.659)
Nonoffice -0.848** 0.0333 -1.009 0.349
(0.390) (0.818) (0.616) (1.267)
Contract 0.420* 0.937*** -0.0216 -0.0386
(0.235) (0.316) (0.278) (0.673)
Insurance 0.864*** 0.478 0.447 1.772**
(0.270) (0.710) (0.429) (0.811)
MidDanger 0.0747 1.064** 0.0456 -0.695
(0.349) (0.506) (0.451) (0.849)
HighDanger -0.810** -0.154 -0.728 -0.288
(0.316) (0.455) (0.460) (0.841)
FirstLine -0.158 1.351** 0.00882 0.336
(0.375) (0.663) (0.505) (1.658)
SecondLine 0.491* -0.712 -0.224 -0.0885
(0.274) (0.736) (0.372) (0.606)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3 presents regression results from the Mixed Logit specification. As-
suming that preference parameters follow a normal distribution within each sub-
sample, we present the mean and standard deviation estimates separately. We
observe that while the majority of standard deviation estimates from the migrant
sample (column 2) are significant, those from the urban sample (column 4) are
not. This indicates that migrant workers have more disperse preferences among
themselves, while the preference pattern of the urban workers is more uniform.
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 present the interaction effects between job character-
istics and personal characteristics, namely, how preferences for job attributes vary
with gender, age, education etc. A quick comparison between Table 2.4 (inter-
action effects for the migrant sample) and Table 2.5 (interaction effects for the
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urban sample) reveals that more parameters are statistically significant in Table
2.4, meaning that the variation in preferences are better explained by personal
characteristics for the migrant sample than for the urban sample. This is consis-
tent with our Mixed Logit estimation results, as the preference pattern of migrant
workers are more dispersed.
Table 2.4: Interaction Effects (Migrant Workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Main Female Age Education Actual Wage Experience Marriage
Wage 0.00108*** -0.000435*** -9.37e-06 -2.93e-06 -2.10e-08* 1.24e-05 -8.18e-05
(0.000413) (0.000127) (7.97e-06) (2.10e-05) (1.26e-08) (1.14e-05) (0.000172)
Time -0.0596** 0.0159* 0.00155*** -0.000840 1.52e-07 -0.000263 -0.0127
(0.0277) (0.00863) (0.000519) (0.00140) (6.59e-07) (0.000770) (0.0113)
Outdoor 0.733 0.395 0.00480 -0.0936 3.38e-06 -0.0220 -0.378
(1.279) (0.421) (0.0260) (0.0672) (5.35e-05) (0.0373) (0.529)
Nonoffice -1.406 0.236 0.0584 -0.0393 5.06e-05 -0.104** 0.0328
(1.741) (0.534) (0.0358) (0.0810) (6.87e-05) (0.0506) (0.610)
Contract -2.430** 0.148*** 0.0378** 1.60e-05 -0.0285 -0.0409
(1.008) (0.0492) (0.0189) (2.69e-05) (0.0281) (0.382)
Insurance -0.167 0.0615 -0.0224 2.37e-05 0.0269 0.773*
(1.105) (0.0560) (0.0210) (3.94e-05) (0.0293) (0.435)
MidDanger 2.952* -0.105 -0.0641** 4.91e-05 -0.0313 0.725
(1.572) (0.0723) (0.0304) (5.57e-05) (0.0413) (0.553)
HighDanger 2.902* -0.630* -0.0765** -0.0866 5.07e-05 0.0131 0.170
(1.608) (0.376) (0.0326) (0.0727) (6.06e-05) (0.0424) (0.579)
FirstLine -1.951 1.103** -0.00235 0.0798 6.84e-05 -0.0307 0.234
(1.647) (0.461) (0.0300) (0.0827) (5.54e-05) (0.0475) (0.646)
SecondLine 0.681 -0.163 -0.0129 0.0388 -1.32e-05 -0.00152 -0.438
(1.189) (0.391) (0.0237) (0.0600) (3.96e-05) (0.0325) (0.477)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We observe from Table 2.4 that compared to male, female migrant workers have
weaker preference for wage and are less averse to long working hours. They prefer
jobs that provide contracts and dislike jobs that are highly dangerous. Moreover
they are more attracted to jobs located in first-line cities. Age plays a very similar
role. We see that older migrant workers care less about working hours but prefer
more secure jobs – jobs with contracts and no danger. Interaction effects between
education and 3 job attributes – contract, insurance, and medium danger – were
dropped from the regression due to multicolinearity. However, for migrant workers
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preference does not seem to vary with education level. Actual wage, experience
(years spent in current industry), and marriage have some limited and statistically
weak effects on preference patterns. Migrant workers who are currently earning
a higher amount tend to care less about wage; more experienced migrant workers
tend to dislike non-office jobs; and married people tend to care more about having
insurance.
Table 2.5: Interaction Effects (Urban Workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Main Female Age Education Actual Wage Experience Marriage
Wage -0.00129 -2.15e-05 3.41e-05** 5.70e-05 6.83e-09 -1.87e-05 -0.000317
(0.00101) (0.000158) (1.63e-05) (4.83e-05) (2.22e-08) (1.14e-05) (0.000290)
Time 0.238*** -0.00416 -0.00339** -0.0113*** -1.04e-06 0.00163** 0.0352
(0.0821) (0.0116) (0.00133) (0.00375) (2.73e-06) (0.000759) (0.0236)
Outdoor -6.966 0.307 -0.0445 0.387** -0.000123 0.0435 1.628
(4.261) (0.608) (0.0734) (0.195) (0.000120) (0.0438) (1.019)
Nonoffice 7.271 -0.513 -0.183* -0.223 -0.000253 0.0615 2.658**
(6.312) (0.803) (0.108) (0.290) (0.000257) (0.0647) (1.155
Contract -2.049 0.155 0.0300 -0.000133 0.0190 -0.541
(2.503) (0.119) (0.0387) (9.68e-05) (0.0246) (0.678)
Insurance 4.328 -0.131 -0.00741 9.76e-05 -0.0229 -1.777*
(3.462) (0.156) (0.0593) (0.000119) (0.0378) (0.936)
MidDanger -6.275 0.297 0.0103 0.000175 -0.0355 1.218
(4.560) (0.204) (0.0720) (0.000157) (0.0426) (1.052)
HighDanger -9.120* 0.836 -0.0140 0.374 3.76e-05 0.0752 2.113*
(4.867) (0.576) (0.0830) (0.234) (0.000192) (0.0568) (1.187)
FirstLine -1.534 -0.294 0.0912 -0.113 5.65e-05 0.0537 -0.754
(5.043) (0.708) (0.0844) (0.222) (0.000169) (0.0454) (1.348)
SecondLine -3.169 0.683 -0.0147 0.135 0.000106 0.0477 0.268
(4.023) (0.595) (0.0687) (0.182) (0.000153) (0.0442) (0.931)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Compared to migrant workers, the interaction effects for urban workers are less
obvious, both in terms of the number of coefficients that are significant and the
strength of statistical significance. Preferences do not vary significantly with gen-
der or current wage level. As for age, older urban workers put more emphasis on
wage and show stronger distaste towards overtime and non-office jobs. More edu-
cated people tend to care less about working longer hours and display less distaste
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toward outdoor jobs – which may sound counter intuitive, but is possible since the
ones who spent most of their lives sitting in classrooms tend to romanticize outdoor
jobs. More experienced urban workers tend to care less about overtime, whereas
married workers show less aversion to non-office jobs, jobs without insurance, and
highly dangerous jobs.
Estimation in the WTP Space and Results
The Mixed Logit model makes it possible to account for heterogeneity in prefer-
ences which are unrelated to observed characteristics and it has been shown that
any discrete choice random utility model can be approximated by an appropriately
specified mixed logit model (McFadden and Train 2000). Since the WTP for an
attribute is given by the ratio of the attribute coefficient to the monetary coeffi-
cient, the WTP from a mixed logit model is given by the ratio of two randomly
distributed terms. Depending on the choice of distributions for the coefficients
this can lead to WTP distributions which are heavily skewed and that may not
even have defined moments. A common approach to dealing with this potential
problem is to specify the monetary coefficient to be fixed. This is a convenient
assumption as in this case the distribution of the willingness to pay for an at-
tribute is simply the distribution of the attribute coefficient scaled by the fixed
wage (or price) coefficient. The problem is that this implies that the standard
deviation of unobserved utility, which is called the scale parameter, is the same
for all individuals. This approach also tends to generate unreasonably large vari-
ance of WTPs, which translates into an untenable implication that many people
are willing to pay an enormous amount of money to have or avoid an attribute
(Train and Weeks, 2005). A more reasonable approach, therefore, is to estimate
the Mixed Logit model directly in the willingness to pay space rather than in
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preference space. This involves estimating the distribution of willingness to pay
directly by re-formulating the model in such a way that the coefficients represent
the WTP measures. The researcher then makes a priori assumptions about the
distributions of WTP rather than the attribute coefficients. This approach has
been found to produce more realistic WTP estimates in applications.
The WTP-Space estimation approach, as in Train and Weeks (2005), specifies
utility as separable in price (or wage in our case), p, and non-price attributes, x:
Unjt = −αnpnjt + β′nxnjt + njt
where αn and βn are individual specific and njt is i.i.d. njt is assumed to be Ex-
treme Value Type 1 with individual specific variance (scale parameter kn), namely
V ar(njt) = k
2
n(pi
2/6). Since scale parameter kn is individual specific, dividing
utility by kn does not affect behavior but will give us a new error term that has
the same scale for all observations:
Unjt = −(αn/kn)pnjt + (βn/kn)′xnjt + εnjt
where εnjt is iid Extreme Value Type 1 with constant variance pi
2/6. Defind λn =
(αn/kn) and cn = (βn/kn). Then the preference space estimation equation can be
rewritten as:
Unjt = −λnpnjt + c′nxnjt + εnjt
We can define willingness-to-pay coefficient as the ratio of the attribute’s coefficient
to the price coefficient, that is ωn = cn/λn and the WTP-space estimation equation
can be written as:
Unjt = −λnpnjt + (λnωn)′xnjt + εnjt
Under this parameterization, the variation in WTP, which is independent of scale,
is distinguished from the variation in the price coefficient, which incorporates scale.
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We estimate ωn directly using this specification. The price parameter −λn is as-
sumed to follow a log-normal distribution whereas WTP parameters are assumed to
be normal. Moreover, the WTP’s are assumed to be uncorrelated over attributes.
Table 2.6: WTP Space
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Migrant Urban Difference
Time -28.90*** -24.18 -2.235
(9.662) (19.88) (17.56))
Outdoor -1,288** -5,438*** -3,107***
(533.4) (1,791) (1,157)
Nonoffice -932.9 -2,245 -570.8
(706.7) (1,669) (1,365)
Contract 1,241*** 1,278 -279.5
(415.6) (859.1) (742.5)
Insurance 2,025*** 3,196** -105.8
(610.4) (1,500) (936.4)
MidDanger -19.09 -520.7 -781.1
(591.3) (1,201) (1,088)
HighDanger -1,884*** -3,805** -968.7
(616.8) (1,640) (1,199)
FirstLine -114.3 284.9 433.0
(668.7) (1,423) (1,311)
SecondLine 1,095** -675.2 -1,800*
(529.3) (1,150) (1,062)
Observations 1,704 996 2,700
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6 gives the estimation results. All parameters in the table now have
monetary interpretations. For example, an average migrant worker needs to be
compensated 1,288 RMB to accept an outdoor job while an average urban worker
needs to be compensated 5,483 RMB. We observe that all WTP parameters are of
reasonable signs although not all of them are significant. Consistent with preference
space estimation results, the two statistically significant “difference” estimates are
Outdoor and Second Line. The magnitude of the differences, however, is quite
large. Urban worker needs to be compensated 3,107 RMB more than migrant
workers to accept an outdoor job, and they need to be compensated 1,800 RMB
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more to be willing to work in a second line city.
In summary, our empirical results substantiate our hypothesis that urban work-
ers are more averse to undesirable job attributes, namely βU > βR. Although the
difference is not significant for every single attribute, it is large in magnitude when
the difference is indeed significant.
2.5 Conclusion
The observation in the Chinese labor market that migrant workers take on blue-
collar jobs that urban workers are unwilling to take and are paid less contradicts
Rosen’s compensating differentials model. It is also not consistent with Lang and
Majumdar’s more recent prediction that in a labor market with search frictions
and heterogeneous preferences, the group that is more averse to unattractive job
characteristics will on average earn less. In the theoretical part of this paper, we
expand the model by Lang and Majumdar (2003) to show that wages need not be
compensating when preferences are heterogeneous, and that the group more averse
to undesirable working conditions need not earn less when reservation utilities differ
and/or when employers practice taste-based discrimination. In the empirical part,
we substantiate the assumption in our theoretical modeling that urban workers are
more averse to undesirable working conditions using a discrete choice experiment,
where 225 workers in China made hypothetical choices between jobs characterized
by different wage levels and working conditions. We backed out preference param-
eters and willingness to accept measures for job attributes. We find that consistent
with our assumption, urban workers need to be compensated more to accept out-
door jobs and jobs in second line cities. We also find that migrant workers have
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more dispersed preferences that vary with personal characteristics such as gender
and education.
This study contributes to the existing literature by, first of all, extending the
existing theoretical model and incorporating more realistic features such as het-
erogeneous reservation utilities and taste-based discrimination either from both
sectors or from only one sector. Although in most of the cases the employment or
wage outcome predictions are not clear, our model provides multiple possibilities
to realign theoretical predictions with empirical observations. We also contribute
to the literate by empirically estimating the key parameter in our theoretical model
and validating our assumption that urban workers are more averse to undesirable
job characteristics than migrant workers. Our choice experiment not only offers a
unique dataset but also suggests a robust way to obtain preference parameters and
WTA measures for job attributes, which cannot be achieved by using observational
data.
One key drawback of this study is that the hypothetical choices that respon-
dents make in our experiments will have no real consequences. This is the typical
problem that all stated preference studies have. Although there is no way to
eliminate this concern, we reduce its impact as much as possible by offering com-
pensation (20 RMB per respondent) and small gifts to encourage them to make
serious considerations. Another potential problem is that our sampling is lim-
ited to Shandong Province, which may not be geographically representative of all
migrant workers in China.
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CHAPTER 3
WHERE DID THE MONEY AND TIME GO? DE-MYSTIFYING
THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON HUMAN
CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
Abstract
International migration and remittances from overseas may encourage human
capital investment and improve educational outcomes in developing countries. Em-
pirical studies, however, have shown mixed evidence some positive, some nega-
tive, some have shown zero effects. In our study, we focus on the case of Kyrgyz
Republic, one of the largest remittances-receiving countries in Asia. We used a 5-
year panel dataset that tracks the same 3,000 households and 8,000 individuals in
the country to examine the impact of remittances on both household educational
expenditure and attendance rate of school age children. We used instrumental
variables and fixed-effects regressions to correct for potential selection bias. We
find that remittances have a negative impact on human capital formation namely
both educational expenditure and school attendance rate are lower for households
that receive a higher amount of remittances. To explore the possible channels of
the negative effects, we further regressed itemized household expenditures and the
time use pattern of school-age children on remittances. We find that the negative
effects can at least be partly attributed to increased expenditure on durable goods
and increased hours of child labor on farm work as a compensation for adult labor
insufficiency induced by out-migration. Our finding calls for the need for moni-
toring farm labor hours of school-age children. Implementation and scaling up of
financial literacy programs that that help parents balance short-term expenditures
(durable goods) and long-term investments (education, health) can be beneficial.
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Moreover, targeted investment to improve the quality of education services in the
country may help increase perceived return to schooling and may therefore improve
human capital investment.
3.1 Introduction
The importance of overseas remittances in developing countries in Asia has been
widely acknowledged in the economic literature. Remittances are known to be
a major vehicle for economic development. In the short term, it contributes to
improve family livelihood and provides immediate disaster relief for the households
left behind (Gupta et al, 2009; Acosta et al., 2007; Adams, 2006). In the long term,
it may encourage investment in local business and community development. For
countries with large young population and low average education level, ascertaining
the effects of remittances on human capital investment is especially important.
Empirical evidence on such effects, however, has been mixed. Adams et al (2010)
and Bansak et al (2009) found strong positive effects in Guatemala and Nepal
respectively, while Gregorian et al (2011) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006)
found negative effects in Armenia and Mexico. Other studies, for example Nguyen
et al (2015) and Ang et al. (2009) found no significant effects in Vietnam and the
Philippines.
A reasonable explanation for the above seemingly contradictory evidence is
provided by McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). On the one hand, the inflow of re-
mittances helps to relax households’ budget constraint. As a consequence, more
resources can be directed to education expenditure. On the other hand, out-
migration leads to reduced adult labor force within the household, which may
result in increased child labor. The combined effect, therefore, depends on the
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relative size of the two forces and may vary based on individual and household
characteristics (for example, the child’s gender, age, number of siblings, and fam-
ily structure, educational attainments of the parents) as well as country-specific
factors (for example, education and labor market systems, legal and institutional
frameworks etc.).
In this paper, we estimate the impacts of remittances on human capital invest-
ment and educational outcome using a 5-year panel data from the Kyrgyz Republic.
The Kyrgyz Republic has very high dependence on remittances. In 2017, its total
remittance receipts as a share of gross domestic product was the highest among
countries in Asia and the Pacific at 34.7% (Figure 3.1). Per capita remittances
during the same year also rank high, sugestive of the substantial potential impacts
remittances bring to the country and its households. Moreover, the Kyrgyz Re-
public has a relatively young population, with its median age at 26.5. Investment
in human capital is therefore relevant and crucial for the future development of
this country. To date, the empirical evidence is scant as to whether a large inflow
of remittances to the country is helping to build human capital with mixed empir-
ical outcomes (Kroeger and Anderson, 2014; WB 2015; Hagedorn, Wang and Chi,
2017), all of which merits revisit on the issue using updated data.
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Figure 3.1: Top 10 Remittance-Receiving Economies in Asia – 2017 (% to GDP)
Empirical identification of the effect of remittances on human capital invest-
ment is known to be challenging due to the endogenous nature of migration deci-
sions and amount of remittances. To overcome this problem, we first exploit the
panel nature of the data to eliminate time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at
the household and individual level. Furthermore, to correct for the possible bias
caused by simultaneity, namely the possibility that higher educational expenditure
may in turn induce higher remittances, we use a set of instrumental variables (for
example: distance to road and other amenities; interaction between land area and
incidences of drought) in our panel regressions. We find that remittances have a
negative impact on human capital investment and educational achievement in the
Kyrgyz Republic even after correcting for endogeneity. Namely, both educational
expenditure and school attendance rate are lower for households that receive a
higher amount of remittances. To explore the possible channels of the negative ef-
fects, we further examined how remittances affected other household expenditures
and the time use pattern of school-age children. We find that the negative effects
can at least be partly attributed to increased expenditure on durable goods and
increased hours of child labor induced by migration and remittances.
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Our study contributes to the ongoing research on the impact of remit-
tances/migration on household human capital investment, by offering a rigorous
case study of a country with high dependency on remittances but with scarcity of
empirical study to date to draw conclusion. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 3.2, we review previous literature on relevant fields; In Section
3.3, we introduce the dataset we use (Life in Kyrgyzstan, LiK) and provide descrip-
tive statistics to show some general patterns of the data; Section 3.4 presents our
identification strategy, instrumental variables used, and estimation results; Sec-
tion 3.5 discusses the policy implications as well as the limitations of our study
and concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The process by which migration experience and remittance inflows affect human
capital investment and educational attainment is complex and multidimensional.
It involves a range of social, economic and cultural values and preferences, and is
characterized by heterogenous outcomes across jurisdictions, sectors, and individ-
ual and household characteristics. Further, remittances and generally the migra-
tion process impact the education of children/youth left behind through different
channels. Indeed, existing studies show that the net effect of remittances and inter-
national migration on human capital investment is ambiguous and heterogeneous
at best.
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3.2.1 Migration, Remittances, and Educational Invest-
ment
According to Gordon H. Hanson and Christopher Woodruff (2003), remittances
may have both positive and negative effects on the educational attainment of
school-age children, and that there may be differential effects by gender of the
children. For example, parents may choose to provide greater access to education
for male children, as they may face a greater obligation in providing for elderly
parents. yet, boys are a better substitute for lost farm labor due to migration and
may be required to forgo education and work more when adults are absent.
A number of empirical studies in the literature support the positive contribu-
tion of migration and remittances on education. Remittances relax households
liquidity constraints and finance the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and
contribute to household capital accumulation, and higher propensities of migrant
families to invest in education (e.g., Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez 2013; Acosta
2011; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Bui, Le and Daly 2015; Calero, Bedi and Spar-
row 2009; Cox-Edwards and Ureta 2003; Lu and Treiman 2007; Yang 2008). Ulti-
mately, these and other studies (e.g., Bansak and Chezum 2009; Bouoiyour, Miftah
and Mouhoud 2016; Bredl 2011; Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Koska et al. 2013;
Lopez-Cordova 2006; Mansuri 2006; Salas 2014) conclude that higher income from
remittances improve childrens educational outcomes in terms of higher school en-
rollment, attendance and completion rates; lower dropout rates; and better quality
of education.
On the other hand, other studies find reverse and negative effects of the migra-
tion and remittance on child education attainment due to the disruptive effects of
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family migration and other confounding factors. For one, negative effects may be
driven by the increased demand for child labor in order to supplement household
income or to substitute for the migrant household members domestic responsibili-
ties (e.g., Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Salcedo 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2010;
Antman 2011; Frisancho Robles and Oropesa 2011; Kroeger and Anderson 2014;
McKenzie and Rapoport 2011). Moreover, if jobs for migrants are mainly low
skilled occupations, left-behind children may discount the value of education, po-
tentially leading to unfavorable educational outcomes. This is further reinforced
at the community level if children reside in areas with a high prevalence of in-
ternational migration. Within these communities, a “culture of migration” can
develop, such that young people are expected to migrate in order to attain socioe-
conomic mobility (Halpern-Manners 2011; Kandel and Massey 2002; McKenzie
and Rapoport 2011). Further, some studies point to the emergence of conspicuous
consumption among migrant households to the extent of allowing a trade-off be-
tween productive and consumptive investment 1. For instance, based on a review
of cross-country case studies, Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2003) cite that a
significant proportion, and often the majority of remittances are spent on “status-
oriented” consumption goods. Stephenson and Wilsker (2016) also show that the
total effects of remittances are largest in the areas of luxury expenditures and home
production and to a lesser extent for education and essential household goods pur-
chases. Additionally, these and other studies (Zhang et al. 2014; World Bank
2015) underline the adverse impacts of the lack or absence of parental inputs, low
returns to education both in origin and destination countries, and country-level
idiosyncrasies into education investment and acquisition.
1Following the logic of Chami et al. (2003), De Brauw and Rozelle (2008), and Yang (2008),
among others, consumptive investments include investments in housing and durable goods while
productive investments include investments in physical or human capital aimed to increase house-
holds income-earning potential (such as in education, agriculture or business).
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Overall and notwithstanding the causality direction of the migration and remit-
tance on educational expenditure/outcome discourse, the literature suggests that
the magnitude of these effects may vary within specific sociodemographic charac-
teristics and is contingent on/influenced by the interplay of other factors. Some
studies find that the potential positive effects of economic migration and remit-
tances on human capital accumulation are much greater for boys, whereas some
point to the contrasting pattern favoring girls (Acosta 2011; Bansak and Chezum
2009; Mansuri 2006). Moreover, other studies provide evidence of the interaction of
gender and environment differentials, finding positive effects mainly accumulating
towards urban males while the negative effects on rural female children (Bucheli,
Bohara, and Fontenla 2018). Similarly, some studies note that the impact of
the overall migration-remittance process on educational investment is heteroge-
neously positive, but is most evident among secondary school-aged children and
with younger siblings standing to gain the most (Acharya and Leon-Gonzales 2014;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2010). Among others, this can be attributed to the
fact that the direct costs of schooling for primary school-aged children is negligible,
given the provision of free public primary schooling.
These mixed results may also reflect a shortcoming found in the identification
strategy of existing studies; many of them do not take into account the potential
endogeneity and reverse causality. (McKenzie and Yang 2010). This fundamen-
tally reflects the pervasive existence of endogeneity between remittances, migration
and developmental outcome variables, of which existing studies either use a vari-
ety of instrumental variables or natural experiment to address this endogeneity
problem. Across these studies, instrumental variables (IV) technique is the most
commonly employed method in addressing the endogeneity of remittances, but the
instruments must be carefully selected based on exclusion restriction assumption
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in order to avoid biased estimates (Gibson and McKenzie and Yang 2013). In
this regard, the preferred option has been to rely on natural experiment, where
using exogenous economic shocks as a source of variation (Yang 2008) and relying
on a visa lottery scheme (McKenzie et al. 2010) have proven to be good exam-
ples. Notably, another effective method increasingly employed in the estimation
of the impacts of remittances and migration is panel data analysis (Bohme 2015;
Funkhouser 2013; Lall et al. 2006; Quisumbing and McNiven 2010; Yang 2008),
on which this study is based.
3.2.2 Existing Literature in the Kyrgyz Republic and
Other Central Asian Countries
A number of empirical studies in the Kyrgyz Republic have focused on the im-
pact of remittances on overall welfare as well as certain household outcomes. For
instance, Karymshakov, Abdieva and Sulaymanova (2014) find that international
remittances considerably decrease poverty level in the country. In terms of spe-
cific household outcomes, Muktarbek kyzy, Seyitov, and Jenish (2015) analyzed
the impact of international migrants remittances on the expenditure structure of
households using the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey for 2010-2012, and find that re-
mittances increase the share of expenditures on construction, celebrations, and
durable goods, but decrease the shares of expenditures on food and public util-
ities. Muktarbek kyzy et al.s (2015) findings are consistent with the results of
the studies by Ukueva and Becker (2010), who conclude that remittances increase
durable goods consumption; and with Hagedorn, Wang and Chi (2017), who find
that increases in household remittance received are correlated with spending on a
smaller share of the household budget on food and housing, and a larger share on
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events and other expenses (such as legal and educational expenses).
Studies on the impact of international migration and remittances on human
capital investment, particularly on education, have grown over time, but the ex-
isting literature in the Central Asia and Kyrgyz Republic is fairly limited. Within
Central Asia, Brown et al. (2008) find that school absenteeism increases with the
receipt of remittances in Tajikistan, with the negative effect potentially explained
by the low level of confidence about the future returns and good employment
opportunities. By contrast, Mirkasimov Anderson (2010) find positive effects in
terms of overall education expenditure, as well as in terms of school enrolment
of older children in the same country while Clement (2011) find no effect. A
study by Kroeger and Anderson (2014) on Kyrgyz Republic is the most relevant to
our study which evaluates the impact of remittances (domestic and international
transfer combined) on child probability of school enrollment using fixed effects and
instrumental variable technique. They find, based on data collected between 2005
to 2009 that the receipt of remittances has no significant impact on overall school
enrollment, with negative and significant effect on children age 14-18, especially
among boys. The negative impact is mainly due to the loss of adult labor in the
household. Our study aims to complement this study by making contribution in
three areas; 1) isolating the effect of international remittances from that of domes-
tic transfer, 2) providing analysis based on alternative and updated panel data set
covering period up to 2016, and 3) introducing additional and more direct outcome
variables (educational expenditure and attendance) in addition to the school en-
rollment data 2, 4) identifying potential channels through which remittances may
affect educational expenditure and outcomes, for example expenditure on other
goods and changes in childrens time use pattern. Similar to Kroeger and Ander-
2WB(2015) explores the impact of international remittances on educational expenditure using
OLS regression, but the study does not control for potential endogeneity.
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son (2014), we exploit panel structure of the data and IV strategy to identify the
causal effects of international remittances on human capital development among
school-aged children in the country.
3.3 Data
The data source of our paper is the Life in Kyrgyzstan (LiK) Study, a longitudinal
survey that tracks the same 3000 households and 8000 individuals over time in
all seven Kyrgyz regions (oblasts, namely Batken, Jalal-Abad, Issyk-Kul, Naryn,
Osh, Talas, and Chui) and the two cities of Bishkek and Osh. The data are
representative nationally and at the regional level (East, West, North, South). The
survey interviews all adult household members about household demographics,
assets, expenditure, migration, employment, agricultural markets, shocks, social
networks, subjective well-being, and many other topics. The survey was first
conducted in the fall of 2010 and has been repeated four times in 2011, 2012, 2013,
and 2016. All members of the households in 2010 are interviewed and tracked over
time. This implies that if a member of an original sample household leaves the
household (e.g. to form an own family), she is still part of the sample. If relevant,
other members (e.g. spouse and children) of the new household are then included
in the sample as well. By the end of the last wave in 2016, the attrition rate for
households is about 20%.
The survey consists of a household questionnaire (to be filled in by the most
informed household member), an individual questionnaire (to be filled in by all
adults of age 18 and above of the sampled households) and a community ques-
tionnaire (to be filled in by a representative of a local administration). Our study
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utilizes all relevant components of the dataset by merging data across years and
modules to create a 5-year unbalanced panel.
Table 3.1 provides some basic summary statistics relevant to the scope of our
study. Within the time span of this study, both household income and education
expenditure increased steadily over years. With regard to remittances, the per-
centage of households receiving remittances increased slightly from 2010 to 2013
and subsequently came back to its original level in 2016. Although the percentage
of households receiving remittances is only about 10%, which is not high compared
to other Asian countries, the receiving households do rely heavily on remittances.
As shown in Appendix B, remittances on average accounts for approximately 70%
of the annual income of the receiving households. Regardless of measurement used
(total vs. per capita, cash vs. in-kind), the amount of remittances received fluctu-
ated greatly over years. This is likely to be due to exchange rate fluctuation and
the unstable economic condition of Russia during this period, since the majority
of Kyrgyz migrants work in Russia.
Table 3.1: Household Finance Summary Statistics (By Year, in Soms)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
Per Capita Household Income 2,847.01 2,970.17 3,531.47 3,988.62 6,042.15
Percentage Received Remittances 10.00% 12.10% 12.90% 13.90% 10.40%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 7,587 24,188 22,424 16,533 18,295
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances (Receiving Households) 75,867 200,721 175,345 119,507 175,989
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 28.67 87.39 124 111.1 83.99
Per Capita Annual Remittances 1,420 4,232 4,429 2,771 2,798
Household Education Expenditure (Primary) 2,044 2,622 2,980 3,781 4,446
Household Education Expenditure (Secondary) 2,826 3,701 4,045 5,249 5,444
Table 3.2 compares the household characteristics of remittances receiving and
non-receiving households. As shown in the last column, they are statistically signif-
icantly different in all aspects. On the one hand, remittances-receiving households
are privileged in the sense that they have higher household income and are more
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likely to have male and married household heads. On the other hand, they are
disadvantaged since they tend to have less educated household head and are more
likely to reside in rural areas. These differences may affect how receiving house-
holds perceive the importance of human capital investment and allocate resources
between production and education, both in terms of money and in terms of time.
Table 3.2: Remittances Receiving and Non-Receiving Households Comparison
Variables Non-Receving Receiving Difference
Household Size 4.676 6.536 -1.860***
Household Income 18,000 22,000 -4.3e+03***
Male Household Leader 71.20% 76.80% -0.056***
Household Leader Age 51.67 54.57 -2.896***
Household Leader Education 4.72 4.412 0.308***
Household Leader Married 0.701 0.78 -0.080***
Rural Households 58.10% 74.30% -0.161***
Observations 12144 1630
Interestingly, there are huge geographical variations across regions within the
Kyrgyz Republic. As shown in Table 3.3, households in the South are more reliant
on remittances compared to the North and Central areas. That is, households in
the South have more migrants per household, more than 20% of them are receiving
remittances, with amounts that are much higher in comparison to other areas.
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Table 3.3: Remittance Trend (By Region)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
North (Talas, Baryb, Issyk-Kul)
Number of Migrants Per Household 0.0476 0.0643 0.0972 0.1200 0.0963
Number of Migrants Per Migrating Household 1.2778 1.3810 1.4074 1.3158 1.3000
Received Remittances 3.43% 4.09% 5.36% 8.02% 6.56%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 2,691 5,327 5,640 7,134 6,508
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 7.62 70.18 99.21 42.19 43.76
Per Capita Annual Remittances 521 1,018 1,316 1,377 1,268
Central (Chui, Bishkek City)
Number of Migrants Per Household 0.0530 0.0418 0.0428 0.0457 0.0491
Number of Migrants Per Migrating Household 1.3333 1.2333 1.4091 1.4000 1.3200
Received Remittances 2.61% 2.85% 2.14% 1.81% 3.15%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 2,225 4,792 3,458 1,379 3,225
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 7.391 14.25 0 0 0
Per Capita Annual Remittances 495 995 803 273 639
South (Osh, Jalal-Abad, Batken)
Number of Migrants Per Household 0.3360 0.3570 0.4410 0.4290 0.2880
Number of Migrants Per Migrating Household 1.5238 1.4122 1.6561 1.6304 1.6220
Received Remittances 19.00% 22.80% 24.50% 24.20% 16.40%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 14,180 47,430 44,214 30,269 31,911
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 55.47 153.7 233 211.7 150.7
Per Capita Annual Remittances 2,579 8,138 8,558 4,976 4,692
To a large extent, the school system in the Kyrgyz Republic continues to follow
the Soviet model. Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, from approximately
age 6/7 to age 15. Following an optional period at a private or state kindergarten,
children enroll in primary school for 4 years (age 6/7 to 9). Secondary educa-
tion is divided into 5 years of Basic Secondary (age 10-15) and Higher Secondary
(age 16-17). Primary and Basic Secondary (Grade 1 to 9) are compulsory and
are provided at the state institutions free of cost. Upon completing secondary
education, a small portion of students would proceed to receive either vocational
education or tertiary education. Vocational education is offered through three
kinds of courses: A three-year course mixing vocational and general education and
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preparing for higher education, a two-year course mixing vocational and general
education (without preparation to higher education), and a ten-month course of
pure vocational education (also open to adults). Vocational education is given in
professional lyceum and vocational technical colleges. Tertiary education delivers
bachelor degree in four years, which allows students to pursue master programs,
lasting two years. PhD programs are offered at some institutes as well. The
average enrollment rates for each level of schooling over the survey years are sum-
marized in Table 3.4. We observe that while primary and secondary education has
high and stable enrollment rate of approximately 90%, enrollment rate for post-
secondary education hovers around 20%. This is likely to be due to the fact that
post-secondary education is neither compulsory nor free of charge. In addition to
its low level, we also noticed a downward trend in post-secondary enrollment rate
over time.
Table 3.4: Enrollment Rate by School Level
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016 Overall
Primary (Age 6-9) 87.4% 88.4% 84.9% 85.3% 89.5% 87.2%
Secondary (Age 10-17) 93.0% 91.9% 91.6% 92.6% 96.1% 92.9%
Post-Secondary (Age 18-24) 23.4% 21.3% 19.5% 14.7% 17.4% 19.3%
To summarize, although household income and education expenditure have
increased over the survey years, school enrollment rate especially post-secondary
school enrollment has declined. On the remittances side, we find that although
the percentage of households receiving remittances is low, their reliance on re-
mittances is very heavy. The amount of remittances received fluctuated over the
survey years and varied greatly across regions. Moreover, we found very distinctive
characteristics between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households, which
may in turn affect how they perceive the trade-off between education and pro-
duction. Although the above descriptive statistics provide insights into the basic
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trends and patterns of our data, we cannot understand the causal relationship
without a rigorous identification strategy.
3.4 Estimation Strategy and Results
The impact of remittances on the education of the school-age children in the recip-
ient household is estimated using educational expenditures and school attendance
as two outcome variables. Two potential sources of endogeineity may bias our
estimate for the impact of remittances on human capital investment and educa-
tional outcomes. First of all, time-invariant unobserved characteristics at both
household level (neighborhood environment, beliefs about the importance of edu-
cation, etc) and individual level (ability, personality, etc) may be correlated with
both migration/remittances and educational outcomes. We address this problem
by using a fixed-effects panel regression methods to difference out these particular
factors (Subsection 3.4.1). Secondly, time-variant unobserved factors and reverse
causality – the possibility that higher school costs may induce family members
to remit more – cannot be addressed by fixed effects alone. We therefore use an
instrumental variable approach to achieve clean identification (Subsection 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Fixed-Effects Panel Regression
The amount of remittances received (or even the decision to migrate) and hu-
man capital investment decisions may be simultaneously affected by unobserved
household characteristics, such as the members latent ability, beliefs about the
importance of education, and neighborhood characteristics. Similarly, a childs
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unobserved ability and personality may be correlated with both her parents mi-
gration decisions and the probability of her attending school. Such endogeneity,
left uncorrected, can lead to biased estimate of the effect of remittances on human
capital investments. We therefore exploit the panel feature of our data and use
fixed effects model to eliminate time-invariant unobserved household characteris-
tics. More specifically, our education expenditure regression model can be written
as:
ln(yjt) = α0 + αj + β ·Remmitjt + γt · T + δ ·Xjt + εjt
where the dependent variable ln(yjt) is the natural log of the educational expen-
diture (up to secondary education only) of household j in year t. The key inde-
pendent variable Remmitjt – the amount of remittances received by household j
in year t – takes two forms in our specification: the natural log of total remit-
tances received by the household, and the natural log of per capita remittances.
The logarithm transformation is common in econometric studies using wage or re-
mittances data since the residuals have a strongly positively skewed distribution.
Furthermore, the log-log specification gives the coefficient an elasticity interpre-
tation. In the above equation, αj is an j × 1 vector capturing household-specific
time-invariant fixed effects, whereas T captures year fixed effects. Xjt is a matrix
of control variables including characteristics of the household head (gender, age,
education level, marital status, and ethnicity), household size, and house value
as a proxy for wealth. Some of the control variables are almost time-invariant,
such as gender and ethnicity of the household head and only see changes when the
household head in previous years leaves the sample or a new household is formed.
The variations that we can exploit from these variables are therefore very limited.
For our educational outcome specification, the likelihood of a child attending
school is a function of household remittances, a vector of individual child charac-
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teristics (the child’s gender and age), and household characteristics (gender, age,
education level, marital status, and ethnicity of the household head, household
size, and house value). Namely,
Sijt = α0 + αi + β ·Remmitjt + γt · T + δ · Cit + δ ·Xjt + εijt
where Sijt is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if child i (age 5-24) in household
j is attending school in time period t. Same as the human capital investment
specification, Remmitjt is the amount of remittances received by household j in
year t and is included either as the logarithm transformation of total remittances or
per capita remittances. To save space, only the results from per capita remittances
specifications are reported in the regression tables. Cit is the child’s characteristics,
and αi is an i × 1 vector capturing child-specific time-invariant fixed effects. Xjt
and T are the same as defined in the human capital investment specification.
Descriptive data of the variables used in estimation are found in the Appendix.
3.4.2 Choice of Instrumental Variables
Although the fixed effects model partials out the effects of time-invariant unob-
servables and alleviates omitted variable bias, the endogeneity problem is not fully
addressed for the following two reasons. First of all, we cannot preclude the ex-
istence of time-variant omitted variables affecting both remittances received and
human capital investment/ educational outcomes. Secondly, the need to invest
more in education may reversely trigger an increase in remittances, thereby bias-
ing the coefficient estimate. To address these problems, we use a set of instrumental
variables (IVs) to correct for potential endogeneity bias.
Existing literature has identified variables such as distance to railroad lines,
83
historical migration rates, exogenous shocks to agricultural production such as
changes in rainfall patterns (e.g.,Woodruff & Zenteno, 2007, Hanson & Woodruff,
2002, McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007, Munshi, 2003 and Passel, 2006) as valid in-
strumental variables. We focus on these variables and modify the specifications
according to the context of our regressions.
Three sets of instrumental variables were used in our analysis, one at a time de-
pending on the context of the regressions. The first set is land area interacted with
severity of drought (no drought=0; mild drought=0.5; severe drought =1), where
the incidence and severity of drought is self-reported by each household. We drew
inspiration from Munshi (2003) where he used rainfall in the origin-community
(collected from local weather stations) as an instrument for the size of the mi-
grant network at the destination, because low rainfall at the origin increases the
probability that the migrant will be occupied in a non-agricultural job. Yang and
Choi (2007) also used rainfall shocks to instrument for income and remittances
in the Philippines. In our case, the drought may lead to increased out-migration
due to reduced farm jobs and may lead to higher remittances to compensate re-
duced income from agricultural production. By interacting land area and severity
of drought, we aim to measure the impact of the disaster more accurately, since
larger farms suffer heavier loss from the drought. One criticism for the use of natu-
ral disasters as instrumental variable in remittance studies is that while drought or
rainfall are exogenous shocks that affect remittances, it may also affect household
expenditures. While we acknowledge the possibility that other household expen-
ditures may be affected, educational expenditure, which is paid by semester, is
unlikely to vary with natural disasters. Hence we only use this set of instrumental
variable when the dependent variable is educational expenditure.
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The second set of instrumental variable is household’s self-reported distance to
the nearest road. This type of instrument (distance to the nearest railroad) has
been used before in the literature by Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) for the case
of Mexico and by Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) for the case of Guatemala. The
rationale is that distance to the nearest transportation system is a good proxy
for migration costs. Since road is the major mode of transportation in Kyrgyz
Republic, the further away a household is from the road system, the lower the
likelihood any household member would migrate and hence lower remittances. One
potential drawback is that distance to the nearest road tends to be time-invariant.
In our dataset, however, we do have enough within-subject variation to allow for
identification. The change may either be induced by construction of new roads
or households moving to new locations. This set of instrument is used for the
regression of other household expenditures on remittances, since distance to the
nearest road is unlikely to be correlated to expenditures on durable goods, food,
wedding, etc.
For the estimation of the impact of remittances on school attendance, distance
to the nearest road may not be a valid instrument as it is likely to directly affect
the transportation cost of childrens commute to school, and is therefore likely
to be correlated with both educational expenditure and school attendance rate.
We therefore introduce a third set of instrumentsthe average distance from the
household to the nearest road, market, town hall, and hospital. While distance to
the nearest road proxies for migration costs, the averaged distance measure proxies
for migration costs and the general centrality of the households location and, at
the same time, reduces the correlation with school attendance.
The first-stage regression results are included in Appendix B. For each regres-
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sion, the instrumental variable included is statistically significant (p < 0.001) on
its own, Moreover, all the three first stage regressions are significant (p < 0.10)
and have passed the weak IV tests. In the results section for our main regres-
sions, we report both the fixed-effect panel regression results without correcting
for endogeneity (columns labeled FE) and with endogeneity corrected (columns
labeled“FE, IV) to allow for side-by-side comparison. For auxiliary regressions
that aims to identify the channels of the impact of remittances, we only report the
results after correcting for selection bias.
3.4.3 Estimation Results (1): Remittances and Human
Capital Investment
The estimation results for the effect of remittances on human capital investment,
measured by household level educational expenditure, are summarized in Table
3.5. The fixed effects panel regression results without using instrumental variables
are presented in columns (1) and (3), whereas the endogeneity corrected results
are presented in columns (2) and (4). The first two columns use the natural log
of total remittances received by the household as the independent variable, while
the last two columns use the natural log of per capita remittances received by the
household.
We observe that remittances have a negative effect on household educational
expenditure. That is, households that receive more remittances tend to spend less
on the education of children. Although the effect is not robust to endogeneity
correction as the key estimates in columns (2) and (4) are not statistically signif-
icant, the trend is negative and very close to significant. In addition, educational
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expenditure is also affected by household characteristics. For example, older house-
hold heads tend to spend more on childrens education, and wealthier households
(proxied by market value of the house) have higher educational expenditure.
Table 3.5: Effect of Remittances on Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHD Educ Exp HHD Educ Exp HHD Educ Exp HHD Educ Exp
VARIABLES FE IV,FE FE IV, FE
Remittances
Log Total Remittances -0.0218* -0.289
(0.0131) (0.272)
Log Per Capita Remittances -0.0262* -0.349
(0.0157) (0.327)
Household Characteristics
Age of Household Leader 0.0289*** 0.0246* 0.0288*** 0.0235*
(0.0103) (0.0141) (0.0103) (0.0141)
Gender of Household Leader -0.580 -1.401* -0.581 -1.403*
(0.399) (0.833) (0.399) (0.835)
Household Size -0.0184 0.108 -0.0188 0.103
(0.0507) (0.0702) (0.0507) (0.0694)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0254 0.0484 0.0257 0.0519
(0.0912) (0.110) (0.0912) (0.109)
Marital Status of Household Leader 0.258 0.649 0.259 0.650
(0.320) (0.458) (0.320) (0.459)
House Value 2.37e-07*** 2.17e-07** 2.38e-07*** 2.19e-07**
(4.31e-08) (8.83e-08) (4.31e-08) (8.98e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.694*** 6.926*** 6.696*** 6.996***
(0.805) (1.321) (0.805) (1.363)
Observations 4,828 3,925 4,828 3,925
Number of HHD 1,980 1,781 1,980 1,781
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The negative (or lack of) impact of remittances on educational expenditure
seems counterintuitive. One possible explanation is that remittances might have
induced an increase in expenditure on certain items that requires existing house-
hold resources to be drawn into the new items. For example, the household may
decide to buy a new car after receiving remittances. However, the amount of remit-
tances received may not be sufficient for the car, so the household head will have
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to cut expenditure on schooling or healthcare to fund the new car. To understand
how household expenditure on other items changed in response to remittances,
we performed a set of regressions of itemized expenditures on remittances, using
distance to the nearest road as instrumental variable . The categorization method
of household expenditure items is summarized in Appendix B. Table 3.6 reports
the endogeneity corrected results.
Table 3.6: Effect of Remittances on Other Household Expenditure (FE, IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Food Non-Durable Durable Wedding Utilities Health Other
Remittances
Log Total Remittances -0.0116 -4.018*** 4.605*** -0.194 0.00757 1.085*** 0.382**
(0.0559) (1.147) (1.290) (0.344) (0.0936) (0.367) (0.174)
Household Characteristics
Age of Household Leader 0.0103*** 0.0722** 0.0963*** -0.0355*** 0.00806*** 0.0375*** -0.00302
(0.00157) (0.0320) (0.0360) (0.00960) (0.00261) (0.0102) (0.00484)
Gender of Household Leader -0.0515 -1.135 2.163* -0.265 -0.227** 0.320 0.178
(0.0556) (1.130) (1.271) (0.339) (0.0922) (0.362) (0.171)
Household Size 0.0971*** 0.653*** -0.225 0.151** 0.0651*** 0.00661 0.114***
(0.00994) (0.197) (0.222) (0.0591) (0.0161) (0.0631) (0.0298)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0208 -0.510* -0.250 0.0755 0.00457 0.00649 -0.0484
(0.0138) (0.282) (0.317) (0.0846) (0.0230) (0.0903) (0.0427)
Marital Status of Household Leader 0.0997** 0.421 -1.055 -0.293 0.363*** 0.231 0.0418
(0.0418) (0.854) (0.959) (0.256) (0.0696) (0.273) (0.129)
House Value 7.99e-08*** 7.63e-07*** 1.42e-06*** 6.51e-08 3.18e-08*** 2.08e-07*** 9.91e-08***
(6.63e-09) (1.35e-07) (1.52e-07) (4.05e-08) (1.10e-08) (4.32e-08) (2.04e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 9.896*** 8.218*** -4.078 7.568*** 8.669*** 3.329*** 8.417***
(0.128) (2.616) (2.940) (0.784) (0.213) (0.837) (0.396)
Observations 12,824 12,871 12,871 12,871 12,871 12,871 12,871
Number of HHD 3,090 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that remittances have a negative impact on non-durable goods (e.g.,
clothing, shoes, personal care items) but have positive impacts on durable goods
(e.g., cars, phones, computers, TV); healthcare (e.g., medicine, hospital visits);
and other expenditures (e.g., house maintenance, recreation, taxes). Interestingly,
expenditure on durable goods has the highest elasticity - a 1% increase in remit-
tances may lead to an approximately 4% increase in durable goods expenditure.
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This suggests that the negative response of educational expenditure to remittances
may be induced by the large expansion in demand for durable goods. This also
means that an increase in remittances is less likely to lead to a parallel increase
in expenditures for education and non-durable goods because of the greater de-
mand to purchase durable consumer goods. This is consistent with the findings of
World Bank (2015) which reports that while being a migrant household correlates
with higher consumption, it does not correlate with higher education expenditures
(either in total or in per capita terms using OLS estimation controlling for house-
hold characteristics). In addition, noting that the dependency ratio for migrant
households is lower than that of non-migrant households, there is evidence that
the choice of migration is not necessarily investment into youth but rather on asset
accumulation (ibid). Meanwhile, Muktarbek kyzy et al. (2015) report partially
similar results, noting that remittances have a greater effect on expenditures on
durable goods than on education (i.e., a 1% increase in remittances share from
total income increases the share of expenditure on durable goods by 1.12% and on
human capital by 0.7%).
In summary, our findings suggest that migrant households in the Kyrgyz Re-
public are primarily driven by consumptive investment (i.e., investment in assets
and goods that immediately improve the quality of life and standard of living
of households) rather than productive investment (i.e., investment in assets that
improve the productive capacity of households in the long-run). This may be
partially explained by the fact that migrant households in the country have low
levels of domestic sources of income and social assistance, are increasingly becom-
ing dependent on remittance income, and thus are more vulnerable to economic
shocks (World Bank 2015). In this regard, remittance income is then more likely
to be used for immediate consumption or as shock absorber as substitute for social
89
protection when the domestic labor market or social assistance is poor (Kireyev
2006). However, the pattern of expenditure on durable goods and other items such
as recreation and house maintenancewhich are often associated as status-oriented
consumption goodsmay suggest that the receipt of remittances may, at the same
time, allow conspicuous consumption at the expense of long-term productive in-
vestments.
On another note, within household characteristics, the finding that older house-
hold heads tend to have a larger expenditure allocation on education seems to
highlight the factor of maturity at play in influencing household expenditure and
consumption behaviors, more so on the productive activities of families. In addi-
tion, the finding relating to investment differences by wealth levels indicate that
wealthier households may have better access to credit, which allows them to en-
gage in more investment opportunities, including on education. Notwithstanding
this possibility, it is worthy to note that overall, expected returns to education and
country-level idiosyncrasies tend to play a large role in determining households
education expenditures in the Kyrgyz Republic, especially towards post-secondary
education. A recent study by Esenaliev (2018) cites that an increasing share of
secondary school graduates opt to leave schools, in part, due to higher admission
requirements in higher education institutions and lack of appropriate employment
prospects for university graduates. In addition, despite the increase in higher ed-
ucation institutions in recent years, the quality of higher education remains poor.
Even while a university diploma does provide better chances of being employed,
unemployment among those with higher education remains considerably high, at
about 18% in 2015. This contextual evidence that the quality of and returns to
education is among, if not the major, determinant in Kyrgyz households expen-
diture allocation on education is partially consistent with the findings of Clement
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(2011) and Brown et al. (2008).
3.4.4 Estimation Results (2): Remittances and Educa-
tional Outcomes
While educational expenditure is a good measure on households investment in
human capital, educational outcomes are of utmost importance. In this section,
we evaluate the effect of remittances on educational outcomes, in particular, school
attendance rate of school-age children/youth. The dependent variable is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 if a person aged between 5 and 24an age range
that covers primary schooling to Masters educationis currently attending school
and 0 otherwise. Since the dependent variable is at the individual level, we use
per capita remittances received instead of total remittances received as our key
independent variable.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Per Capita Remittances on Attendance Rate (By School Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Overall Overall Primary Primary Secondary Secondary Post Post
FE IV, FE FE IV, FE FE IV, FE FE IV, FE
Remittances
Log PC Remittances -0.0531*** -1.136*** 0.0303 0.263 -0.0290* -0.605*** -0.0411** -0.0507
(0.00883) (0.147) (0.0346) (0.492) (0.0165) (0.211) (0.0199) (0.406)
Child Characteristics
Age -0.332*** -0.246*** -0.595*** -0.619*** -0.0760*** -0.0291 -0.626*** -0.625***
(0.0130) (0.0171) (0.0867) (0.0970) (0.0255) (0.0306) (0.0441) (0.0577)
Gender 0.0361 -0.333 1.798 1.716 -0.525 -0.712 -0.100 -0.0786
(0.254) (0.261) (1.354) (1.329) (0.461) (0.470) (0.647) (0.670)
Household Characteristics
Household Size -0.0246 0.0456 -0.152 -0.174 0.0957* 0.133** -0.0162 -0.0238
(0.0292) (0.0311) (0.122) (0.127) (0.0574) (0.0593) (0.0673) (0.0731)
Age of Household Leader 0.00716 0.0249*** 0.00342 0.000423 0.00739 0.0171 -0.0194 -0.0193
(0.00619) (0.00664) (0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0148) (0.0164)
Gender of Household Leader 0.252 -0.337* 0.139 0.138 -0.248 -0.563 0.158 0.134
(0.179) (0.197) (0.958) (0.965) (0.335) (0.353) (0.482) (0.537)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0262 0.0272 -0.278 -0.251 0.167* 0.181* -0.124 -0.125
(0.0516) (0.0518) (0.220) (0.218) (0.101) (0.101) (0.105) (0.104)
House Value -4.02e-07*** -4.21e-07*** -1.16e-06*** -1.15e-06*** -6.07e-07*** -6.23e-07*** -3.41e-07*** -3.44e-07***
(3.27e-08) (3.29e-08) (1.71e-07) (1.70e-07) (6.03e-08) (6.09e-08) (7.66e-08) (7.73e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,012 11,011 1,017 1,017 3,376 3,376 2,301 2,301
Number of Individuals 2,724 2,724 393 393 948 948 683 683
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The first two columns of Table 3.7 summarize our estimation results using
the full sample, with and without instrumental variables. We observe that the
coefficient on remittances remains negative and statistically significant regardless
of the model used. That is, remittances have a negative impact on childrens school
attendance rate.
We further breakdown the effects by school level and report them in columns
(3) to (8) in Table 3.7. We observe that regardless of the model used, remittances
do not have a statistically significant impact on primary school attendance rate
(columns (3) and (4)). This is not surprising as primary education is compulsory
and children between ages 6 and 9 are unable to substitute for adult labor. In
terms of secondary school attendance rate, the effect is, however, negative and
statistically significant. This may be associated to the maturity of children aged
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10-17, i.e., their ability to act as potential substitutes for adult labor. To note, in
the LiK questionnaire, household heads are asked to report if, and why, school-
age children within their households are not attending school. While works to
support family is not considered as a reason for any absence from primary school,
it is quoted as a reason for approximately 10% of the cases of secondary school
non-attendance. For post-secondary education, the effect seems to be negative
but is not statistically significant after correcting for selection bias. One possible
explanation rests on the fact that college attendance rate in the Kyrgyz Republic is
generally very low 3. Therefore, the effects of remittances on such small variation
can hardly be robustly identified.
As mentioned in the previous section, the attractiveness of higher secondary
(non-compulsory) and post-secondary education in the country is on a downward
trend due to higher admission requirements and low quality and returns in terms
of prospective employment opportunities. Similarly, the poor rewards to education
in destination countries may have a disincentive effect on school attendance, and
ultimately on educational attainment. Kyrgyz labor migrants are generally less
educated than domestic workers 4, and most are engaged in low-skilled occupations
(World Bank 2015). A decline in migration is also apparent among households in
the higher wealth quantiles while poorer households are increasingly becoming
migrant-sending households (ibid). These two patterns do not only underline the
fact that labor migration in the Kyrgyz Republic exhibits a selection bias towards
younger, less educated workers, but also that returns to education in destination
countries are generally low.
3In fact, enrollment in tertiary education has been flat since 2009 (World Bank 2015).
4About two-thirds of labor migrants have completed a general secondary degree, while over
a third of domestic workers have completed a specialized secondary or tertiary degree (World
Bank 2015).
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On another note, school attendance rate is also negatively affected by age,
with older children less likely to attend school. This is in parallel with World
Banks (2015) study which reports that older children aged 1518 are less likely
to be enrolled in school. Gender surprisingly does not seem to play a role in
determining school attendance. Interestingly, house value also negatively affects
attendance rate, indicating that children from wealthier families are less likely to
attend school. This might be due to the possibility that households that own
larger properties require kids to help more with house work or farm work. Since
house value is not exogenous, it might also be that some common unobservables
are driving both wealth and attendance rate.
An alternative breakdown method is by compulsoriness, where we divide
the school-age children sample into compulsory education (age 6-15) and non-
compulsory education (age 16 and above). The results are reported in Table
3.8. We observe that for both categories -compulsory and non-compulsory - and
across specifications used, the impact of remittances on school attendance rate is
uniformly negative and statistically significant. In other words, the existence of
compulsory education does not negate the negative impact of migration and remit-
tances on childrens educational outcomes. It is understandable that the effects are
statistically significant for both categories, since secondary education - the school
level that is most heavily impacted by migration and remittances - is included in
both categories. In terms of individual characteristics and household characteris-
tics, the finding is the same as in the by school level breakdown analyses. We find
that older children and children from wealthier families are less likely to attend
school, both in compulsory and non-compulsory education.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Per Capita Remittances on Attendance Rate (By Compulsori-
ness)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Compulsory Compulsory Non-Compulsory Non-Compulsory
FE FE, IV FE FE, IV
Remittances
Log Per Capita Remittances -0.0268* -0.918*** -0.0681*** -0.791***
(0.0139) (0.186) (0.0161) (0.277)
Child Characteristics
Age -0.0348* 0.0400 -0.842*** -0.774***
(0.0205) (0.0255) (0.0350) (0.0422)
Gender -0.217 -0.525 -0.142 -0.422
(0.363) (0.370) (0.576) (0.585)
Household Characteristics
Household Size -0.00321 0.0644 -0.0506 -0.0161
(0.0458) (0.0478) (0.0578) (0.0611)
Age of Household Leader 0.00769 0.0217** -0.00324 0.00885
(0.00872) (0.00920) (0.0130) (0.0137)
Gender of Household Leader -0.106 -0.551* 0.402 -0.00859
(0.285) (0.303) (0.382) (0.409)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0660 0.0717 -0.0337 -0.0285
(0.0765) (0.0772) (0.0885) (0.0877)
House Value -5.65e-07*** -5.89e-07*** -3.03e-07*** -3.26e-07***
(5.01e-08) (5.08e-08) (6.44e-08) (6.43e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,668 4,668 4,556 4,555
Number of Individuals 1,264 1,264 1,259 1,259
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The negative effect of remittances on school attendance rate is similarly coun-
terintuitive as in the educational expenditure case. It is therefore an empirical
question why school-age children in high remittances families are less likely to
attend school and, if they are not in school, where was their supposed time for ed-
ucation/schooling spent. To answer these questions, we performed an additional
set of analyses where we aim to identify the effect of remittances on school-age
childrens time use pattern.
In the household questionnaire, household heads are required to answer the
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following three questions: (1) On average, how many hours each day did [CHILD
NAME] spend doing homework during the past academic year (we term it home-
work); (2) On average, how many hours each day did [CHILD NAME] spend
helping at home, family business or farm during the past academic year (we term
it housework); and (3) If any, how many hours a day did [CHILD NAME] work
outside of the household for money in the past academic year (we term it outside
work). We regress these three measures on per capita remittances using the fixed
effects model with and without instrumental variables. The instrument used is the
average distance from the household to road, town hall, hospital, market, etc.the
reason being that the average distance is likely to affect migration cost, and hence
remittances, but is unlikely to affect the amount of time that children spend on
homework, housework, and outside work. It must be noted that only children
between ages 5 and 17 are included in this analysis since time use patterns for
children beyond 17 years old are unreported. The estimation results are presented
in Table 3.9, with the plain fixed effects model (FE) and instrumented fixed effects
model compared in juxtaposition to each other.
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Table 3.9: Effect of Per Capita Remittances on Children’s Time Use Pattern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Homework Homework Farmwork Farmwork Outside Work Outside Work
FE FE,IV FE FE,IV FE FE,IV
Remittances
Log Per Capita Remittances -0.000349 0.00872 0.0153*** 0.154* -0.00109 0.0157
(0.00421) (0.0596) (0.00551) (0.0809) (0.00226) (0.0320)
Household Characteristics
Age 0.0999*** 0.0996*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.0240*** 0.0230***
(0.00604) (0.00706) (0.00790) (0.00959) (0.00324) (0.00380)
Gender 0.132 0.143 0.201 0.254 -0.00163 0.00436
(0.113) (0.115) (0.148) (0.156) (0.0606) (0.0618)
Household Size 0.00596 0.00433 0.0338* 0.0100 -0.0269*** -0.0298***
(0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0188) (0.0240) (0.00771) (0.00950)
Age of Household Leader 0.00264 0.00257 -0.00108 -0.00246 0.00191 0.00175
(0.00263) (0.00270) (0.00344) (0.00366) (0.00141) (0.00145)
Gender of Household Leader -0.164** -0.158* -0.0766 0.0104 -0.0552 -0.0447
(0.0809) (0.0891) (0.106) (0.121) (0.0433) (0.0479)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0373 0.0376 0.0261 0.0296 0.00550 0.00593
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0299) (0.0311) (0.0123) (0.0123)
House Value 6.18e-09 6.17e-09 3.28e-08* 3.66e-08** -1.84e-08*** -1.79e-08**
(1.31e-08) (1.32e-08) (1.71e-08) (1.79e-08) (7.00e-09) (7.09e-09)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.330 0.326 -1.074*** -1.028*** -0.0986 -0.0932
(0.216) (0.218) (0.282) (0.296) (0.116) (0.117)
Observations 12,413 12,408 12,413 12,408 12,413 12,408
Number of ID 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
From the first row, we observe that while the coefficients on homework and
outside work are not statistically significant, the coefficients on housework are
significantly positive. This implies that school-age children in households that
receive higher remittances spend a significantly higher amount of time helping at
home, family business or farm. This result is robust regardless of which model is
used. The magnitude of the impact looks rather small at first sighta 10% difference
in annual remittances translates into 30 minutes per month, or equivalently 6 hours
per year, difference in a given school-age childs time spent on housework. However,
this also implies that if household A receives twice as much remittance as household
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B does, the child in household A spend 60 hours more on housework annually than
the child in household B, which is a significant amount of time.
Our result is consistent with McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) in that while
remittances may help relax households’ budget constraint, the absence of adult
labor force calls for child labor as a substitute, alters school-age childrens time use
pattern, and ultimately negatively affects school attendance rate. In the Kyrgyz
Republic, the labor substitution effect outweighs the budget constraint relaxation
effect, as households tend to spend the extra income into durable-goods purchases
rather than on human capital investments. It is interesting to note that the labor
substitution effect only occurs in housework, not outside work. One major reason
may be the tightening of regulations on child labor in recent years. In 2004,
the Kyrgyz Republic ratified the International Labor Organization Convention for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. In 2011, the Parliament
strengthened the Criminal Code by increasing penalties for adults found guilty
of crimes against children, including enslavement. In addition, the Government
adopted the 2012 - 2014 Social Protection Development Strategy and Action Plan,
which serves to protect children and families in difficult conditions, including child
laborers. Such laws and regulations increase the risk and cost of hiring children on
the formal labor market. Housework, the blind spot of governmental monitoring,
is thus a rather convenient channel of substituting adult labor with child work.
In addition to the remittances panel, we observe from the household charac-
teristics panel that older children spend more time on all three types of activ-
itieshomework, housework, and outside workmost likely because they have more
school work to do and, at the same time, better ability to perform household duties
and jobs outside the household. Children in larger households spend less time on
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outside work, potentially because adult labor supply is sufficient with more family
members working. Children in households headed by males tend to spend less time
on homework, which is an interesting finding with little theoretical foundation. It
is likely that female household heads put greater emphasis or have favorable prefer-
ences toward supporting childrens schooling/education. It is also likely that male
household heads tend to spend more time for work and have thus less time for
parental monitoring for childrens school performance. Lastly, we find that while
children in wealthier households spend less time doing outside work, they do spend
more time on housework. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of wealth (proxied
by house value) on housework outweighs that on outside work, meaning that chil-
dren from wealthier households tend to work more overall. This helps explain the
seemingly puzzling negative effect of wealth on school attendance rate school age
children in wealthier families are working instead of attending schools. The under-
lying reason is theoretically ambiguous, but it is likely that parents in wealthier
families spend more time earning wages, leaving school-age children at home to
attend to housework and substitute for parents domestic responsibilities.
Inspired by Hanson and Woodruffs (2003) finding that remittances may have
different effects on boys and girls, we are interested in testing if the effects of
remittances on school-age childrens educational outcomes vary by gender. As
explained in the literature review section, the theoretical prediction is inconclusive.
On the one hand, parents may prioritize the education for boys, since they have
better employment opportunities on the labor market. On the other hand, boys are
a better substitute for lost farm labor due to migration. To empirically determine
the relative magnitude of the above two effects, we perform two additional sets of
regressions. First, we examine if remittances have differential impacts for boys and
girls on school attendance rate. Secondly, we examine if the impact of remittances
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on children’s time use pattern differ by gender.
In Table 3.10, we separate the sample by gender and look at the effects of remit-
tances on boys and girls. The coefficients are uniformly negative and statistically
significant, regardless of models used. However, we observe that the magnitude
of the coefficients for boys (columns (1) and (2)) is larger in absolute value than
for girls ((columns (3) and (4)), and the relationship is true for both plain fixed
effects specification and the instrumental variable specification. This implies that
although school attendance rates for both boys and girls are negatively impacted
by migration and remittances, the detrimental effects are greater for boys com-
pared to girls. This empirically shows that in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic,
labor substitutability outweighs the prospect of future employment, which results
in boys being burdened more with housework.
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Table 3.10: Effect of Remittances on Attendance Rate (By Gender)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Attendance Boys Attendance Boys Attendance Girls Attendance Girls
FE FE, IV FE FE, IV
Remittances
Log Per Capita Remittances -0.0719*** -1.194*** -0.0289** -1.067***
(0.0124) (0.208) (0.0130) (0.208)
Individual Characteristics
Age -0.327*** -0.237*** -0.348*** -0.267***
(0.0181) (0.0237) (0.0195) (0.0251)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.000424 0.0729 -0.0644 0.00601
(0.0418) (0.0448) (0.0424) (0.0448)
Age of Household Leader 0.00350 0.0234** 0.0118 0.0278***
(0.00858) (0.00926) (0.00923) (0.00980)
Gender of Household Leader 0.232 -0.383 0.226 -0.338
(0.250) (0.275) (0.266) (0.291)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0340 0.0498 0.0185 0.0100
(0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0719) (0.0724)
House Value -4.19e-07*** -4.37e-07*** -3.92e-07*** -4.14e-07***
(4.60e-08) (4.59e-08) (4.79e-08) (4.83e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,719 5,718 5,143 5,143
Number of Individuals 1,399 1,399 1,301 1,301
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We are therefore interested in investigating if the larger negative effect of remit-
tances on boys’ attendance rate is at least partly explained by the time use pattern
change induced by remittances. To do so, an interaction term per capita remit-
tances received interacted with gender (boy =1)is added in our regression where
the dependent variable is time spent on house work, the only time use measure
that is significantly affected by remittances 5. Following our previous approach,
only children between ages 5 and 17 are included in the analysis as time use pat-
terns for children beyond 17 years old are not reported. Table 3.11 shows that
while the coefficient on the interaction term in the plain fixed effects model is not
5The same regressions for time spent on homework and outside work were performed, and
results show no significant difference between boys and girls.
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statistically significant, it does become significant when endogeneity bias is cor-
rected. The interaction term is positive, which implies that compared to girls in
high remittance-receiving families, boys in high remittance-receiving families tend
to spend more time on housework. Empirically, this result partly explains why
boys’ school attendance rate is affected more negatively by remittances compared
to girls: as adults migrate out of the country, an under-supply of adult labor occurs.
Consequently, boys are brought in to substitute for the adult labor insufficiency
on housework, thereby leading to lower school attendance rate.
Table 3.11: Effect of Remittances on Time Use (By Gender)
(1) (2)
Farm Work Farm Work
VARIABLES FE FE, IV
Remittances
Log Per Capita Remittances 0.0211*** 0.0533
(0.00791) (0.0978)
Log Per Capita Remittances × Boy -0.0113 0.211*
(0.0109) (0.126)
Personal Characteristics
Age 0.173*** 0.168***
(0.00790) (0.00998)
Household Size 0.0342* 0.00673
(0.0188) (0.0249)
Age of Household Leader -0.00116 -0.00175
(0.00344) (0.00379)
Gender of Household Leader -0.0780 0.0350
(0.106) (0.126)
Education Level of Household Leader 0.0262 0.0373
(0.0299) (0.0324)
House Value 3.33e-08* 2.98e-08
(1.71e-08) (1.89e-08)
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes
Constant -0.967*** -1.011***
(0.273) (0.302)
Observations 12,413 12,408
Number of ID 4,608 4,608
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.5 Conclusion
In a country where labor migration is a prominent phenomenon and where re-
mittances comprise a significant proportion of household income, examining how
and to what extent remittance income is allocated for human capital investment is
vital. More specifically, ascertaining the impact of remittances on educational ex-
penditure and educational outcomes among children left behind is a development
concern that deserves an empirical investigation. The case of the Kyrgyz Republic
is a particularly interesting area of study given the critical importance of this issue
to the country, as well as its dual experience of development and transition in
recent years.
This paper finds that remittances, which constitute a large share of national
income, have a negative effect on human capital investment (i.e., educational out-
come and expenditure), though the effect is not robust to endogeneity correction.
The negative relationship can be at least partially explained by the large positive
effect of remittances on expenditure on durable goods. Moreover, this study finds
that remittances have a negative effect on educational outcome, that is, on the
school attendance rate of children. This can be attributed to the increase of child
labor in agricultural/farm work, especially for boys. The main finding of this study
calls for actions that mitigate negative impacts as well as to look for ways to in-
centivize families to invest remittances for education. Intervention programs may
be needed to improve financial literacy so that short-term expenditures (such as
on durable goods) and long-term expenditures (such as on education and health)
can be balanced. Subsidizing farm assets and healthcare may also prove beneficial
to effectively utilize remittances for education.
Furthermore, the study shows that the existence of legal and institutional
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frameworks targeting child labor does not automatically lead to better educational
outcomesaddressing gaps in the design and implementation of these frameworks is
necessary. The Kyrgyz Government has made advancement in efforts to eliminate
the worst forms of child labor, including the ratification of all key international
conventions concerning child labor 6 , as well as the establishment of national laws,
regulations and policies related to child labor 7. However, gaps remain in terms
of the coverage and comprehensiveness of national frameworks, as well as the in-
ability/inadequacy of laws and regulations to meet international standards. For
instance, children are required to attend school only until grade, typically when
they reach age 14 or 15. This standard makes children ages 14 and 15 particularly
vulnerable to child labor as it is not compulsory for them to attend school but
are also not yet legally permitted to work. Noting the high prevalence of child
labor in the agriculture sector (i.e., 98.9% of working children aged 10-14 were en-
gaged in agricultural work) 8 , monitoring farm labor hours of school-age children
may help ensure appropriate enforcement of child labor laws and encourage school
attendance.
Lastly, improving the quality of and access to education and techni-
cal/vocational education and training (TVET), could help promote the overall
attractiveness of secondary and post-secondary education, and ultimately improve
childrens school performance/educational outcomes. In this regard, increasing
public expenditure for education, greater investments in quality teaching, and cul-
6Including the ILO C. 138, Minimum Age; ILO C. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labor; UN
CRC; UN CRC Optional Protocol on Armed Conflict; UN CRC Optional Protocol on the Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography; and Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in
Persons (as cited by the United States Department of Labor, 2017).
7Including minimum age for work and hazardous work; prohibition of forced labor, child
trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation of children, using children in illicit activities, and
military recruitment; compulsory education age; and free public education (as cited by the United
States Department of Labor, 2017).
8As cited by the United States Department of Labor (2017) based on Understanding Childrens
Work Projects analysis of statistics from National Child Labour Survey, 2014.
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tivating partnerships with the private sector are integral not only in enhancing
the quality and accessibility of the countrys education system but also, and more
importantly, address the skills mismatch in the labor market.
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CHAPTER 4
KINSHIP, SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND VOTING IN RURAL
CHINA: A LAB-IN-THE-FIELD EXPERIMENT
Abstract
Economists have come to understand that human choices are not only driven
by self-interest but also “social preferences” – a persons concern over resources
allocated to other people. Moreover, such preferences may be affected by the
environment in which such choices are made, especially social networks and social
pressure. We performed a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural China, where we
recruited 162 Chinese farmers to vote in 7 variants of allocation games in randomly
assigned groups and with real-world social contacts, with and without pressure.
We find that social network and social pressure combined have significant yet
heterogeneous effects on social preferences. The source of heterogeneity includes
the assignment with in-group or out-group members, membership in dominant
lineages, individual characteristics as defined by age and gender, and the degree
of kinship between individuals within a social group. Our study not only provides
empirical evidence for the social preference theories but also urges policy makers
to be careful in choosing an appropriate voting method. In addition, constraining
the power of dominant lineage and having better educated villagers more involved
in village affairs could be welfare improving.
4.1 Introduction
Economic behaviors of human beings have been modeled on the basic assumption
that individuals are rational agents driven exclusively by self-interest, maximizing
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their own utilities defined in monetary or material terms. However, this assump-
tion is often contradicted by casual observations in history 1 as well as in the real
world 2. In recent years, “social preferences” – a persons concern over resources
allocated to others have been introduced to complement self-interest 3. Parallel to
the theoretical modeling are lab experiment results that refute the self-interest as-
sumption and reveal that people exhibit social preferences when making economic
decisions (Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006; Messer et al., 2010). A key aspect that is missing from
the literature, however, is whether or not such social preferences are dependent on
social network (whose interests are involved) and social pressure (how such prefer-
ences are elicited). In this paper, we perform a lab-in-the-field experiment where
we introduce dyad-level social networks (the lineage) and randomly assignment of
pressure treatment into the experimental design. We invite villagers in rural China
to bring in their real-world social contacts to play an array of allocation games,
with and without social pressure. We find that social preferences are affected the
combined force of social network and social pressure. The effects, however, are
heterogeneous and vary with lineage dominance, personal characteristics, as well
as distance between individuals within a lineage.
The primary objective of our study is to address the incompetence of lab ex-
periments in identifying network-dependent social preferences. In most of the
lab experiments, “the subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they do not know
1Mass demonstrations to overturn dictatorships in China and Eastern Europe
2Blood donation, volunteer activities, etc.
3Three major types of social preferences are theoretically modeled: altruism, where people
positively value material resources allocated to relevant reference agents (Andreoni, 1989; Cox
et al., 2001; modeled as efficiency in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004); inequality aversion, where
people prefer an equitable distribution of material resources (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000), and reciprocity, where people respond to actions that are perceived to be
kind in a kind manner, and to actions that are perceived to be hostile in a hostile manner (Rabin,
1993; Charness and Rabin, 2002)
116
anything about each other and they are allocated to different roles in the exper-
iment at random”, while in reality, “the social context, the saliency of particular
agents, and the social proximity among individuals, are all likely to influence ref-
erence groups and outcomes”(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This is supported by a
observational studies on the impact of social network characteristics on cooper-
ative behaviors. These studies have a wide geographical and cultural coverage
and show evidence from the United States (Alesina et al., 1997), India (Banerjee,
Iyer and Somanathan, 2005), the United Kingdom (Bandiera et al., 2005), Kenya
(Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and China (Miquel et al., 2012). The findings gen-
erally indicate that more fragmented social network structure reduces cross-group
cooperation and leads to lower level of public goods provision. Therefore, even
if a lab experiment finds that people care more about fairness than total welfare
(Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006), it may not be the case in the real world because in
the real world people are embedded in networks instead of floating around like free
atoms.
Acknowledging its importance, more recent lab studies attempt to incorporate
social network into their experimental designs. Their approaches of introducing
networks, however, are either temporary (on-site assignment of groups within the
lab) or categorical (group affiliation instead of dyad level interpersonal relation-
ships). One example of the temporary assignment approach is Chen and Li (2009),
where participants that prefer paintings by the same artists are assigned to the
same social group. This “group identity” is then reinforced through a few rounds of
within-group interactions. This approach, however, fails to incorporate personal
histories in the real world and is likely to be rather weak. Guala and Filippin
(2005), for example, manipulates the complexity of distributive tasks to show that
the induced group identity is merely a framing effect that can be easily displaced
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by alternative decision heuristics. On the other end of the spectrum is the cate-
gorical assignment using existing social groups, for example college fraternities in
Kollock (1998) and tribes in Bernhard et al. (2006). They found that group affili-
ation has a significant effect on distributional preferences – people favor in group
members at the expense of outgroup members. The problem with this method is
that it homogenizes social ties within a group and mutes the more nuanced effects
of interpersonal relationships. Namely, if A and B belong to the same fraternity,
they must favor everyone else in the fraternity to the same extent and treat anyone
outside the fraternity with the same degree of hatred. Therefore, to more realisti-
cally characterize the effect of network on preferences, a dyad-level approach that
reflects the mutual, specific, and context-bound interactions between individuals
is necessary.
Bringing a community with identifiable dyad-level personal relationships into
a behavioral lab is mostly unrealistic due to long travel distance and conflicting
schedules of community members. We therefore decide to carry the lab to the
field and invite participants to bring in their real-world social contacts to a set
of experiments without having to travel from their communities. The design of
our experiment (explained in detail in Section 4.3) will allow us to examine the
nuanced dependence of social preferences on social network. We also conduct a
post-experiment survey to collect information on the specifics of the interpersonal
relationship between each pair of participants, which allows us to investigate (1)
how participants perceive resources allocated to in-group and out-group members;
(2) if members of dominant social groups have different social preference patterns;
(3) if social preferences vary with personal characteristics such as gender and age;
(4) if variations in social preferences can be explained by social proximity.
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Another aspect that is missing from the literature is how social pressure affects
social preferences, especially when such pressure interacts with social network ef-
fects. It is true that some recent economic experiments incorporate peer pressure
as a form of informal sanction and find that disapproval of other agents can in-
crease contribution to public goods (Masclet et al, 2003), and that the allocators
in third-party allocation games choose less efficient but more equal distributions
when recipients are identifiable (Halali et al, 2017). These lab experiments, how-
ever, still recruited independent participants and therefore failed to test how social
pressure adds on to social network. Our study, on the other hand, investigates
the interaction effect of social pressure and social network by randomly assigning
participants into a control group, where anonymity is ensured, and a treatment
group, where participants are informed that their choices will be revealed to other
participants. This assignment is performed in the social network context where
participants play with their social contacts and in the random assignment con-
text where participants play with unknown members. We also interact the social
pressure with social proximity between participants to test if the pressure effect
depends on degree of kinship.
The current paper is to our knowledge the first lab-in-the-field experiment
that embeds dyad level, real-world network structure into allocation games. By
observing choices made by any pair of participants in our games and obtaining
information on their social interaction in real life, we are able to examine the
complex interplay of social preferences and social pressure in the context of the
very details of social network. Our study not only serves as an empirical test for
the long debated social preference theories but also provides insights at the policy
level. Our results show that in any society where social interactions are frequent
and personal, the design of a welfare-enhancing policy where collective action is
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involved (voting, donation, private provision of public goods, etc.) requires a thor-
ough understanding of the social preference patterns of participants and how such
preferences interact with the specific network structure and social norms. Without
such considerations, identifying an appropriate roadmap of collective action (in
the case of voting, policy makers need to choose among secret balloting, show of
hands, village meeting, etc.) that yields economically efficient outcomes would be
difficult.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we explain the
reason why we choose to carry out our experiment in rural China, including the his-
tory and characteristics of lineage networks in China; In section 4.3, we introduce
our experimental design and procedures. In section 4.4, we present our regression
models and empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Social Network and Social Preferences in the Chinese
Context
We choose to implement this experiment in rural China for three reasons, which
will be elaborated in the following subsections. First of all, lineages saliently define
the basic social network structure in rural China and have long been governing the
economic and social behaviors of Chinese villagers (Cohen 2005; Liu and Mur-
phy 2006). Such salience facilitates our recruitment as well as the identification
of network effects. Secondly, the rich and observable variations in the patrilin-
eal relationships in the Chinese rural society can be exploited to test how social
preferences vary with personal characteristics and with the strength of social ties.
Thirdly, the interplay of social network, social pressure, and social preferences is
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particularly relevant to recent policy changes in village governance in China and
other developing countries.
4.2.1 Salience of Lineage Network in Rural China
Social networks exist in numerous forms, but the network in rural china that cen-
ters on patrilineal lineage ties is especially salient and deeply entrenched. A lineage
is a branch of residents that descend from the same patrilineal ancestors and share
the same surname. The patrilineal lineage system has over 3000 years of history
form the basis of the Chinese social network (Hu, 2007). Since farmers are at-
tached to their lands, usually the households in a lineage cluster in a settlement
for generations, and this long-term connection and repeated interactions make lin-
eage structure within a village rather stable (Coate and Ravallion, 1993). Lineages
draw so much on their networks for collective activities that every aspect of village
lives revolves around lineages (Cohen 2005; Liu and Murphy 2006; Lu and Tao
2017) 4. Such stable entrenchment of qualify Chinese villages as an ideal setting
to carry out this field experiment.
4In terms of economic affairs, lineage groups have taken on governmental functions such as
property protection and tax collection (Huang 2008). The provision of village public goods such
as elementary schools and irrigation systems has also relied heavily on the donation of major
lineage groups (Tsai, 2007; Miquel et. al. 2012). In terms of political affairs, strong lineages
influence village elections to ensure members entry into village power operations (Thurston 1998).
In some villages, strong lineage networks are mobilized to unite villagers to resist implementation
of unpopular birth control policies (Peng 2010). Wary that lineage might counterbalance state
power, the Mao government attempted to force peasants to break away from the lineage system
and by establishing an administrative village system(He 2003). However, as the economic reforms
proceed, the lineage system has undergone a remarkable revival in rural China (Xiao 2001; He
2003) and regained its influence on village affairs.
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4.2.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Lineage Network
The advantage of exploiting the lineage network structure is rural China that its
rich and identifiable variations allows us to ascertain (1) how participants perceive
resources allocated to in-group and out-group members; (2) if members of domi-
nant lineages (big surnames) have different social preference patterns; (3) if social
preferences vary with personal characteristics such as gender and age; (4) if varia-
tions in social preferences can be explained by social proximity (closer relationship
within a lineage).
In-group vs Out-group Allocations
Community in Sociology is often defined as a group of insider people or called
insiders-we compared to outsiders-they (Landa 1997: 110, 130). This division of in-
group and out-group has been particularly evident in China, where lineage groups
tend to be inwardly focused and self-interested and that great inward cohesion [is]
gained at the expense of equivalent outward antagonism 5 (Baker, 1979: 1212).
It would therefore be interesting to examine how individuals perceive resources
allocated to in-group versus out-group members, especially if in-group favors would
be offered at the price of hostility towards out-group members (Fukuyama, 2001:
8).
5It is also documented in Liu and Murphy (2006) that in many villages in mid 1990s, members
of small descent groups were pushed out of their residential villages by larger descent groups and
relocating to their ancestral villages. The rationale behind such territorializing actions is that
lineage members did not want to allow a share to those who were outsiders
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Lineage Dominance
Another interesting feature of the lineage system in rural China is the existence of
dominant lineages; that is, a large proportion of residents share the same surname.
Relying on the vast of their lands and their prestige in village history, the dominant
lineages control the economic and political resources and influence village affairs
heavily. Smaller lineage groups, on the other hand, are often suppressed and
bullied in the form of name-calling, the vandalism of crops and property and the
withholding of irrigation water by the members of the larger kinship groups in their
villages (Liu and Murphy, 2006). The display of social preferences may change
as the degree of lineage dominance increases (Pan, 2011). This is because in a
large lineage group, a members selfish choice may result in more lineage members
retaliation. Also the cost of defection potentially rises as the size of the lineage
increases, since the deviant can be denied access to a greater amount of resources
withheld by the large lineage (He et al, 2017). In our experiment, we will test the
how social preferences vary with the degree of lineage dominance.
Personal Characteristics
The lineage ties in rural China are highly individualistic phenomenon in the sense
that each tie can only be specified with reference to a particular individual. Hence,
an individuals personal characteristics, such as gender and age, can affect his or
her position within the network and consequently his or her social preferences.
Female members, for example, are positioned inferiorly in this patriarchal system
and do not have moral authority as male members do (He 2017). Age is another
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factor because in the lineage system, seniority equals authority 6. It is therefore
expected that behaviors in our games may depend on personal characteristics of
the players.
Network Characteristics
The sacredness of the family tree, the genealogical table that records the human
relationship between lineage members, is another feature of the lineage network in
rural China. A physical copy of the family tree is kept in the lineage temple, and
every member is aware of his position relative to everyone else in the lineage. The
strength of dyadic ties in the lineage system depends on social proximity, namely,
how close the two agents are in the family tree. The closer agents may therefore
display stronger social preferences and may tend to do so at greater costs to the
out-group member. We also test this hypothesis in our experiment.
4.2.3 Lineage Network and Rural Democracy
Another reason why we chose rural China for implementation is because the inter-
play of social network and social preferences has profound policy implications for
the democratization movement in recent years. Since late 1990s, the political and
economic aspects of village affairs became more and more democratized. Village
leaders are elected instead of nominated, and public project proposals need to be
voted on before implementation7. The outcomes of such collective decision making,
6Confucianism supports patrimonial power and emphasizes that everyone should respect their
superiors, the young should respect the old and the old should love the young (Hu, 2007)
7One example is the introduction of the “One Project, One Review” (“Yi Shi Yi Yi”) scheme
in 2007, where villagers jointly propose public projects that they wish to implement and vote on
the proposal. In addition, welfare allocations are also determined in a more decentralized way in
villages nowadays. Villagers gather at village meetings to vote on which households should be
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however, largely depend on how individuals perceive the trade-offs between selfish
gains and the social optimality when making choices. It has been reported that
some villages can hardly ever reach an agreement and hence have never had any
public projects implemented. Welfare aids seldom reach the poorest households
but end up being allocated to the dominant lineage groups.
One plausible cause, as discussed in the pages before, is that heterogeneous lin-
eage groups often have conflicting interests and tend to only care about in-group
members welfare. Social pressure is another plausible factor. An interesting ob-
servation we have made from our field research is that villages use various voting
methods in village meetings, ranging from a secret ballot to a show of hands. The
lack of anonymity may alter the pattern of social preferences displayed in voting,
for example making lineage members more fixated on in-group gains, thereby ex-
acerbating the inefficiency of resource allocation. Therefore, we believe carrying
out this experiment in the villages in China will help offer valuable policy insights.
Moreover, our experimental results can be expanded to other developing countries
in the process of democratization, whose formal institutions are weak and informal
institutions such as lineages, tribes, or castes guide peoples behavior.
Our experimental design allows us to not only identify the effects of network and
pressure on social preferences, but also to ascertain the source of the heterogeneity
of such effects (in-group vs out-group, lineage dominance, personal and network
characteristics). The identification of preference parameters and network/pressure
effects is achieved by manipulating the payoff structure of our allocation games,
whereas the identification of the source of heterogeneity is made possible by our
post-experiment questionnaire, where we obtain information on demographics of
all participants and the degree of kinship between any pair.
provided with the rice or flour allocations from the upper level governments.
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4.3 Experimental Design
We designed a series of three-person allocation games and use participants’ choices
in these games to characterize social preference patterns. To test if voters behave
differently when they vote in a network setting (i.e. with their social contacts)
or under social pressure, we invite participants to play with anonymous group
members and with people from his/her social network, either with social pressure
or without. Subsection 4.3.1 discusses the payoff structure and assignment rules
of the experiment, and Subsection 4.3.2 describes recruitment and experiment
procedure in detail.
4.3.1 Payoff Structure and Assignment Rules
Our experiment consists of 7 variants of a three-person allocation game. The
baseline payoff structure of the 7 games is presented in Figure 4.1. Before each
game, each participant receives a handout that presents payoffs to the 3 people
in his group, with payoff to himself highlighted. Participants are informed that a
3-person group is formed to vote and decide which allocation scheme, out of two
alternatives, will be implemented. The voting follows a majority rule. That is, if
two or three people in the 3-person group vote yes, each of them will get paid the
amount indicated in the Yes column. Otherwise each individual will be paid the
amount indicated in the No column. No discussion is allowed. The payoff structure
and voting rules have been shown to be incentive compatible, that is, as long as
voters have strict preferences over outcomes, voting for ones preferred outcome is
the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006).
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Figure 4.1: Payoff Structure: Round 1
The 7 game variants in the baseline case, where the 3 members of each group
are randomly assigned before each variant is played (hereafter “Round 1”), are
designed to help us understand how preferences for efficiency (total payoff to all
3 players) and equity (fairness of allocation) vary with the pocketbook cost of ob-
taining them. In the 3 variants of Game 1, for example, overall efficiency is held
constant (15 RMB in total for both Yes and No) while the degree of inequality
varies across variants. Note that Person 3s self-interest is held constant at 5 RMB
between options and across variants, a design that allows us to identify the degree
of inequality aversion when no self-interest is involved. For Person 2, obtaining
equality requires a sacrifice. We can therefore calculate the proportion of partic-
ipants willing to sacrifice x units of self-interest in exchange for equality (Person
2, x=1, 2, 3). On the contrary, for Person 1, choosing equality is in line with his
self-interest. The 4 variants of Game 2 introduce tension between efficiency and
equality. The Yes alternative yields higher overall efficiency (18 RMB) as opposed
to the No alternative (15 RMB). The trade-off, however, is that the No alternative
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is more equal. Note that in the first 3 variants of Game 2, Person 2s payoff is held
constant at 5 RMB. This allows us to examine the relative importance of efficiency
and equality, when no self-interest is involved. Variations in the payoffs to Person
1 and Person 3, on the other hand, help us identify participants’ willingness to
sacrifice x units of self-interest and 3 units of overall efficiency in exchange for
equality (x=1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and willingness to sacrifice x units of self-interest and
equality in exchange for 3 units of efficiency gain (x=1, 2, 3). Note that the way
in which the 3 RMB efficiency gain is allocated differs across variants. Variant 3
represents a Pareto gain, Variant 4 represents a majority gain, whereas Variant 1
and 2 represent a majority loss.
We introduce social network in Round 2 by manipulating the 3-person group
assignment rule. In the recruitment period, for each session, we recruit 3 origi-
nal participants (OPs) who are required to come to the experiment with a social
contact of his own choice a family member, a relative, or a friend (We term the
social contacts Relatives for simplicity). In addition, for each session we recruit
3 villagers who come to the experiment alone (we term them Others). The com-
position of each session is therefore 3 OPs + 3 Relatives + 3 Others. In Round
2, instead of randomly sampling from the 9 participants in each session to form
three 3-person groups as we did in Round 1, we assign any OP and the Relative
he brings to the same group, plus one Other. Other remains anonymous through-
out the experiment to avoid the possibility that any unobserved personal histories
between the pair and the Other could affect their votes. In addition, a new Other
is reassigned before each game, so that the pair cannot use the decision made by
Other in the previous game to get information on his preference pattern and adjust
voting strategy accordingly. We name Round 1 “Random Assignment” and Round
2 “Network Assignment” in our discussion of the experimental results.
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The same 7 game variants are played in Round 2. The only difference is in the
presentation of payoff tables (shown in Figure 4.2), where players can now identify
payoffs to himself, to his Relative, and to Other. In the 3 variants of Game 1, both
overall efficiency (total payoff to all 3 players) and within-group efficiency (sum
payoffs of OP and Relative) are held constant. This allows us to test how many
players are willing to sacrifice x units of self-interest in exchange for within-group
equality (OP, x=1, 2, 3), with the out-group members payoff unaffected. This
proportion can also be interpreted as the percentage of subjects willing to sacrifice
x units in order to help a friend (Altruism). Note that since Others own payoff
remains constant across 3 variants, we will be able to observe how the third-party
chooses for the within-group allocation when self-interest is not involved. The 4
variants of Game 2, on the other hand, allow us to examine the tension between in-
group vs overall efficiency and in-group vs overall equality. In Variant 1, the overall
efficiency gain from choosing yes all goes to the out-group member, leaving the in-
group efficiency lower in the yes alternative. In Variant 2, the overall efficiency
gain all goes to the in-group, leaving the out-group member deprived. Variant 3
represents a Pareto gain both in- and out-group members gain by choosing yes,
although the yes allocation is less fair. Variant 4 represents an allocation where the
out-group member welfare improves while in-group efficiency remains unaffected.
This design allows us to examine how preferences for self-interest, overall efficiency
and overall inequality change when participants play with in-group and out-group
members.
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Figure 4.2: Game Variants: Round 2
Another dimension of our design, in addition to Random Assignment vs Net-
work Assignment, is the social pressure treatment. While each participant plays in
both rounds, the same participant will be assigned into either the Control group
(no pressure) or the Treatment group (with pressure), not both. The social pres-
sure treatment aims to test if voters reveal different patterns of social preferences
when they are aware that their choices are visible to others, mirroring the potential
impact of lack of anonymity in village democracy – for example the show of hands
instead of secret ballot. In terms of implementation, we inform participants at the
beginning of the session that their votes will be revealed to group members after
all games are completed. We choose to reveal the votes at the very end of the
experiment instead of after each game so that participants cannot judge the type
of their group members and adjust strategically in the subsequent games. The
combination of assignments and treatments are summarized in the table below.
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Figure 4.3: Assignment-Treatment Combinations
4.3.2 Experiment Procedure
The formal experiment was implemented in July 2017 in 4 randomly selected vil-
lages in Linyi, Shandong Province in China. Before the formal experiment, we
performed a pilot experiment in January 2017 in Shandong for test purposes only.
Data from the pilot experiment is not used in this paper. The experiment design
and consent process was reviewed and approved by the Internal Review Board
(IRB) at Cornell University. We obtained oral consent from all subjects for their
participation in the experiment. All experiment materials, including payoff cards
and questionnaires, were presented in Chinese. Experiment instructions were read
to participants in Linyi dialect to ensure understanding.
We held 18 experiment sessions with 9 subjects in each session (162 participants
in total). For recruiting, we first contacted the leader of each village to explain the
purpose of our study and to obtain the leaders consent. The village leader then sent
out our recruitment materials (age requirement, time, location, expected monetary
payoff ect., see Appendix C) to the entire village to invite voluntary participation.
Summary statistics of participants’ personal characteristics are presented in the
table below. Approximately 2/3 of participants were female, plausibly due to the
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fact males were working in the field during most of our sessions. Age of participants
ranges from 20 to 56, with an average of 41 years old. The participants on average
completed 8 years of education, which is equivalent to a sophomore in junior high
school. “Name Percentage” is a variable we use to capture the dominance of
the lineage group each participant belongs to. For example if a participant has
surname “Wang” and 80% of the village population shares the same surname,
then his “Name Percentage” is indicated as 0.8. We obtained this information
from village leaders and confirmed with randomly selected participants in each
village. A by-village breakdown of the summary statistics is provided in Appendix
C.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation
Female Percentage 66.7%
Age 41.36 10.38
Years of Education 7.929 2.550
Monthly Income (RMB) 1922.1 2882.5
Name Percentage 0.213 0.280
Observations 162
In the pilot experiment, we presented the 7 game variants in table format, as
shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. However, due to the low education level and
limited literacy, a majoriity of our participant had trouble reading and compre-
hending tables and numbers. We hence modified the presentation in our formal
experiment. We use a red and a blue “plate” to represent the yes and no alterna-
tives, as shown in Figure 4.4, with images of the Chinese currency (RMB) on each
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plate to visualize the payoffs. The yellow labels on the edges of plates indicates
ownership of allocation, namely, to whom the money will be allocated (for exam-
ple, You, Member 2, Member 3 in Round 1, You, Your Relative, Other in Round
2). The small numbers in black under the labels are numerically equivalent to the
amount of RMB presented in each row. We included them to help participants
double check their counting. Participants in the formal experiment voted red or
blue instead of yes or no.
Figure 4.4: Colored Plates to Present Payoffs
9 subjects enter the experiment room and sit in designated seats (Figure 4.5,
O=OP, F=Relative, T=Other). The distance between seats was set to be at least
1.5 meters so that subjects cannot communicate or peek each other’s vote.
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Figure 4.5: Colored Plates to Present Payoffs
The same script of experimental instructions (in Appendix) was read out to
participants in Linyi dialect by the same experimenter at every session to ensure
consistency. The experimental instruction is essentially the same as described in
the previous subsection. At the beginning of Round 1, the main experimenter
informs subjects that 3 members will be selected at random to form a group (3
groups in total). Group members are shuﬄed and reassigned at the beginning of
each new game and the identity of group members will not be revealed. She then
proceeds to explain the distribution schemes and the majority rule. In the Control
sessions (Session 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18), participants are informed that their
votes will never be made public whereas in the Treatment sessions (Session 3, 4, 7,
8, 11, 12, 15, 16), participants are warned ahead of time that after all games are
finished we will reveal everyones votes to group members. The experimenters then
distribute payoff plates and instruct participants how to read their own payoffs and
other participants payoffs. The majority rule is explained again and confirmation
questions are asked to ensure correct understanding. For example, “if you vote
red and the other two members vote blue, what would Person 3’s payoff be for
this game”. For each game, we give participants 1 minute to consider before we go
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collect votes. Participants are instructed to point at the color of their choice instead
of stating aloud so that votes remain unknown to other participants. Experimenter
writes down votes on a data sheet and uses majority rule to decide which allocation
to implement. Corresponding payments are made immediately to participants to
provide monetary incentives. Round 2 proceeds the same way as Round 1, with
the only exception that participants are informed that the pair (OP + Relative)
will always be in the same group while the third member will be randomly assigned
before each game and will remain unidentifiable.
After all games are completed, participants are required to fill out a question-
naire about their demographic information. The pairs (OPs and Relatives) are
asked to complete an additional set of questions on their relationships, frequency
of interaction, etc. Each session, including the survey completion, takes between
45 minutes and 1 hour. The total payoff to each participant ranges from 50 to
90 RMB with mean payoff targeted at 75 RMB, which is equivalent to an average
participant’s daily income. We believe this provides sufficient financial incentive
to participants and ensures that they take their decisions seriously.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Results
In this sub-section, we provide a game-by-game description of participants’ social
preferences patterns exhibited in the experiment. Due to limited space, we include
tables (t-test results) in Appendix C (Part B). Entries of the tables are percent-
age of players voting No. The more rigorous econometric analysis results will be
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presented in sub-section 4.4.2.
In all the 3 variants of Game 1 where efficiency is held constant at 15RMB be-
tween Yes and No, the majority of participants (over 50% in all variants) chose the
fair allocation regardless of treatment. In addition, more than half of participants
were willing to sacrifice self-interest (1 RMB, 2 RMB and 3 RMB) to achieve a
fair allocation. In terms of treatment effect, in Round 1 (Random Assignment)
social pressure does not alter behaviors in a statistically significant manner. In
Round 2 (Network Assignment), however, subjects are more willing to make sac-
rifices when they are under social pressure. In other words, subjects display more
pro-social preferences when they are aware that their choices will be revealed to
people in their social networks. The motive of such behavior changes – if it is due
to stronger preferences for overall equality or within-group equality – will be tested
in regression analyses.
The 4 variants of Game 2 allocate the 3 RMB overall efficiency gain differently.
In Game 2 Variant 1, the efficiency gain goes exclusively to the out-group member
while the in-group members lose. In the Round 1 (Random Assignment)- Control
(No Pressure) situation, the proportion of Person 2 players (no self-interest in-
volved) choosing efficiency and the proportion choosing fairness are almost equal.
This proportion changed significantly when Person 2 players are informed that
they will be paired with their partners (Round 2). Without social pressure, 27%
more of them chose the option that increases in-group total payoff, although it
results in a larger loss in overall efficiency.
In Game 2 Variant 2, the efficiency gain is allocated to in-group members
exclusively. With self-interest neutral across options, the majority of Person 2
players chose efficiency over fairness most of the time. This ratio is only reversed
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in the Round 1 (Random Assignment)- Treatment (Pressure) situation, where 25%
more of Person 2 Players chose fairness over efficiency. Interestingly, 20% more of
the out-group members voted No when they are informed the other two are pairs,
a sign that the out-group members dislike allocations where the paired players gain
more.
The Yes option of Game 2 Variant 3 represents a Pareto gain. Most of our sub-
jects realize this and played accordingly. The large majority of players (67%-87%)
chose efficiency over equality, and this strong preference for Pareto efficiency gain
is consistent across treatments and across roles. The only exception is that Person
1 players voted more for equality when they play with their partners under pres-
sure. However even after this change, the proportion of Person 1 players choosing
efficiency over equality is still as high as 2/3.
Finally, Game 2 Variant 4 represents an efficiency gain that goes to the out-
group member while keeping in-group efficiency constant. In this case, in-group
members (Person 1 and Person 2) consistently preferred the fair allocation, un-
willing to let the efficiency gain go to the out-group member. When Person 1
players are informed that Person 2 is their Relatives, they make significantly more
sacrifices to let Person 2 earn more.
In summary, when efficiency is held constant, subjects displayed strong distaste
towards inequality and are willing to sacrifice self-interest for equality even in the
Random Assignment. Social pressure, when efficiency is constant, only works under
Network Assignment. When there is an efficiency gain, however, behavioral change
depends heavily on how the efficiency gain is allocated in-group vs. out-group. We
also observe that when subjects play under Network Assignment, they become
fixated on within-group gains even when doing so leads to an overall efficiency
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loss, and such tendency becomes more prominent when social pressure is present.
A Pareto gain, on the other hand, is strongly preferred regardless of assignment
and treatment.
4.4.2 Regression Analysis
Social Preferences, Network Effects, and Pressure Effects
The rich variation in payoff structure of the 7 game variants allows us to identify
parameters that characterize preference for self-interest, efficiency, and inequality
aversion, since these 3 components have been found to foster sharply different
conduct (Rabin 1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness
and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 2004, Fehr and Schmidt 2006). While self-
interest and efficiency have been consistently defined in the existing literature as
payoff to oneself and the sum of payoffs to all members respectively, the definition
of equality has been under debate. We include three measures of inequality aversion
– FS, ERC, and MaxiMin – in our regression analyses since they not only form the
basis of theoretical work but also are the most widely employed ones in empirical
tests (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Messer et al, 2010).
Attempting to explain cooperative behavior by a single simple model, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS) model fairness as self-centered inequality aversion;
namely, people do not care about inequity per se that exists among others but are
only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of
others. Mathematically, the utility that person i generates from the game outcome
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is written as:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pij − pii, 0} − βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pii − pij, 0}
αi ≥ βi, 0 ≤ βi < 1
where pii is the payoff to i himself, pij is the payoff to any other player j, and n
is the total number of players. In this framework the two max terms are mutually
exclusive: αi measures the disutility from other members being better off (Namely,
when i is Behind), while βi measures the disutility from other members being worse
off (namely, when i is Ahead), αi ≥ βi therefore captures the idea that a player
suffers more from inequality that is to his disadvantage. They then tested the
model on a wide array of games such as ultimatum games, market games, and
public goods games. The result is mixed in that in some games (ultimatum, public
goods with punishment) more cooperative behaviors are observed whereas in other
games (market, public goods without punishment) subjects behave more selfishly.
They therefore conclude that the distribution of social preferences depends heavily
on the strategic environment of the games.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, henceforth
ERC) organized a large set of laboratory games with a simple model constructed
on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their
relative payoff standing. In particular, individual is utility function is specified as:
Ui = Ui(pii, σi)
c =
∑
j
pij
σi = σi(pii, c, n) =

pii/c if c > 0
1/n if c = 0
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Ui(cσi, σi) = αicσi − βi
n
(σi − 1
n
)2
αi ≥ 0, βi > 0
Namely, the utility is a function of payoff to i himself (pii) and the share he gets
in the total payoff (σi). Utility is assumed to be strictly concave in the share
argument, with a maximum around the allocation at which ones own share is
equal to the average share. This implies that the egalitarian division is most
preferred. In essence, the further the allocation moves from player i receiving an
equal share, the higher the loss from the comparative effect. A players type is
characterized by αi/βi, the ratio of weights that are attributed to the pecuniary
and relative components. The authors then fit data from various games (dictator,
gift-exchange, Prisoners Dilemma, etc ) and find that ERC equilibrium predicts
peoples strategic behavior quite well.
Charness and Rabin (2002, henceforth MaxiMin) measures inequality by the
payoff to the worst-off person. They designed an array of new experimental games
to determine whether subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare
sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients
than with reducing differences in payoffs. The multi-person MaxiMin model is
specified as:
Ui(pi1, pi2, ..., piN) = (1−λ)pii +λ[δ ·min(pi1, pi2, ..., piN) + (1− δ)(pi1 +pi2 + ...+piN)]
λ ∈ [0, 1]
That is, subjects like money but also prefer Pareto-improvements. By positing a
concern for efficiency, this model helps explain why many subjects make inequality-
increasing sacrifices because these choices are Pareto-improving and inexpensive.
A number of empirical studies in the 2000s employ new game designs to com-
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pare performances of the above social preference models. Engelmann and Strobel
(2004), for example, presents a set of three-person one-shot distribution experi-
ments to examine the importance of efficiency and inequality aversion in decision-
making. They also compare the relative performance of the three models mentioned
above. They find that the multi-person MaxiMin model can rationalize most of the
data while neither ERC or FS can explain important patterns. In response, Bolton
and Ockenfels (2006) challenged the Engelmann-Strobel design since the decision
makers self-interest remained unaffected in most cases namely no sacrifice was
necessary. They then performed additional experiments to show that willingness
to pay for efficiency is substantially lower than it is for equity. They also look more
closely at the role of procedural equity by manipulating the role assignment rule in
a majority voting game, and find that equal opportunity procedures can soften the
tension between equality and efficiency. Messer et al (2010) uses a Random Price
Voting Mechanism (RPVM) to elicit social preferences in a referenda experiment
to find that the two equity based models ERC and FS are not supported by the
data while MaxiMin performs relatively well. They conclude that a social efficiency
motive may lead to economically meaningful deviations from selfish voting choices
and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.
We use participants’ choices in each game and the associated payoff structures
to estimate preference parameters in the above 3 models respectively. Specifically,
we fit the ERC, FS, Maximin utility functions using a binary logit regression as in
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Assuming that all
individuals choose yes or no to maximize their utilities, the probability of individual
i voting yes can be written as:
P (yesi) =
eUi(yesi)
eUi(yesi) + eUi(noi)
Utility is assumed to be separately additive in three elements: self-interest, so-
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cial efficiency, and inequality (using ERC, FS and MaxiMin one at a time).
Note that when empirically applying the theoretical model specified in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), multi-colinearity is unavoidable since FS Ahead = FS Behind
+ Efficiency - 3× Self − Interest. To overcome this problem, we follow Engel-
mann and Strobel (2004) by using two approaches. In a first approach, we exclude
self-interest (we term it the FS model when presenting regression results). In a
second approach, we employ Engelmann and Strobel’s strict version by specifying
FSstrict = FS Ahead + FS Behind. This new measure is essentially an ag-
gregation of inequality where equal weights are assigned to disadvantageous and
advantageous inequality (we term it the FS Strict model when presenting regression
results).
Table 4.2: Utility Specification in Regressions
Utility Function of Person i
ERC αSELF,ERCi pii + β
EFF,ERC
i
∑
j pij + β
ERC
i |pii − 1N
∑N
j=1 pij|
FS βEFF,FSi
∑
j pij + β
FS,AHEAD
i
1
N−1
∑
j 6=iMax(pii − pij, 0) + βFS,BEHINDi 1N−1
∑
j 6=iMax(pij − pii, 0)
FS Strict αSELF,FSsti pii + β
EFF,FSst
i
∑
j pij + β
FSst
i
1
N−1 [
∑
j 6=iMax(pij − pii, 0) +
∑
j 6=iMax(pii − pij, 0)]
Maximin αSELF,MMi pii + β
EFF,MM
i
∑
j pij + β
MM
i1 ·Min(pi1,..., piN)
The design of our experiment, especially the Assignment-Treatment Combi-
nations as shown in Figure 4.3, allows us to identify two effects. Network effect
characterizes if participants display different degree of preferences for self-interest,
efficiency, and equality when they are assigned to the same group as their social
contacts, with or without pressure. Pressure effect, on the other hand, character-
izes if participants display different degree of preferences for self-interest, efficiency,
and equality when they are under social pressure, with or without social contacts
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in their groups. Mathematically, the utility function used to identify network ef-
fect, without social pressure (P = 0) and with social pressure (P = 1) is specified
as:
Ui(P = 0) = α
N0
i,P=0pii + β
N0
i,P=0
∑
j
pij + γ
N0
i,P=0di
+ αN1i,P=0pii · 1N(i) + βN1i,P=0
∑
j
pij · 1N(i) + γN1i,P=0di · 1N(i)
Ui(P = 1) = α
N0
i,P=1pii + β
N0
i,P=1
∑
j
pij + γ
N0
i,P=1di
+ αN1i,P=1pii · 1N(i) + βN1i,P=1
∑
j
pij · 1N(i) + γN1i,P=1di · 1N(i)
where pii represents self-interest,
∑
j pij represents the efficiency measure, di rep-
resents any inequality measure (ERC, FS, FS Strict, or MaxiMin), and 1N(i) is
an indicator function that takes value 1 if the choice made by individual i is ob-
served from the Network Assignment. We are interested in testing which of the two
network effects – network effect without social pressure (which we term Network
Effect A, identified as αN1i,P=0, β
N1
i,P=0, and γ
N1
i,P=0) and network effect with social
pressure (which we term Network Effect B, identified as αN1i,P=1, β
N1
i,P=1, and γ
N1
i,P=1)
– is statistically significant.
Similarly, the utility function used to estimate pressure effect, in the Random
Assignment (N = 0) and Network Assignment (N = 1), is specified as:
Ui(N = 0) = α
P0
i,N=0pii + β
P0
i,N=0
∑
j
pij + γ
P0
i,N=0di
+ αP1i,N=0pii · 1P (i) + βP1i,N=0
∑
j
pij · 1P (i) + γP1i,N=0di · 1P (i)
Ui(N = 1) = α
P0
i,N=1pii + β
P0
i,N=1
∑
j
pij + γ
P0
i,N=1di
+ αP1i,N=1pii · 1P (i) + βP1i,N=1
∑
j
pij · 1P (i) + γP1i,N=1di · 1P (i)
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where 1P (i) is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the choice made by
individual i is observed from the Treatment Group (with social pressure). We
are interested in testing which of the two pressure effects – pressure effect under
Random Assignment (which we term Pressure Effect A, identified as αP1i,N=0, β
P1
i,N=0,
and γP1i,N=0) and pressure effect under Network Assignment (which we term Pressure
Effect B, identified as αP1i,N=1, β
P1
i,N=1, and γ
P1
i,N=1) – is statistically significant.
The above 4 effects are summarized in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Each 4 columns
present a set of results using the 4 inequality measures respectively – ERC, FS
Strict, FS, and Maximin. Column (1) - (4) of Table 4.3 examines Network Effect
without social pressure (Network Effect A); Column (5) - (8) of Table 4.3 examines
Network Effect under social pressure (Network Effect B); Column (1) - (4) of
Table 4.4 examines Pressure Effect in random assignment (Pressure Effect A);
Column (5) - (8) of Table 4.4 examines Pressure Effect in network assignment
(Pressure Effect B). The logic of our result presentation is summarized in Figure
4.6. We also performed a balance covariates check to make sure the demographics
of participants in the control and treatment groups do not differ significantly.
The result is presented in the Appendix. Age is the only covariate that differs
across control and treatment, and the difference is rather weak (at p=0.1). We are
therefore confident to say that the treatment assignment is indeed random.
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Figure 4.6: Regression Tables Illustration
The upper panel of the first 4 columns of Table 4.3 characterizes the baseline
(no social pressure, no network effects) social preference patterns displayed by our
participants. Results are robust across the 4 model specifications in the sense that
all social preference parameters are statistically significant and are of the expected
signs. Subjects strongly prefer (p<0.01) higher payoffs to themselves (self-interest)
and higher total payoffs to the group (efficiency). In the mean time, players display
significant inequality aversion regardless of the measurement used. We also observe
that the FS Behind parameter is (in absolute value) twice the size of the FS
Ahead parameter, meaning that subjects suffer more from inequality that is to their
disadvantage. This is in line with the theoretical prediction in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). The lower panel of the first 4 columns reveals that when participants
are not under social pressure, network effect is statistically insignificant. In other
words, when participants are informed that their votes will not be made public,
playing with their relatives does not change their preference patterns.
The upper panel of columns (5)-(8) of Table 4.3 characterizes social preference
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patterns when participants play in Random Assignment under social pressure.
Very similar pattern is revealed here as in the baseline case. The lower panel
of columns (5)-(8), however, shows very strong Network Effect. That is, when
participants are aware that their votes will be revealed to other players, assigning
them to play with their relatives will significantly alter their social preference
patterns. The change is particularly obvious in inequality aversion, in that players
display much stronger distaste for unfair distributions and stronger willingness to
help the worst-off person.
Table 4.3: Network Effects: Without and With Social Pressure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Pressure No Pressure No Pressure No Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure
ERC FS Strict FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Self-Interest 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.231*** 0.226*** 0.229***
(0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0410) (0.0471) (0.0470) (0.0476)
Efficiency 0.206*** 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.189*** 0.170*** 0.233*** 0.300*** 0.157***
(0.0538) (0.0569) (0.0554) (0.0471) (0.0602) (0.0639) (0.0624) (0.0529)
ERC -0.333*** -0.331***
(0.0593) (0.0678)
FS -0.122*** -0.127***
(0.0194) (0.0222)
FS Ahead -0.137*** -0.0978*
(0.0447) (0.0499)
FS Behind -0.351*** -0.404***
(0.0494) (0.0579)
MM 0.399*** 0.403***
(0.0543) (0.0615)
Self × Network -0.0556 -0.0565 -0.0586 -0.0254 -0.0396 -0.0603
(0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0580) (0.0704) (0.0693) (0.0678)
Efficiency × Network 0.0147 0.0317 0.0109 0.0165 0.135 0.157* 0.139 0.0391
(0.0763) (0.0810) (0.0787) (0.0669) (0.0878) (0.0937) (0.0916) (0.0758)
ERC × Network -0.0449 -0.283***
(0.0841) (0.103)
FS × Network -0.0211 -0.0915***
(0.0277) (0.0336)
FS Ahead × Network -0.0789 -0.206***
(0.0640) (0.0738)
FS Behind × Network -0.00177 -0.155*
(0.0700) (0.0877)
MM × Network 0.0637 0.150*
(0.0778) (0.0901)
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The upper panel of the first 4 columns of Table 4.4 is exactly the same as
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that of Table 4.3 – it summarizes the baseline (no social pressure, no network
effects) social preference patterns. In addition, all parameters in the lower panel
of the first 4 columns are statistically insignificant, indicating that when group
members are randomly assigned and anonymous, adding social pressure does not
alter participants’ social preference patterns.
The upper panel of columns (5)-(8) of Table 4.4 presents social preference
patterns when participants play in Network Assignment without social pressure.
Consistent with results shown in all the upper panels in the previous discussion,
all social preference parameters are significant and are of the expected signs. The
lower panel of columns (5)-(8) shows statistically significant Pressure Effect in most
of our specifications. Participants display stronger inequality aversion (in ERC,
FS Strict, and FS) when they are aware that their votes will be revealed to their
relatives.
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Table 4.4: Social Pressure Effects: Random vs Network Assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random Random Random Random Network Network Network Network
ERC FS Strict FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Self-Interest 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.107*** 0.0996** 0.0998**
(0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0410) (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0409)
Efficiency 0.206*** 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.189*** 0.221*** 0.290*** 0.316*** 0.205***
(0.0538) (0.0569) (0.0554) (0.0471) (0.0541) (0.0576) (0.0558) (0.0475)
ERC -0.333*** -0.378***
(0.0593) (0.0597)
FS -0.122*** -0.143***
(0.0194) (0.0198)
FS Ahead -0.137*** -0.216***
(0.0447) (0.0458)
FS Behind -0.351*** -0.353***
(0.0494) (0.0495)
MM 0.399*** 0.463***
(0.0543) (0.0557)
Self × Pressure 0.0684 0.0702 0.0710 0.0986 0.0871 0.0693
(0.0623) (0.0621) (0.0628) (0.0663) (0.0652) (0.0633)
Efficiency × Pressure -0.0359 -0.0248 -0.00503 -0.0319 0.0845 0.101 0.123 -0.00935
(0.0807) (0.0856) (0.0835) (0.0708) (0.0838) (0.0896) (0.0872) (0.0722)
ERC × Pressure 0.00158 -0.237**
(0.0901) (0.0983)
FS × Pressure -0.00468 -0.0751**
(0.0295) (0.0321)
FS Ahead × Pressure 0.0391 -0.0884
(0.0670) (0.0711)
FS Behind × Pressure -0.0531 -0.206**
(0.0762) (0.0824)
MM × Pressure 0.00402 0.0899
(0.0820) (0.0862)
Observations 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In summary, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 combined reveal that in addition to
self-interest, participants consistently display preference for social efficiency and
distaste for inequality. Such social preferences are intrinsic and robust against
alternative specifications. Moreover, social network or social pressure alone can-
not alter behaviors. Social preference patterns, in particular inequality aversion,
change only when the two forces are combined.
One thing to note is that the above analyses have pooled choices made by all
participants, including the pair and the Other. One may suspect that by doing so,
preference patterns of the Others may have weakened Network Effects and Pressure
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Effects, since Others came alone and are hence less susceptible to judgment made
by their social contacts. As a robustness check, we excluded Others from our
analyses and only kept choices made by the pairs. The results and conclusions are
unchanged.
From the baseline parameters we are able to calculate willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for “social goods”, namely how much money (in RMB) a person is willing to sacri-
fice in order to achieve efficiency and equality. The WTP measures are calculated
as the ratio of the social preference parameter and self-interest parameter, namely,
WTPEFF = MRSSelf,EFF =
MUEFF
MUSelf
=
βEFF
βSelf
WTPEQ = MRSSelf,EQ =
−MUEQ
MUSelf
=
−βEQ
βSelf
The results are reported in Figure 4.7. We observe that except for FS, all
willingness-to-pay measures are greater than one, meaning that on average partici-
pants are willing to give up more than one RMB in exchange for one-RMB increase
in efficiency, or one-unit reduction (in squared terms) in equality, or one-RMB in-
crease in the payoff to the worst of person. In other words, social preferences are
not only present but also large in magnitude.
Figure 4.7: Willingness to Pay for Social Goods
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In-group vs Out-group Allocations
As introduced in Section 4.2, one key feature of the Chinese lineage networks is
the clear division of “insiders-we” and “outsiders-they”. In this subsection, we
examine how people in a network setting perceive resources allocated to in-group
members (relatives) as opposed to out-group members (Others).
We introduce three new variables: In-group Efficiency, which measures the to-
tal payoff to the pair (piOP + piRelative); In-group Inequality, which measures the
absolute difference in payoffs between the pair (|piOP − piRelative|); and Distance,
which measures how far the Other’s payoff is away from the average payoff of the
pair(|piOther − 12(piOP + piRelative)|). We only use data from the Network Assign-
ment, because the division of in-group and out-group does not exist in Random
Assignment. In addition, we separate observations of the pairs (in-group mem-
bers) and the Others (out-group members), because they may behave differently
facing the division and social pressure. Specifically, utility function of the in-group
members is specified as a separately additive function of 4 elements: self-interest,
overall efficiency, in-group efficiency, and in-group inequality; utility function of
the out-group members is specified as a separately additive function of 3 elements:
self-interest, overall efficiency, and distance. The results are presented in Table
4.5.
The upper panel of Table 4.5 presents preferences for in-group measures in the
network setting without social pressure. The pairs (in-group members) do not
seem to be concerned with self-interest nor overall efficiency in this case. Since
in-group efficiency is included in the regression, this can also be interpreted as
their disregard of the payoffs to the out-group member. Instead, all that they care
about are in-group measures – in-group efficiency and in-group inequality. Such
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fixation on in-group measures is exacerbated by social pressure, as we observe
from the lower panel of column (1). Imposing social pressure on the pair does not
increase their concern for the group as a whole (or for the welfare of the out-group
member). Instead it makes them more averse toward in-group inequality.
Column (2) characterizes social preference patterns of the out-group member.
Compared to the pairs, out-group members care more about overall efficiency.
Since self-interest is included in the regression, this means that the out-group mem-
ber actually prefer higher payoff to the pair. They also dislike distance. Namely,
the greater the difference between their own payoffs and the pairs’ average payoff,
the unhappier they feel. Moreover, social pressure does not significantly alter their
preference patterns.
151
Table 4.5: In-group Measures (Pairs and Others)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Pairs Others
Self-Interest 0.0116 0.199*
(0.0539) (0.108)
Overall Efficiency 0.0916 0.304***
(0.0649) (0.118)
In-group Efficiency 0.320***
(0.0676)
In-group Inequality -0.210***
(0.0361)
Distance -0.327***
(0.121)
Self-Interest × Pressure 0.0919 0.226
(0.0878) (0.172)
Overall Efficiency × Pressure 0.157 -0.0602
(0.101) (0.179)
In-group Efficiency × Pressure -0.0590
(0.101)
In-group Inequality × Pressure -0.155**
(0.0615)
Distance × Pressure -0.141
(0.186)
Observations 1,512 756
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Social Preferences of Dominant lineages
A major feature of the lineage network in rural China is that the dominant lineages
control the economic and political resources and influence village affairs heavily.
In this section, we examine the social preference pattern of members in dominant
lineages as opposed to that of members in non-dominant lineages.
The dominance of the lineage that person i belongs to is measured by variable
Name, which is defined as the percentage of villagers that share the same surname
as person i. Greater value of Name indicates larger lineage group, hence greater
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power in village affairs. The regressions we perform in this section include both
main effects and Name interaction effects controlling for other personal character-
istics (gender, age, education, and income). Namely, utility function is specified
as
Ui =
∑
k
βk ·Xik +
∑
k
θkXik ·Namei +
∑
lk
δlk ·XikZi
where Xik is the elements of social preference measures presented in each game
(self-interest, efficiency, plus one set of inequality measure), and Zi is the vector of
personal characteristics of person i. To save space, in this section we only present
the parameters of Name interaction effects, namely θk in different scenarios.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4.6 characterize Name interaction effects in Ran-
domly Assignment. We observe that none of them is significant, indicating that
when voting with randomly assigned unknown members, members of dominant
lineages do not behave differently compared to members of non-dominant lineages.
When it comes to Network Assignment, however, columns (5) to (8) in Table 4.6
reveal different patterns. We notice that the interaction effect for ERC is posi-
tive, indicating that members of larger lineages care less about inequality. More
importantly, they seem to feel better about inequality that is to their advantage.
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Table 4.6: Social Preferences of Dominant lineages (All Observations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random Random Random Random Network Network Network Network
VARIABLES ERC FS Struct FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Self-Interest × Name -0.158 -0.145 -0.143 0.178 0.205 0.222
(0.143) (0.142) (0.143) (0.149) (0.148) (0.147)
Efficiency × Name 0.153 0.201 0.161 0.199 -0.289 -0.241 -0.171 -0.215
(0.184) (0.196) (0.191) (0.162) (0.192) (0.206) (0.199) (0.168)
ERC × Name 0.227 0.402*
(0.202) (0.215)
FS × Name 0.0392 0.0894
(0.0667) (0.0713)
FS Ahead × Name -0.0226 0.313*
(0.155) (0.164)
FS Behind × Name 0.173 0.0417
(0.170) (0.181)
MM × Name -0.112 -0.272
(0.186) (0.195)
Observations 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We further break down the Name interaction effects in Network Assignment
into Pairs and Others. The results are presented in Table 4.7. We notice that
almost all parameters in the first 4 columns (Pairs) are statistically significant,
while none of them is significant in the last 4 columns (Others). In other words,
members of dominant lineage groups behave differently only when the interest of
their relatives are involved. They care more about self-interest and less about
the welfare of the group as a whole (Efficiency). Members of dominant lineages
are also less concerned about inequality. In fact, they do not feel as bad when
the inequality is to their advantage (FS Ahead). This result is consistent with
phenomena reported in the literature, where larger kinship groups exploit their
control of economic and political resources to suppress smaller groups.
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Table 4.7: Social Preferences of Dominant lineages (Pairs and Others)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pairs Pairs Pairs Pairs Others Others Others Others
VARIABLES ERC FS Strict FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Self-Interest × Name 0.398** 0.449** 0.483*** -0.446 -0.170 -0.153
(0.174) (0.176) (0.179) (0.462) (0.407) (0.363)
Efficiency × Name -0.371* -0.475* -0.311 -0.423** -0.0710 0.207 0.150 0.182
(0.219) (0.246) (0.234) (0.201) (0.476) (0.445) (0.439) (0.373)
ERC × Name 0.538** 0.564
(0.240) (0.745)
FS × Name 0.192** -0.0366
(0.0850) (0.180)
FS Ahead × Name 0.670*** -0.187
(0.213) (0.326)
FS Behind × Name 0.0746 0.0402
(0.195) (0.548)
MM × Name -0.715*** 0.146
(0.249) (0.390)
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442 742 742 742 742
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Social Preferences and Personal Characteristics
Compared to the networks in western societies, the lineage ties in rural China
are highly individual, in the sense that any interpersonal relationship are affected
heavily by the individuals’ personal characteristics. In this subsection, we examine
how gender, age, education and income interact with social preference patterns.
The results are presented in Table 4.8. Overall we observe that personal char-
acteristics interaction effects (δlk) do not differ greatly across Random Assign-
ment and Network Assignment. Female (Gender=1) consistently display greater
inequality aversion compared to male, especially when the inequality is to their
disadvantage. Interestingly, female displayed greater concern for overall efficiency
and the welfare of the worst-off member under Random Assignment, but such
concern disappears when they are in Network Assignment. Although we do not
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have direct evidence to explain this phenomenon, we reason that female are by
nature more caring and compassionate especially towards the deprived. However,
when the interests of their relatives are involved, such nature is suppressed and
outweighed by in-group concerns. In the Age panel, we observe that compared
to the young, senior participants are less concerned with self-interest and inequal-
ity in both Random Assignment and Network Assignment. They seem to be less
sensitive to every element in the utility function and behaves in a more neutral
manner.
The interaction effects in the Education and Income panels are apparently
weaker. In Network Assignment, better educated participants display greater con-
cern for overall efficiency and tend to feel worse when the inequality is to their
advantage. Such pattern, however, is not present in Random Assignment. The
effect of income is almost non-existent.
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Table 4.8: Social Preferences and Personal Characteristics (All Observations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random Random Random Random Network Network Network Network
VARIABLES ERC FS Strict FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Gender
Self-Interest × Gender 0.115 0.102 0.138 0.157 0.143 0.136
(0.0977) (0.0953) (0.0992) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
Efficiency × Gender 0.0925 0.186 0.219* 0.121 -0.0397 0.0625 0.104 -0.0815
(0.125) (0.134) (0.130) (0.110) (0.138) (0.149) (0.141) (0.119)
ERC × Gender -0.284** -0.272*
(0.144) (0.154)
FS × Gender -0.122*** -0.123**
(0.0470) (0.0516)
FS Ahead × Gender -0.174 -0.146
(0.110) (0.121)
FS Behind × Gender -0.321*** -0.348***
(0.114) (0.125)
MM × Gender 0.399*** 0.221
(0.130) (0.136)
Age
Self-Interest × Age -0.0109*** -0.0104*** -0.00854** -0.0118*** -0.0109*** -0.00923**
(0.00371) (0.00362) (0.00367) (0.00396) (0.00383) (0.00375)
Efficiency × Age -0.00105 -0.00342 -0.00634 0.00240 0.00188 -0.00126 -0.00466 0.00460
(0.00444) (0.00471) (0.00462) (0.00392) (0.00461) (0.00492) (0.00480) (0.00404)
ERC × Age 0.0133** 0.0163***
(0.00525) (0.00570)
FS × Age 0.00496*** 0.00608***
(0.00169) (0.00182)
FS Ahead × Age 0.00269 0.00473
(0.00365) (0.00389)
FS Behind × Age 0.0165*** 0.0198***
(0.00455) (0.00491)
MM × Age -0.00930** -0.0144***
(0.00464) (0.00490)
Education
Self-Interest × Education 0.0163 0.0133 0.0137 -0.0230 -0.0247 -0.0222
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0156)
Efficiency × Education 0.0183 0.00764 0.0106 0.00209 0.0376* 0.0406* 0.0310 0.0329*
(0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0195) (0.0166) (0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0172)
ERC × Education -0.0286 -0.0334
(0.0218) (0.0241)
FS × Education -0.00258 -0.0104
(0.00700) (0.00761)
FS Ahead × Education 0.00438 -0.0365**
(0.0155) (0.0168)
FS Behind × Education -0.0128 -0.00290
(0.0185) (0.0201)
MM × Education -0.00630 0.0246
(0.0194) (0.0201)
Income
Self-Interest × Income -2.26e-05 -2.58e-05 -8.28e-06 -3.78e-05 -3.78e-05 -3.58e-05
(2.47e-05) (2.15e-05) (2.50e-05) (2.63e-05) (2.43e-05) (2.63e-05)
Efficiency × Income 1.33e-05 2.07e-05 1.37e-05 2.35e-05 3.75e-05 4.84e-05 3.63e-05 3.50e-05
(1.82e-05) (2.23e-05) (2.28e-05) (1.92e-05) (2.51e-05) (2.96e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.37e-05)
ERC × Income -2.33e-05 -5.82e-06
(3.56e-05) (3.82e-05)
FS × Income -8.62e-06 -6.61e-06
(1.07e-05) (1.27e-05)
FS Ahead × Income -3.49e-05* -3.85e-05
(1.99e-05) (2.50e-05)
FS Behind × Income -3.30e-06 1.13e-05
(2.92e-05) (3.39e-05)
MM × Income 4.28e-05 -5.51e-06
(3.01e-05) (3.20e-05)
Observations 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1157
Table 4.9 breaks down personal characteristics interaction effects in the Net-
work Assignment into Pairs and Others. We observe that female participants in
the pairs behave more selfishly compared to female participants playing the role
of Others – they care more about self-interest and feel worse when the inequality
is to their disadvantage. Education affects the pairs’ preferences but not the Oth-
ers. In particular, better educated pairs are less selfish, more averse to inequality,
especially when inequality is to their advantage, and care more about the welfare
of the worst-off person. Age and Income interaction effects, on the other hand, are
not different across pairs and Others in an observable way.
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Table 4.9: Interaction with Personal Characteristics (Pairs and Others)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pairs Pairs Pairs Pairs Others Others Others Others
VARIABLES ERC FS Strict FS MM ERC FS Strict FS MM
Gender
Self-Interest × Gender 0.212* 0.199* 0.189 0.182 0.321 0.148
(0.119) (0.118) (0.122) (0.358) (0.304) (0.273)
Efficiency × Gender -0.0177 0.0261 0.0868 -0.0965 0.0299 0.220 0.327 -0.0366
(0.155) (0.172) (0.162) (0.137) (0.371) (0.331) (0.324) (0.281)
ERC × Gender -0.223 -0.352
(0.170) (0.578)
FS × Gender -0.0801 -0.241*
(0.0593) (0.131)
FS Ahead × Gender -0.0241 -0.268
(0.150) (0.238)
FS Behind × Gender -0.300** -0.697*
(0.132) (0.404)
MM × Gender 0.0831 0.316
(0.171) (0.279)
Age
Self-Interest × Age -0.0116** -0.0108** -0.0111** -0.0175 -0.0172* -0.0104
(0.00464) (0.00459) (0.00473) (0.0115) (0.00917) (0.00792)
Efficiency × Age -2.36e-05 -0.00180 -0.00499 0.00338 0.0117 0.00510 -0.000618 0.00994
(0.00536) (0.00603) (0.00584) (0.00500) (0.0105) (0.00960) (0.00936) (0.00809)
ERC × Age 0.0156** 0.0183
(0.00630) (0.0171)
FS × Age 0.00526** 0.00801**
(0.00218) (0.00392)
FS Ahead × Age 0.00304 0.00457
(0.00510) (0.00689)
FS Behind × Age 0.0180*** 0.0274**
(0.00544) (0.0123)
MM × Age -0.0145** -0.0140*
(0.00636) (0.00842)
Education
Self-Interest × Education -0.0321 -0.0352* -0.0265 -0.0637 -0.0546 -0.0478
(0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0458) (0.0342) (0.0298)
Efficiency × Education 0.0264 0.0441 0.0296 0.0383 0.0547 0.0420 0.0238 0.0394
(0.0255) (0.0288) (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0378) (0.0351) (0.0338) (0.0299)
ERC × Education -0.0507* 0.0323
(0.0285) (0.0641)
FS × Education -0.0213** 0.0106
(0.0101) (0.0143)
FS Ahead × Education -0.0641** -0.0152
(0.0254) (0.0250)
FS Behind × Education -0.0172 0.0576
(0.0231) (0.0453)
MM × Education 0.0749** -0.0342
(0.0296) (0.0312)
Income
Self-Interest × Income -2.99e-05 -3.20e-05 -4.70e-05 -3.57e-05 1.13e-05 -1.69e-05
(2.71e-05) (2.48e-05) (2.98e-05) (0.000113) (8.99e-05) (7.98e-05)
Efficiency × Income 3.35e-05 3.21e-05 2.34e-05 2.04e-05 0.000113 0.000149 0.000152 9.73e-05
(2.46e-05) (2.83e-05) (2.78e-05) (2.22e-05) (0.000110) (0.000101) (9.94e-05) (8.39e-05)
ERC × Income -2.75e-06 -7.06e-06
(3.89e-05) (0.000175)
FS × Income 7.12e-07 -3.46e-05
(1.25e-05) (4.03e-05)
FS Ahead × Income -2.10e-05 -6.16e-05
(2.42e-05) (7.02e-05)
FS Behind × Income 2.12e-05 -7.67e-05
(3.45e-05) (0.000123)
MM × Income -4.33e-05 2.47e-05
(3.42e-05) (8.31e-05)
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442 742 742 742 742
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1159
Social Preferences and Network Characteristics
The last set of results (Table 4.10) looks at how social preferences vary with network
characteristics, namely how close the pairs are in terms of their relationship within
the lineage network. We construct a “Relation” variable – a Coefficient of Human
Relationships – to numerically express this degree of kinship in human genealogy.
The Coefficient of Human Relationships is defined over a scale of 0 to 1, where
greater value indicates closer relationship. In the patriarchal lineage system in
rural China, married couples form the basic units of the society, the coefficient for
spouses is set to be 1. An offspring carries half the genes of each parent, so the
coefficient for parent-offspring relationship is 0.5. Calculation of the coefficients
for other relationships is provided in the Appendix.
Since the concept of network or relationship does not exist in Random Assign-
ment, our analysis focuses on behaviors in Network Assignment. Moreover, since
the relationship variable can only be calculated for the pairs, we exclude Others
from our sample. We focus on in-group measures of social preferences in this sub-
section, because those are likely to be what in-group members are most concerned
with and are more naturally affected by relationship. As a robustness check, we
repeated the analysis using overall measures of preferences – they reveal almost
identical pattern.
The upper panel of Table 4.10 presents relationship interaction effects. We
observe that when voting with closer relatives, in-group members care less about
self interest. We also notice that closer social relationship makes in-group mem-
bers care more about both overall efficiency and in-group efficiency. In addition,
in-group members playing with closer Relatives are more averse to in-group in-
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equalities that are to their advantages. Namely, their sense of guilt increases with
social proximity. The lower panel of Table 4.10 presents the triple interaction ef-
fects with relationship and with social pressure. The only statistically significant
triple interaction effect is the one with in-group efficiency, meaning that pressure
effect is more prominent on preference for in-group efficiency when the pair is
closer. Since both overall efficiency and in-group efficiency are included in the
regression, this also indicates that social pressure makes the more intimate pairs
more fixated on their within-group gains even at the cost of the out-group member.
Table 4.10: Within Measure Relationship Interaction (Round 2- Pairs Only)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Within Strict Within
Self-Interest × Relation -0.178*
(0.107)
Overall Efficiency × Relation 0.247** 0.247**
(0.125) (0.125)
In-group Efficiency × Relation 0.289** 0.200*
(0.128) (0.117)
In-group Inequality × Relation -0.0907
(0.0729)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Relation -0.180**
(0.0878)
In-group Inequality (Behind) × Relation -0.00180
(0.0928)
Self-Interest × Relation × Pressure -0.0962
(0.226)
Overall Efficiency × Relation × Pressure -0.310 -0.310
(0.260) (0.260)
In-group Efficiency × Relation × Pressure 0.524** 0.476*
(0.267) (0.244)
In-group Inequality × Relation × Pressure 0.175
(0.156)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Relation × Pressure 0.127
(0.184)
In-group Inequality (Behind) × Relation × Pressure 0.223
(0.200)
Observations 1,512 1,512
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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One potential drawback of our definition of the Coefficient of Human Rela-
tionships is that although the spouses form the basis of human societies, they are
in fact not genetically related. Hence as a robustness check, we separate spouses
from other types of human relationships by including a dummy variable for spouses
and use our former definition of the coefficient for all the other relationships. The
interaction effects are reported in Table 4.11. The first two panels present the inter-
action terms between the utility components and spouse/relationship. Consistent
with our findings in Table 4.10, participants tend to care less about self-interest
and more about in-group gains when they are playing with a spouse or a rela-
tive with closer kinship. Interestingly, when participants vote with a spouse, they
tend to be more averse to in-group inequalities that are to their advantages. How-
ever when they play with a close kin, they tend to be more averse to in-group
inequalities that are to their disadvantages. The last two panels show the triple
interaction effects among utility components, spouse/relationship, and the social
pressure treatment dummy. We find that the triple interactions with spouse dum-
mies are not statistically significant. The only significant triple interaction with
the coefficient of human relationships is in-group inequality, in particular when the
in-group inequality is to one’s disadvantage. Therefore, the intensified aversion to-
ward in-group inequality under social pressure we observed in Table 4.10 is mainly
driven by degree of kinship outside marriage.
162
Table 4.11: Within Measure Spouse/Relation Interaction (Round 2- Pairs Only)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Within Strict Within
Self-Interest × Spouse -0.291**
(0.130)
Overall Efficiency × Spouse 0.121 0.121
(0.151) (0.151)
In-group Efficiency × Spouse 0.298* 0.152
(0.154) (0.142)
In-group Inequality × Spouse -0.0815
(0.0882)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Spouse -0.227**
(0.104)
In-group Inequality (Behind) × Spouse 0.0639
(0.114)
Self-Interest × Relation -1.056**
(0.464)
Overall Efficiency × Relation -0.593 -0.593
(0.569) (0.569)
In-group Efficiency × Relation 1.131* 0.603
(0.606) (0.550)
In-group Inequality × Relation 0.114
(0.305)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Relation -0.414
(0.386)
In-group Inequality (Behind)× Relation 0.642*
(0.381)
Self-Interest × Spouse × Pressure 0.0401
(0.131)
Overall Efficiency × Spouse × Pressure 0.108 0.108
(0.154) (0.154)
In-group Efficiency × Spouse × Pressure 0.226 0.246
(0.165) (0.152)
In-group Inequality × Spouse × Pressure -0.0725
(0.0908)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Spouse × Pressure -0.0524
(0.111)
In-group Inequality (Behind)× Spouse × Pressure -0.0925
(0.113)
Self-Interest × Relation × Pressure 0.577
(0.483)
Overall Efficiency × Relation × Pressure 0.776 0.776
(0.550) (0.550)
In-group Efficiency × Relation × Pressure -0.679 -0.391
(0.562) (0.504)
In-group Inequality × Relation × Pressure -0.919***
(0.348)
In-group Inequality (Ahead) × Relation × Pressure -0.631
(0.417)
In-group Inequality (Behind)× Relation × Pressure -1.208***
(0.430)
Observations 1,512 1,512
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.5 Conclusion
Economists in the past two decades have come to realize that human choices are
not only driven by self-interest but also social preferences a persons concern over
resources allocated to other people. Moreover, such preferences may be affected
by the environment in which such choices are made, especially social networks and
social pressure. To overcome the difficulties of identifying causal effects in obser-
vational studies and the lack of interpersonal relationships in lab experiments, we
performed a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural China, where the lineage network
structure is salient and relevant, and invited villagers to bring in their real-world
social contacts to play an array of three-person allocation games. The variations
in payoffs and the randomization of social pressure treatment allows us to iden-
tify social preference patterns as well as network effects and pressure effects. Our
post-experiment survey collects information on demographics and the specifics of
the interpersonal relationship between each pair of participants, which allows us
to investigate (1) how participants perceive resources allocated to in-group and
out-group members; (2) if members of dominant social groups have different social
preference patterns; (3) if social preferences vary with personal characteristics such
as gender and age; (4) if variations in social preferences can be explained by social
proximity.
Consistent with evidence shown in prior literature, we find that (a) in addi-
tion to self-interest, participants consistently display preference for social efficiency
and distaste for inequality. Such social preferences are intrinsic and robust against
alternative specifications. Moreover, social network or social pressure alone can-
not alter behaviors. Social preference patterns, in particular inequality aversion,
change only when the two forces are combined; (b) In-group members tend to be
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fixated on in-group gains and disregard the welfare of out-group members, and
such fixation is often exacerbated by social pressure; (c) When playing with peo-
ple in their networks, members of larger lineage groups, especially those in the
position of pairs, tend to be less concerned with overall efficiency and inequality.
They also seem not to feel as bad when the inequality is to their advantage; (d)
Social preference patterns also vary with personal characteristics, such as gender,
age, and education; (e) Closer social relationship makes in-group members care
more about efficiency and inequality. Moreover, social pressure makes the more
intimate pairs more fixated on within-group gains even at the cost of the out-group
member.
This study is to our knowledge the first lab-in-the-field experiment that em-
beds both real-world social network and social pressure into allocation games. Our
results not only provide empirical evidence for the social preference theories but
also offer policy insights for the developing world. The democratization progress of
many developing countries in Asia and Africa has been complicated by social net-
work structures, especially when the in-group out-group division is salient. In this
case, recognizing the possibility that in-group preferences may outweigh out-group
preferences and yield economically inefficient outcomes is essential. Since social
pressure and social network tend to have a combined effect that reinforces each
other, policy makers must be careful in choosing an appropriate voting method.
Secret ballot instead of show of hands, for example, may help alleviate in-group
members’ fixation on in-group gains when they are under social pressure, and may
help improve the welfare of the out-group members. In addition, since members of
the dominant lineages consistently displayed less pro-social tendencies during the
experiment, constraining the power they can wield in the decision-making process
is important in enhancing the performance of rural democracy projects. Last but
165
not least, since better educated participants are more pro-social during our exper-
iment – they care more about overall efficiency and the welfare of the worst-off
member and are more averse to inequalities that are to their advantages – having
them more involved in village decision making could be beneficial.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The above three chapters investigate preferences with respect to different aspects
of human life and choices made at various levels of human society. The first chapter
examines preferences at the individual level and focuses on occupational choices of
migrant workers and workers in China. The second chapter looks at household-level
decisions and how that could affect human capital formation of school-age children
in Kyrgyz Republic. The third chapter goes beyond individuals and households to
examine how social preferences and social network can affect collective decisions
at the community level in this case where Chinese villagers vote for public goods
provision.
The key message I wish to convey through this collection of essays is that in all
areas of human life and at all levels of the human society, preferences and choices
are not only the causes but also the consequences of inequality.
First of all, preferences of and choices made by individuals, households, and
communities have profound implications for inequalities in multiple aspects of hu-
man society. In the first chapter of this dissertation, we used a labor search model
with market frictions to theoretically demonstrate that the heterogeneity in pref-
erences across two groups migrant workers and urban workers may negate com-
pensating differentials and lead to the counterintuitive phenomenon in the Chi-
nese labor market where migrant workers take blue-collar jobs with undesirable
working conditions and are nonetheless paid less. In the second chapter, we find
that households preferences over the allocation of financial and labor resources,
especially their emphasize on short-term consumptions and use of child labor to
compensate for adult labor insufficiency, may have led to the decrease in educa-
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tional expenditure and the deterioration of school attendance, placing school-age
children within migrant households in a disadvantaged position. In the final chap-
ter, we showcased that social preferences a persons concern over the welfare of
other people may be conditioned by membership within a social network and ex-
posure to social pressure. In particular, our finding that members of the dominant
lineages tend to behave less pro-socially in thee social context helps explain why
the welfare of underrepresented lineages in rural China is overlooked.
However, it is not our intention to blame individual or collective choices for
all the dire manifestations of inequalities in our society, since the preferences of
each person, each household, and each community are shaped by the evolution
of the human society itself and are therefore consequences of inequality as well.
For example, in the first chapter, we demonstrated through a choice experiment
that preferences of the migrant workers are more dispersedly distributed and vary
more with personal characteristics such as gender and age. These are evidence
that preferences of the individuals are not exogenously imposed but are informed
by the role that they play in the society. In the second chapter, although we
found that households in the Kyrgyz Republic would rather spend remittances on
durable goods than invest them in education, we reason that such preferences are
plausibly informed by the low expected return to schooling due to the low quality
of post-secondary education. Similarly, these households decisions to retain school-
age children at home for house work in order to compensate for the insufficiency of
adult labor force are likely to be a consequence of the underperformance of domestic
labor market, which caused large waves of labor out-migration in the first place.
Last but not least, in the final chapter, although villagers preferences for in-group
gains at the cost of out-group members welfare contribute to the inequality in
rural China as dominant lineages manipulate village elections and public goods
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voting, the formation of such preferences is an endogenous process and is affected
by inequality itself. For example, we find that social preference patterns vary
with personal characteristics, with more educated villagers caring more about the
overall efficiency of resource allocation. The underinvestment of schooling and low
level of education in rural China therefore at least partly contributes to the lack
of prosocial behaviors in our study.
Informed policy interventions that take the heterogeneity of preferences into
account are therefore necessary to rectify uninformed decisions and alleviate in-
equality in the developing world. In the first chapter, for example, we argue that
although the implementation of labor contract law and workplace safety regulations
is well intended, it may in fact backfire when the two groups on the labor market
the migrant workers and the urban workers have heterogeneous preferences as the
new policies may induce urban workers into the market and crowd out migrant
workers. In the second chapter, our finding that remittance-receiving households
prefer short-term expenditures (durable goods) over long-term investments (edu-
cation) and prefer to retain children in farm work calls for the need for monitoring
farm labor hours of school-age children as well as the provision of financial literacy
programs that help household heads balance short-term and long-term financial
goals. Moreover, targeted investment to improve the quality of education services
in the country may help increase perceived return to schooling a first step to alter
preference patterns at the household level. In the final chapter, our study not only
provides empirical evidence for the social preference theories but also urges policy
makers to be careful in choosing an appropriate voting method for example secret
ballot instead of show of hands. In addition, constraining the power of dominant
lineage and having better educated villagers more involved in village affairs could
be welfare improving and inequality alleviating.
175
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Experiment Materials
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Table B.1: Kyrgyz: Reliance on Remittances
Overall Receiving
2010 8.51% 84.3%
2011 10.12% 83.2%
2012 10.44% 79.8%
2013 8.97% 63.6%
2016 7.98 % 75.1%
Table B.2: Kyrgyz: Percentage Spent on Education and Other Items
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
Education 5.53% 6.17% 4.55% 4.57% 5.73%
Food 49.93% 55.82% 43.58% 43.61% 48.53%
Non-durable 13.79% 2.96% 18.73% 15.88% 17.64%
Durable 1.63% 1.82% 4.06% 5.41% 4.54%
Wedding 5.76% 4.95% 5.05% 6.79% 3.45%
Utilities 11.78% 14.97% 11.99% 11.32% 8.99%
Health 1.83% 2.45% 2.37% 2.14% 2.54%
Other 9.75% 10.86% 9.66% 10.88% 8.58%
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Table B.3: Kyrgyz: Remittance Trend (By Urban/Rural)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
Urban
Number of Migrants Per Household 0.134 0.143 0.154 0.155 0.0877
Received Remittances 7.28% 8.65% 8.83% 7.07% 5.95%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 6,826 13,917 16,489 12,695 7,288
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 37.6 107 73.43 71.72 26.1
Per Capita Annual Remittances 1,333 2,491 3,520 2,300 1,342
Rural
Number of Migrants Per Household 0.207 0.22 0.289 0.304 0.234
Received Remittances 11.90% 14.50% 15.70% 18.20% 13.20%
Total Annual Amount of Cash Remittances 8,130 31,283 26,504 18,997 25,034
Total Annual Amount of In-Kind Remittances 22.29 73.91 158.7 136 119.4
Per Capita Annual Remittances 1,482 5,436 5,054 3,077 3,689
Table B.4: Education Expenditure Comparison: Receiving and Non-Receiving
Families
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Total Houshold Education Expenditure 2602 2417 3043 2775 3371 3281 4281 3909 5118 4487
Tuition 587.1 487.6 580.1 310.0 582.9 405.7 652.2 337.6 716.0 335.2
School Supplies 1825 1746 2238 2195 2536 2506 3310 3367 3791 3237
Other Education Expenses 190.5 183.3 224.4 270.3 252.7 369.1 238.0 173.4 327.9 264.0
Tutoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 80.61 30.48 166.9 138.9
Table B.5: Reasons Not To Enroll (Primary)
Reasons Percent
Costs too much 1.44
School is too far 0.66
Illness 0.66
Does not like study 0.26
Conflict with Pupils or Teacher 0.13
Will start next year 93.05
Finished 0.26
Other 3.54
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Table B.6: Reasons Not To Enroll (Secondary)
Reasons Percent
Costs too much 4.75
School is too far 3.06
Illness 3.74
Does not like study 15.11
Works to support family 9.17
Will start next year 1.02
Finished 53.31
Political unrest 0.51
Other 9.34
Observatrions 589
Table B.7: Use of Remittances (Ranked High to Low)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2016 Overall
Non-durable Goods 71.7% 72.0% 70.0% 66.6% 76.1% 71.0%
Saving 23.0% 41.5% 44.6% 32.3% 42.4% 36.9%
Wedding 26.7% 30.8% 26.7% 26.7% 13.3% 25.4%
Education 20.7% 22.5% 28.7% 23.3% 30.3% 25.0%
Durable Goods 18.3% 26.2% 29.8% 17.7% 24.6% 23.4%
Health and Medication 19.7% 17.0% 25.1% 22.8% 29.5% 22.6%
Other 17.0% 11.5% 7.7% 7.9% 12.9% 11.1%
Funeral 6.7% 9.8% 12.7% 6.2% 11.4% 9.3%
Gifts 4.0% 6.1% 3.9% 3.4% 13.6% 5.8%
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Table B.8: Summary Statistics for Regression Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables
Household Education Expenditure 9,112 12,558 0 278,900
Non-Durable Goods Expenditure 23,066 25,949 0 544,000
Wedding Expenditure 9,528 23,743 0 500,000
Utilities Expenditure 21,000 52,985 0 4,812,000
Other Expenditure 18,346 21,688 0 345,000
Food Expenditure 76,154 44,406 0 893,365
Durable Goods Expenditure 7,296 24,984 0 1,275,000
Healthcare Expenditure 4,701 9,869 0 342,000
School Attendance Rate 0.564 0.496 0 1
Independent Variables
Total Household Remittances 17,789 145,774 0 9,876,000
Per Capita Remittances 3,124 27,748 0 1,411,000
Age of Household Head 52 14 16 105
Percentage of Male Household Heads 78.8%
Household Size 4.9 2.4 1.0 17.0
Household Head Education Level 4.7 1.5 1.0 8.0
Percentage of Household Heads Married 71.0%
House Value 1,185,000 1,488,000 6,000 14,000,000
Age of School-age Children 15.45 5.544 6 24
Percentage of Female School-age Children 50.7%
Hours per Day Homework 1.759 1 0 20
Hours per Day House/Farm Work 1.37 1.392 0 20
Hours per Day Outside Work 0.0572 0.481 0 10
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Table B.9: First Stage Results
Educ Expense 1 Educ Expense 2 Other Expenses Attendance
Total Remittances PC Remittances PC Remittances PC Remittances
Instrument
Drought * Land Area 0.00246** 0.00204**
-0.0009 -0.0008
Distance to Road 0.0000962***
0
Average Distance 0.0000614***
0
Covariates
Age of Household Leader 0.00532 0.00134 0.0053** 0.0171**
-0.0192 -0.016 -0.0074 -0.0131
Gender of Household Leader -2.328** -1.940** -0.434*** -0.552***
-0.757 -0.6282 -0.2428 -0.2596
Household Size 0.0409 0.0195 0.1301* 0.0621*
-0.0951 -0.0789 -0.0321 -0.027
Education Level of Household Leader -0.119 -0.0874 -0.0008 -0.00574
-0.1444 -0.1198 -0.0668 -0.0486
Marital Status of Household Leader 0.672 0.563 0.183 0.159
-0.5714 -0.4741 -0.1951 -0.1696
House Value 0.000000241** 0.000000206** 0 0
0 0 0 0
Age of Child 0.0651***
-0.0132
Gender of Child -0.326
-0.2597
Ethnicity Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald F-Statistics 6.96 6.96 13.83 14.53
P-Value 0.0083 0.0084 0.0002 0
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Table B.10: Itemized Household Expenditure
Category Items included
Food Food
Non-durable Goods Clothing; Shoes; Soap, detergents; Personal care items and cosmetics
Durable Goods
Cell and stationary phone; Furniture and other interior equipments; Electronics and spare parts;
Electric and household appliances; Other durable goods
Wedding Celebrations, funerals, rituals
Utilities
Electricity; Cold water and sewage; Hot water; Central heating; Gas (natural and liquified);
Coal and other fuel for heating; Construction and maintenance/repair of housing;
Maintenance and repair of household vehicles and appliances
Health Medicines; Medical care, including dental care
Other
Transportation services; All types of taxes (income, land, etc) and social benefit plan contributions;
Entertainment, recreation, eating out; Internet
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Part A: Experiment Materials
A1. Recruitment Material
192
A2. Experiment Instruction
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A3. Summary Statistics By Village
Table C.1: Summary Statistics by Village
Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4
Gender 0.70 0.83 0.56 0.59
Age 39.11 42.67 47.44 41.41
Education 8.08 7.72 7.56 8.00
Income 1939.33 816.67 1431.48 3055.56
Name Percentage 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.25
N 90 18 27 27
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Part B: Supplementary Analysis
B1. Balance Check
Table C.2: Covariate Balance (Control vs Treatment)
(1) (2) (3)
Control Treatment Difference
Mean SD Mean SD Difference t-Statistics
Gender 0.64 0.48 0.71 0.46 -0.06 (-0.86)
Age 42.92 10.46 39.22 9.75 3.70∗ (2.31)
Education 7.84 2.43 8.06 2.72 -0.22 (-0.53)
Income 1929.78 1924.64 1898.61 3728.06 31.16 (0.07)
Name Percentage 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.29 -0.03 (-0.64)
N 90 72 162
B2. Game-by-Game Comparison
Figure C.1: Game 1 Variant 1
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Figure C.2: Game 1 Variant 2
Figure C.3: Game 1 Variant 3
Figure C.4: Game 2 Variant 1
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Figure C.5: Game 2 Variant 2
Figure C.6: Game 2 Variant 3
Figure C.7: Game 2 Variant 4
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B3. Coefficient of Human Relationship
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